

Supplemental Information: Western Political Rhetoric and Radicalization

This Supplemental Information (SI) file includes further details on the theoretical motivation (SI.1), the study design (i.e., survey methodology, question wording, and justification for the design of experimental treatments) (SI.2), randomization and balance tests (SI.3), regression output for the main analysis (SI.4), robustness tests of the main analysis (SI.5), and subgroup analysis (SI.6).

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SI.1: Further Details on the Theory

In the main text, we presented a brief summary of our expectations about how hostile political rhetoric leads to radicalization: anti-Muslim rhetoric is likely to cause identity threat, which leads to defensive reactions to restore one’s identity’s worth. These reactions include (a) heightened salience of in-group identity (and associated feelings of superiority), (b) animosity toward the out-group (i.e., toward the group that is the source of the threat), and (c) approval of the use of violence to defend the in-group. Here, we elaborate on each part of this argument in turn.

Consequences of Identity Threat

Prior work has shown that group threat plays an important role in producing radical sympathies (e.g. Doosje et al., 2016; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Mitts, 2019; Victoroff, Adelman and Matthews, 2012).¹ Why does identity threat have such an effect? Scholars draw on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) to provide an explanation. Specifically, SIT suggests that individuals are motivated to uphold a positive self-image. A positive image of the group to which they belong helps achieve that goal, while threats against the group are attacks against positive self-image, breeding resentment, anger, and frustration (Feddes, Mann and Doosje, 2015). The literature highlights three different but related reactions as coping mechanisms that individuals use to deal with these negative emotions and to restore their self-worth.

As the first step, individuals engage in efforts to reinforce their in-group favoritism and to intensify their in-group pride by starting to identify more strongly with their group (Perez, 2015).² Stronger identity implies more intense beliefs about the positive distinctiveness of one’s in-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). These beliefs help individuals affirm the value and quality of their group and thereby restore positive self-image. In line with this argument, prior work has shown that threat to Muslim identity motivates individuals to strengthen their feelings of Muslim superiority (see van Bergen et al., 2015).

Second, the flip-side of this process and another way to preserve the positive distinctiveness of one’s group is to *negatively* distinguish the out-group (Brewer, 1999; see also O’Duffy, 2008). This reaction is particularly likely if the out-group is perceived as the source of the threat. By devaluing and vilifying the out-group, representing its members as inferior, and expressing resentment toward them, the threatened individuals’ own group appears superior, helping these individuals restore a positive self-image (van Bergen et al., 2015).

Third, such negative reactions toward the out-group and the need to restore the positive value of one’s own group may also be accompanied by a desire for and approval of violent action in support of the group (Silke, 2008; Twenge et al., 2001). This would serve the dual purposes of (a) retribution and (b) vigorous in-group defense (Doosje et al., 2016; van Bergen et al., 2015), i.e., it would simultaneously negatively distinguish the out-group and positively defend the in-group, again helping an individual cope with the identity threat and

¹These findings are in line with the more general argument that people are inclined to support extreme ideologies and use violence when their ego is threatened (Baumeister, Smart and Boden, 1996; Hoffer, 1951).

²Related research on immigrants, for example, shows that identity threat due to anti-immigrant hostility increases the salience of immigrants’ ethnic identity (e.g., Jimenez, 2010; White, 2016).

restore self-worth. Prior work has indeed shown that threatened individuals are more likely to support violent in-group defense (see van Bergen et al., 2015). They are also more easily attracted to radical messages by foreign rebels (Mitts, 2019). Accepting and approving of radical messages is one of the initial steps toward joining a violent extremist movement. Indeed, threatened individuals are relatively more likely to fully radicalize and to become members of such movements (e.g., Doosje et al., 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2009; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). We therefore expect identity threat to provoke approval of violence in a wide range of individuals, not just those already sympathetic to radical points of view.

In sum, these arguments suggest that, when their Muslim identity is threatened, individuals respond with efforts to defend their identity's worth by reinforcing feelings of in-group superiority, intensifying negative attitudes toward the out-group, and endorsing violence.

Political Rhetoric as Identity Threat

Identity threat results from (perceived) discrimination and hostile sentiment against one's group, such as name-calling, racial profiling, negative representation of Islam in the media, and anti-Muslim public attitudes (Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2016; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Mitts, 2019). That is, hostile sentiment includes actions and rhetoric that is targeted toward Muslims as a group and that can be interpreted as portraying the group in a negative, inferior light. It is easy to see how hostile political rhetoric by Western leaders can function in this capacity. Hostile political rhetoric matters because such rhetoric raises the salience of Muslim identity together with devaluing its worth (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002; Perez, 2015). It feeds the perceptions that the West is waging a war against Muslims — a sentiment that is already commonplace among Muslims worldwide — together with feeling personally under attack and indignant as a result (van San, Sieckelinck and de Winter, 2013; see also Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Taken together, then, insofar as anti-Muslim rhetoric by Western politicians has any role in producing identity threat, we expect it to (a) strengthen individuals' Muslim identity, (b) intensify negative attitudes toward the out-group, and (c) increase favorable attitudes toward violent in-group defense.

Consequences of Pro-Islam Rhetoric

Prior work has focused only on the effect of identity *threat* on radicalization. However, rhetoric in particular can also be positive and provide a boost to Muslim identity. This flip-side of identity threat is not well understood or theorized, and it is therefore not clear whether the effects related to identity are symmetric. We are thus largely taking a leap in the dark by extending our analysis beyond anti-Islam rhetoric and also exploring the effects of pro-Islam rhetoric by Western politicians. More specifically, we seek to understand whether reinforcing positive distinctiveness of one's Muslim in-group reduces the strength of Muslim identity, out-group animosity, and radical sympathies. Uncovering whether Western politicians' portrayal of Islam in a positive light has these desired effects is of significant theoretical and practical relevance.

As stated, existing research provides relatively little guidance on this question. The theoretical perspective that perhaps comes closest in helping us understand the effects of pro-Islam political rhetoric is the mutual intergroup differentiation model (Hewstone and Brown,

1986). Mutual intergroup differentiation is one of the processes that has been argued to help reduce intergroup conflict. According to this model, hostility between groups can be reduced by (a) encouraging groups to emphasize their mutual distinctiveness in a respectful way, and (b) introducing cooperative interdependence (Gaertner et al., 2000). Pro-Islam political rhetoric is able to provide the former, while not necessarily the latter. Still, such rhetoric emphasizes the equal status of the groups and acknowledges their different perspectives in an appreciative manner (Gaertner et al., 2000; Hewstone and Brown, 1986), and thereby removes (or at least lowers) any threat to the positive identities of Muslims. This, in turn, is likely to reduce the need for additional positive in-group differentiation and out-group derogation, suggesting that pro-Islam rhetoric may indeed help suppress individuals' strength of Muslim identity, out-group animosity, and radical sympathies.

SI.2: Additional Information on the Study Design

Survey Methodology

We conducted five separate studies that were implemented by the survey firm IPSOS as part of their monthly omnibus surveys. These were nationally representative surveys according to gender, age, ethnicity, region, and type of settlement.³ Our experiment was fielded across five waves of the omnibus survey, monthly from March through July 2017. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in the local language, and our experiment was included only in interviews with Muslim respondents. Each wave included an average of 522 Muslim respondents out of 1,200 total interviews (about 43%). Different geographic locations were targeted in different waves. For the main analyses, we combine the five waves into a single sample ($N =$ of 2,608), which is representative of Bosnia’s Muslim population. In SI.5, we conduct analyses with each wave separately. Results are consistent with the full model, indicating that neither geographic variation, nor current events influenced our conclusions.

Because interviews were conducted in the local language, respondents are less likely to exhibit social desirability bias when answering questions about radicalization. If social desirability bias is present, it will be consistent across respondents since all were interviewed by a co-ethnic.

IPSOS gathered demographic information about each respondent in a separate recruitment survey that occurred days prior to fielding interview questions, including our experiment. These demographic questions are listed below.

Pre-Treatment Questions

- *Gender*: male is coded as 0, female as 1. Male is the control condition.
- *Age*: respondent’s age in years.
- *Education*: below university = 0, university = 1.
- *Unemployment*: the survey asks about a respondent’s type of employment. Options include “working for somebody,” “freelancer,” “farm owner,” “business owner,” “unemployed,” “housewife,” “student,” “retired,” “military,” and “maternity leave.” We categorize unemployed as those identifying as unemployed. Results are robust to including those identified as students with the unemployed group.
- *Marital status*: the original response options included “married,” “single,” “divorced,” “widow,” and “living with a partner.” We dichotomized this question where married = 1 and other responses = 0.

Treatment Wording

- *Control*: “How important is immigration as an issue for Bosnia?”

³The survey protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Washington University in St. Louis, IRB ID 201607026.

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not important at all

- *Positive Treatment*: “The following comment was recently made by a prominent politician in America about US immigration policy: ‘Let’s be clear: Islam is not our adversary. Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people and have nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism. . . they need to feel not just invited, but welcomed within the American society.’

How important is immigration as an issue for Bosnia?”

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not important at all

- *Negative Treatment*: “The following comment was recently made by a prominent politician in America about US immigration policy: ‘I think Islam hates us. There is something there, a tremendous hatred. . . And we can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the United States.’

How important is immigration as an issue for Bosnia?”

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not important at all

Justification for Using Rhetoric by U.S. Politicians

As we state in the main text, we believe that statements by U.S. politicians are a particularly appropriate source for inducing identity threat in Bosnia for the following reasons. First, these statements represent the kind of anti-Muslim rhetoric employed in the West and often blamed for producing radical responses among Muslims. Second, Bosnian citizens have developed a special relationship with and interest in the politics of the United States — one that no other Western country, including no country in Europe can rival. This is largely because of two factors: (1) the role of the U.S. in ending the Bosnian War and (2) the large Bosnian diaspora (largest among Western nations) that resides in the U.S.

More specifically, the United States’ decision to intervene in the Bosnian War, ultimately leading to the Dayton Agreement, remains extremely salient. Indeed, almost all discussions of governance in Bosnia begin with the Dayton Agreement because it completely reorganized the Bosnian political structure. Individuals who were even tangentially involved in that agreement have become minor Bosnian celebrities.⁴ In addition, the U.S. has the largest

⁴Sarajevo Times, 2016. “Emina Bicakcic welcomed Hillary in Tuzla in 1996, now she supports her in the presidential Race.” November 6. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/emina-bicakcic-welcomed-hillary-tuzla-1996-now-supports-presidential-race/>.

Bosnian Muslim population of any Western country (about 300,000 according to the U.S. Census Bureau). The largest Bosnian diaspora in the U.S. is located in St. Louis, Missouri. Residents moved there after being displaced from the Bosnian War. Not only do Bosnians know about this diaspora, they follow its opinions and actions closely. St. Louis is proudly referred to as “Little Bosnia,” and Bosnians claim significant credit for rebuilding the city.⁵

The unique interests of Bosnians in the U.S. politics were significantly heightened during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, partly due to the candidates involved in that race. Hillary Clinton famously visited Sarajevo in 1996, and her response and that of the then President Bill Clinton continues to resonate with Bosnians.⁶

Bosnians paid even more attention to Donald Trump both before the election and after. Because of his relative fame, Bosnian media ran successive stories about the opinions of individuals who had worked with him.⁷ Additionally, Trump was the most Googled person in Bosnia in 2016.⁸ During the campaign, Trump was compared to Slobodan Milosevic on several occasions, creating the idea that Bosnian Muslims would be personally under attack with Trump as president.⁹ Furthermore, during the campaign, Bosnians recognized the importance of this particular election and produced a myriad of stories about the impact of the Bosnian vote in St. Louis, thus linking Donald Trump and Bosnian citizens.¹⁰ St. Louis Bosnian residents expressed fear in a Donald Trump presidency and stated that Trump’s hate speech reminded them of the Bosnian War.

These fears among the U.S. Bosnians that the Bosnian media covered translated into rallies and protests for and against Trump in Sarajevo.¹¹ This shows that not only are Bosnians concerned with the U.S. policy, but they are willing to demonstrate opposition to Donald Trump’s rhetoric. Since the election, Bosnians have continued to react to Trump’s

⁵Sarajevo Times, 2016. “U.S. Media: This was a Ghost City and then the Bosnians came.” December 2. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/u-s-media-ghost-city-bosnians-came/>.

⁶Sarajevo Times, 2015. “Mothers of Srebrenica spoke to Clinton: If you could not help us in 1995, help us now.” July 11. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/mothers-of-srebrenica-spoke-to-clinton-if-you-could-not-help-us-in-1995-help-us-now/>; Sarajevo Times, 2016. “What does the former Ambassador of BiH to the USA say about America under Trump?” November 8. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/former-ambassador-bih-usa-say-america-trump/>.

⁷For example: Sarajevo Times, 2016. “Bosnian who worked for Trump: He is strict, but fair!” May 19. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/bosnian-who-worked-for-trump-he-is-strict-but-fair/>; Sarajevo Times, 2016. “Man from Mostar reveals how it is to work for the new U.S. President” November 22. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/man-mostar-reveals-work-new-u-s-president/>.

⁸Sarajevo Times, 2016. “‘The most Googled’ Person in the World in 2016: Who was searched in BiH?” December 24. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/googled-person-world-2016-searched-bih/>.

⁹Sarajevo Times, 2017. “What Slobodan Milosevic taught me about Donald Trump?” February 15. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/slobodan-milosevic-taught-donald-trump/>; Sarajevo Times, 2017. “Clinton compared Trump with Milosevic.” June 4. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/clinton-compared-trump-milosevic/>.

¹⁰For example: Sarajevo Times, 2016. “Which US Presidential Candidate has the support of the BH Community in St. Louis?” September 7. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/bh-community-st-louis-supports-hillary-clinton/>; Sarajevo Times, 2016. “St. Louis: ‘Bosnian Vote’ will decide between Clinton and Trump?” September 5. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/st-louis-bosnian-vote-will-decide-clinton-trump/>; Sarajevo Times, 2016. “Why Bosnians are concerned about Trump?” September 24. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/bosnians-concerned-trump/>.

¹¹Sarajevo Times, 2016. “How many people came to the rally in support of Trump in East Sarajevo?” October 24. <http://www.sarajevotimes.com/many-people-came-rally-support-trump-east-sarajevo/>.

statements and policies against Muslims and expressed fear about Trump’s attitude about Muslim immigrants.¹²

In sum, there are good reasons to believe that Bosnians pay attention to rhetoric from prominent U.S. politicians. Donald Trump’s anti-Muslim and anti-immigration stances generate anxiety among Bosnians. Some believe that these policies could lead to further ethnic conflict in Bosnia itself. Others are concerned for Bosnians living in the U.S. and fear that Islam is under attack in ways that will have repercussions for Bosnian citizens. This underscores the relevance and appropriateness of using Trump’s rhetoric to induce identity threat among Bosnian Muslims. Given the strong and unique ties between the two countries, statements by U.S. politicians are not likely to be dismissed and are likely to provoke strong reactions among Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, thinking more globally, beyond the Bosnian case, U.S. leaders and U.S. foreign policy have been at the forefront of the fight against Islamist militant groups and influential in shaping global public opinion on Islam, particularly after 9/11. This further justifies using quotes from U.S. politicians rather than elsewhere to understand the effects of Western political rhetoric about Islam.

One potential concern is that while psychologically close, the U.S. is geographically distant from Bosnia. Because of this, we originally also considered using quotes from prominent European politicians. We ran into two types of difficulties. First, as stated above, no country in Europe can claim an equally special and unique relationship with Bosnia as does the U.S. Germany perhaps comes closest given the significant role it played in accepting Bosnian refugees during the war. Today, however, the Bosnian Muslim population in Germany is only about a half of that in the U.S. Second, and perhaps more importantly, unlike in the U.S., anti-Muslim rhetoric in Germany occurs in the political fringes and not in the mainstream. Even the far-right politicians who engage in this type of rhetoric focus more on how, in their opinion, Islam does not belong in Germany due to its cultural difference.¹³ This is a different and a milder form of anti-Islam rhetoric than the reference to hatred in the quote from the U.S., which amounts to a more blatant portrayal of Islam as a direct physical threat. All of this suggests that a quote from a German politician would constitute a milder treatment than the one that we are currently using.

Treatment Construction

We chose to construct our treatments based on actual statements by U.S. politicians and to use previous work to guide our survey question wording. Because the two treatments are actual quotations, they are not completely symmetrical. This may generate the concern that one treatment is stronger than the other. We do not believe this to be the case because both treatments include the same three essential components: they reference (a) social standing of the group (Islam is an ally vs. adversary), (b) societal judgment of the group (Muslims are hateful vs. peaceful) and (c) immigration from Islamic countries. That is, the anti-Islam

¹²Eleanor Rose, 2016. “Trump’s Anti-Migrant Rants Worry US Bosnians.” *Balkan Insight*, November 11. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/trump-victory-stirs-fears-for-us-based-bosnians-11-10-2016>.

¹³For example, consider the statement in the manifesto of the far right Alternative for Germany: “Islam does not belong in Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are a danger to our state, our society, and our values.”

treatment couples Islam’s “hatred” toward the U.S. with a degradation in group status while the pro-Islam treatment emphasizes that Muslims are peaceful and they are equals. Both treatments, therefore, target two components of identity threat or boost: a societal judgment about a group and the social standing of the group, which suggests that they are likely to be of comparable strength.¹⁴

A consequence of constructing our treatments based on actual politician statements is that some respondents may know who said the statements and react based on their impression of the presumed speaker. Because the statements are consistent with the images of these two politicians, recognizing the authors of the statements should only reinforce the treatment effects, not undermine them. One might also be concerned that the treatments confirm pre-conceived notions about the U.S., rendering the treatments comparable to the control condition. Since only one outcome question prompts the control group to think about the U.S., this is unlikely to undermine the strength of the treatment effect.¹⁵

Post-treatment Questions

- *U.S. Favorable*: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the U.S.?”
 0. Unfavorable
 1. Favorable

- “Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
 - (a) *Muslim Identity*: Being Muslim is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.”
 1. Strongly agree
 2. Somewhat agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Somewhat disagree
 5. Strongly disagree

 - (b) *Approve Violence*: “I can understand others who use violence to defend their ethnic or religious group.”
 1. Strongly disagree
 2. Somewhat disagree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Somewhat agree
 5. Strongly agree

¹⁴Our results bear out this expectation: except for a single outcome, the treatment effects are not systematically different across the two treatment groups.

¹⁵Our results confirm this: the only outcome on which we observe treatment effects is the one that asks about favorability toward the U.S.

Outcome Variable Construction

The three outcome measures listed above follow directly from the theoretical concepts of interest: (1) strength of in-group identity, (2) attitudes toward the out-group, (3) endorsement of violence. Recall that our study includes five surveys with Bosnian Muslim respondents drawn from the general population, with an N of about 520 in each survey. Given the constraints and costliness of such large-scale mass surveys, we were limited to using a single item for each concept.

Muslim Identity measures how strongly the respondent identifies with the in-group. We follow Perez (2015), who used it as a more appropriate item for a mass survey than multi-item social identity scales. The item is also used in studies of radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe (Doosje, Loseman and Bos, 2013; Feddes, Mann and Doosje, 2015; van Bergen et al., 2015, 2016). Such validation of the measure for Muslim respondents in particular further underlines its appropriateness for our purposes.

U.S. Favorable measures attitudes toward the out-group and is borrowed from the Pew Research Center’s Global Indicators Database. This measure, too has been previously used to capture anti-Americanism among Muslim populations in particular (Blaydes and Linzer, 2012).

Approve Violence is a direct indicator of the third concept — endorsing violent (i.e., radical) tactics. This item has been previously used in studies of radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe (see Doosje, Loseman and Bos, 2013; Feddes, Mann and Doosje, 2015; van Bergen et al., 2015, 2016). In those studies, it has been part of a two-item battery of violent tendencies (or violent radicalization) among this population, with the other item tapping into willingness to commit violence. We only ask about approval of violence because it more directly captures our concept of interest. Note also that the question mentions both ethnic and religious groups, which fully captures the way in which Bosnian Muslims identify. As above, the fact that this question has previously been used with Muslim respondents in particular increases our confidence that it is an appropriate measure given our respondent pool.

To be sure, literature on radicalization more generally, beyond the Muslim population, offers a number of measures of “militant extremism mindset” (Stankov et al., 2010), radicalization (Hogg, Meehan and Farquharson, 2010), or “radical intentions” (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009). We preferred the above measures to the alternatives for the following reasons:

1. All three measures have been used to study Muslim populations, and some have been developed for the context of Muslim radicalization in Europe in particular. In contrast, Stankov et al. (2010) study high-schoolers in Serbia ($N = 297$), entry-level job applicants in Australia ($N = 52$), and college students in the U.S. ($N = 103$); Hogg, Meehan and Farquharson (2010) conduct lab experiments with college students in Australia ($N = 82$); and Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) study college students in the U.S. ($N = 140$) and the Ukraine ($N = 146$), and online survey respondents from the U.S. ($N = 429$).
2. As we explain above, instead of multi-item scales, we were looking for a single item validated by prior work for each of our concept of interest. While offering very innova-

tive measures, Stankov et al. (2010) unfortunately use a 24-item scale and Moskaleiko and McCauley (2009) use a 10-item one. These are hard and costly to adopt for a mass survey.

3. Our items match the concepts of interest precisely. At the same time, they remain conceptually similar to the measures and latent concepts used in these other studies. For example, Stankov et al. (2010) extract three factors from their 24-item scale, one of which (“justification of violence”) is conceptually similar to our *Approve Violence* measure. Similarly, Hogg, Meehan and Farquharson (2010) use two outcome measures, one of which (“group identification”) is close to our measure of identity strength and the other (intention “to engage in behaviors on behalf of the group”) is close to our measure of approval of violence on behalf of one’s group. Moskaleiko and McCauley (2009)’s “Radicalism Intentions Scale” is also conceptually similar to our measure of endorsing violence to defend one’s group.

All in all, we believe that our items precisely measure the theoretical concepts of interest, are appropriate for Muslim respondents, and fit the constraints of mass surveys while also not venturing conceptually far from measures used in the literature on radicalization beyond the Muslim population.

Immigration Prime

In addition to positive or negative references to Islam, our treatment conditions refer to the issue of immigration. We were therefore concerned about a potential compound treatment. In order to alleviate that concern, we included a question, presented immediately after the treatment to all respondents (including the control group) about the importance of the immigration issue in Bosnia. This question was intended to prime all respondents equally on the issue of immigration. The results in Table SI.2.1 confirm that the importance of immigration does not differ among those assigned to the treatment or control groups.

Table SI.2.1: Immigration Prime

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Immigration Unimportant
Tr 1: Islam Positive	−0.026 (0.053)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	−0.007 (0.054)
Female	−0.056 (0.045)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)
Education	−0.159*** (0.038)
Unemployment	0.026 (0.052)
Married	−0.011 (0.046)
April	0.031 (0.070)
May	−0.041 (0.070)
June	−0.165* (0.068)
July	−0.091 (0.070)
Observations	2,608

Note: Ordered Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SI.3: Randomization and Balance Checks

Table SI.3.1 displays multinomial logistic regression results to test whether the randomization procedure was successful. The reference category consists of respondents assigned to the control condition. None of the observable covariates are statistically significant in either treatment condition. Further, a Wald Test shows that we cannot reject a null hypothesis that the covariates are simultaneously equal. Table SI.3.2 displays balance checks of individual covariates on treatment assignment. Again, none of the individual covariates are statistically significant. These two results indicate that randomization was successful and that the treatment and control groups are balanced on observable characteristics.

Table SI.3.1: Randomization Check

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Tr 1: Islam Positive	Tr 2: Islam Negative
	(1)	(2)
Female	-0.165 (0.097)	-0.090 (0.099)
Age	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Education	-0.053 (0.083)	-0.029 (0.084)
Unemployed	-0.020 (0.112)	-0.0001 (0.113)
Married	-0.144 (0.099)	-0.117 (0.100)
Constant	0.524 (0.302)	0.090 (0.308)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,743.897	5,743.897
Wald Test χ^2 (5 df)	4.131 ($p = 0.531$)	

Note: Multinomial logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. Reference category is the control condition.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table SI.3.2: Individual Covariate Balance

	Mean 1	Mean 0	Estimate	Std. Error	<i>p</i> -value
Tr 1: Islam Positive					
Female	1.528	1.556	-0.025	0.019	0.185
Age	45.413	46.548	-0.001	0.001	0.136
Education	1.871	1.869	0.002	0.015	0.916
Unemployed	0.264	0.262	0.002	0.021	0.908
Married	0.577	0.603	-0.0239	0.019	0.205
Tr 2: Islam Negative					
Female	1.545	1.547	-0.001	0.018	0.941
Age	46.907	45.820	0.001	0.000	0.157
Education	1.862	1.873	-0.007	0.15	0.644
Unemployed	0.259	0.264	-0.006	0.021	0.768
Marriage	0.591	0.597	-0.005	0.0186	0.774
Control					
Female	1.565	1.537	0.026	0.019	0.165
Age	46.214	46.146	0.000	0.001	0.928
Education	1.875	1.867	0.005	0.015	0.726
Unemployed	0.265	0.262	0.004	0.021	0.861
Marriage	0.615	0.584	0.029	0.019	0.124

OLS regressions of each covariate on the specified treatment with standard errors and *p*-values. Mean 1 refers to when the specified treatment was 1, Mean 0 refers to when the specified treatment was 0. OLS *p*-values are equivalent to Welch Two Sample *t*-tests.

SI.4: Regression Output

Table SI.4.1 displays the main results without additional covariates, but including month fixed effects. Model 1 shows no significant effect of the pro- or anti-Islam treatments on changes in Muslim identity. Model 3 shows the positive relationship between the pro-Islam treatment and favorability of the U.S. Model 5 shows null results for the relationship between the treatment and approval of violence. Figure 1 in the main text shows the OLS results from Models 2, 4, and 6 for ease of interpretation. There are no substantive differences between the probit and logit models and the OLS models.

Table SI.4.1: Full Sample With Month Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Muslim Identity		U.S. Favorable		Approve Violence	
	Probit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Probit	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	0.055 (0.052)	0.062 (0.061)	0.155** (0.060)	0.061** (0.024)	0.081 (0.055)	0.098 (0.062)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	-0.038 (0.052)	-0.049 (0.061)	0.016 (0.060)	0.006 (0.024)	0.072 (0.055)	0.074 (0.062)
April	-0.045 (0.069)	-0.067 (0.080)	0.060 (0.079)	0.024 (0.031)	-0.032 (0.072)	-0.038 (0.081)
May	-0.116 (0.068)	-0.122 (0.079)	0.272*** (0.079)	0.108*** (0.031)	0.035 (0.072)	0.024 (0.081)
June	-0.040 (0.067)	-0.045 (0.078)	0.286*** (0.077)	0.114*** (0.030)	-0.032 (0.070)	-0.065 (0.079)
July	-0.024 (0.069)	-0.019 (0.080)	0.120 (0.079)	0.048 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.072)	-0.056 (0.081)
Constant		3.891*** (0.066)	-0.236*** (0.066)	0.407*** (0.026)		1.936*** (0.068)
Observations	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608

Note: Regression coefficients are displayed with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month is March.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SI.5: Robustness Checks

We were concerned that the dependent variables may suffer from either floor or ceiling effects, i.e., that opinions on the outcome variables had uniformly low or high values, leaving little room for treatments to have an effect. To check for these issues, we computed the mean values for the dependent variables among respondents in the pro- and anti-Islam treatment group as well as the control group.

The mean value of *Muslim Identity* for respondents receiving the pro-Islam treatment is 3.91 on a 5-point scale. It is 3.84 for the control group and 3.79 for the anti-Islam treatment group. The mean scores for all groups are relatively high, with most respondents ‘somewhat agreeing’ that being a Muslim is important to their sense of self. However, these scores are not so high such that we need to be concerned with ceiling effects.

The average values of *U.S. Favorable* are 47.3% for the negative treatment, 52.6% for the positive treatment and 46.8% for the control group, strongly suggesting that floor or ceiling effects are unlikely. We reach a similar conclusion with regard to *Approve Violence*. On this variable, the average score for the negative treatment is 1.98 on a 5-point scale, indicating that respondents in the anti-Islam treatment group ‘somewhat disagree’ that the use of violence to defend an ethnic or religious group is understandable. The average scores for those receiving the pro-Islam treatment and the control group are 2.01 and 1.91, respectively. These averages indicate that opinions are not uniformly high or low and, therefore, ceiling/floor effects are not a serious concern.

Table SI.5.1 provides robustness checks for the dependent variable measuring Muslim identity. Model 1 is a full model including all months and observable covariates. None are significant. Models 2 through 6 split the sample by month. Neither the treatments nor covariates are consistently significant.

Table SI.5.2 shows the effect of the treatments on U.S. favorability. The pro-Islam treatment is positively correlated with U.S. favorability in all but one specification, though the strength of this relationship varies by month.

Table SI.5.3 provides a similar set-up for the approval of violence. Again, the treatment conditions are not consistently significant.

Table SI.5.1: Muslim Identity Full Sample By Month

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Muslim Identity					
	Full	March	April	May	June	July
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	0.051 (0.052)	0.010 (0.119)	0.267* (0.122)	-0.176 (0.118)	-0.028 (0.112)	0.192 (0.117)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	-0.037 (0.052)	-0.088 (0.120)	-0.039 (0.118)	-0.106 (0.116)	-0.036 (0.112)	0.104 (0.123)
Female	-0.075 (0.044)	-0.090 (0.101)	-0.021 (0.101)	-0.110 (0.098)	-0.071 (0.094)	-0.044 (0.101)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Education	0.021 (0.037)	0.043 (0.080)	0.174* (0.087)	-0.163* (0.080)	0.033 (0.084)	0.052 (0.092)
Unemployed	0.005 (0.051)	-0.045 (0.116)	-0.064 (0.118)	0.148 (0.107)	0.066 (0.109)	-0.115 (0.123)
Married	0.010 (0.045)	-0.045 (0.103)	0.065 (0.105)	0.089 (0.099)	-0.044 (0.095)	0.026 (0.100)
April	-0.055 (0.069)					
May	-0.126 (0.068)					
June	-0.045 (0.067)					
July	-0.027 (0.069)					
Observations	2,608	518	508	512	566	504

Note: Ordered Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month in Model 1 is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SI.5.2: U.S. Favorable Full Sample By Month

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	U.S. Favorable					
	Full	March	April	May	June	July
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	0.156** (0.060)	0.157 (0.137)	0.457*** (0.139)	-0.177 (0.138)	0.050 (0.129)	0.271* (0.135)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	0.018 (0.061)	0.101 (0.140)	0.206 (0.138)	-0.257 (0.134)	0.078 (0.130)	-0.067 (0.142)
Female	-0.108* (0.051)	-0.327** (0.116)	-0.097 (0.116)	-0.061 (0.114)	-0.240* (0.109)	0.181 (0.117)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Education	-0.0001 (0.043)	0.022 (0.093)	-0.047 (0.099)	-0.011 (0.093)	0.062 (0.097)	-0.046 (0.106)
Unemployed	-0.068 (0.058)	-0.177 (0.134)	0.083 (0.135)	-0.165 (0.123)	-0.211 (0.125)	0.203 (0.143)
Married	0.123* (0.051)	0.309* (0.120)	0.013 (0.121)	0.102 (0.115)	0.137 (0.110)	0.091 (0.116)
April	0.047 (0.079)					
May	0.273*** (0.079)					
June	0.292*** (0.077)					
July	0.122 (0.079)					
Constant	-0.056 (0.173)	0.160 (0.385)	-0.119 (0.365)	0.312 (0.347)	0.353 (0.352)	-0.238 (0.385)
Observations	2,608	518	508	512	566	504
Log Likelihood	-1,786.659	-344.314	-343.526	-350.140	-385.239	-341.642
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,597.319	704.627	703.051	716.280	786.478	699.284

Note: Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month in Model 1 is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SI.5.3: Approve Violence Full Sample By Month

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Approve Violence					
	Full	March	April	May	June	July
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	0.078 (0.055)	0.105 (0.126)	0.056 (0.132)	-0.009 (0.124)	0.095 (0.119)	0.074 (0.121)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	0.071 (0.055)	0.108 (0.128)	0.293* (0.127)	-0.123 (0.122)	0.113 (0.119)	-0.043 (0.129)
Female	-0.116* (0.046)	-0.162 (0.106)	0.002 (0.108)	-0.208* (0.103)	-0.043 (0.100)	-0.156 (0.106)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Education	-0.139*** (0.040)	-0.104 (0.085)	-0.239* (0.094)	-0.027 (0.085)	-0.292** (0.092)	-0.054 (0.096)
Unemployed	0.054 (0.053)	0.086 (0.122)	-0.019 (0.127)	-0.010 (0.112)	0.159 (0.113)	0.125 (0.127)
Married	0.073 (0.047)	0.269* (0.110)	-0.001 (0.112)	0.181 (0.105)	-0.155 (0.101)	0.035 (0.104)
April	-0.041 (0.073)					
May	0.027 (0.072)					
June	-0.036 (0.071)					
July	-0.009 (0.072)					
Observations	2,608	518	508	512	566	504

Note: Ordered Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month in Model 1 is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SI.6: Subgroup Analysis

Recent observational research suggests that certain types of individuals might be more likely to radicalize than others. For example, men may be more likely to respond to identity threat with anger because they are prone to quick reactions to potential threats (Ladbury, 2009). Young people have less stable careers and financial futures, so threats to their identity may be more powerful than threats to those with savings (Bhui, Warfa and Jones, 2014; Ladbury, 2009; Richardson, Berlouis and Cameron, 2017). Unemployment likely has a similar effect (Bhui, Warfa and Jones, 2014; Delia Deckard and Jacobson, 2015; Richardson, Berlouis and Cameron, 2017). Those who are educated are more likely to be able to put identity threats aside and recognize that responding with violence is not the most effective way to manage intergroup conflict (Azam and Thelen, 2008). Marriage could increase radicalization because partners' proclivity for radicalization could build off of each other (Koomen and Van Der Pligt, 2016).

In order to test for these heterogeneous treatment effects, we estimate a series of interaction models, where the subgroup variable of interest is interacted with the two treatments (anti-Islam and pro-Islam) for each of the three dependent variables. It is important to keep in mind that we did not block randomize treatment assignment for any of these subgroups, which means that we lose all important randomization properties of the experimental design. That is, any results from these subgroup analyses are equivalent to studies using observational data and should be taken as exploratory.

Table SI.6.1 presents ordered probit models where the subgroup variable of interest is interacted with the two treatments for the Muslim identity dependent variable. The last two rows of the Table show the interactions between the treatment and the covariate of interest in each column. No interactions between the treatment and covariate of interest are significant. Table SI.6.2 looks at the U.S. favorable dependent variable. Treatment indicators for pro-Islam are all in the positive direction. Finally, Table SI.6.3 shows similar subgroup analysis for the approval of violence dependent variable. The interaction terms are not significant in any specification. Overall, there do not appear to be any significant heterogeneous treatment effects.

Table SI.6.1: Muslim Identity Subgroup Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Muslim Identity				
	Gender	Age	Married	Unemployed	Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	-0.139 (0.171)	0.276* (0.140)	0.101 (0.082)	0.073 (0.061)	-0.039 (0.166)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	0.036 (0.173)	-0.025 (0.145)	0.016 (0.083)	-0.043 (0.061)	-0.208 (0.169)
Female	-0.100 (0.074)	-0.074 (0.044)	-0.075 (0.044)	-0.073 (0.044)	-0.074 (0.044)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Education	0.024 (0.037)	0.025 (0.037)	0.022 (0.037)	0.022 (0.037)	-0.023 (0.060)
Unemployed	0.002 (0.051)	0.003 (0.051)	0.006 (0.051)	0.024 (0.084)	0.005 (0.051)
Married	0.010 (0.045)	0.009 (0.045)	0.067 (0.075)	0.011 (0.045)	0.010 (0.045)
April	-0.055 (0.069)	-0.053 (0.069)	-0.056 (0.069)	-0.057 (0.069)	-0.054 (0.069)
May	-0.127 (0.068)	-0.128 (0.068)	-0.126 (0.068)	-0.127 (0.068)	-0.125 (0.068)
June	-0.046 (0.067)	-0.046 (0.067)	-0.047 (0.067)	-0.047 (0.067)	-0.043 (0.067)
July	-0.027 (0.069)	-0.030 (0.069)	-0.028 (0.069)	-0.030 (0.069)	-0.027 (0.069)
Tr 1 x Covariate	0.124 (0.105)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.083 (0.106)	-0.082 (0.118)	0.048 (0.084)
Tr 2 x Covariate	-0.048 (0.106)	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.088 (0.107)	0.025 (0.120)	0.092 (0.086)
Observations	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608

Note: Ordered Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SI.6.2: U.S. Favorable Subgroup Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	U.S. Favorable				
	Gender	Age	Married	Unemployed	Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	0.348 (0.196)	0.080 (0.161)	0.147 (0.095)	0.178* (0.070)	0.383* (0.191)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	0.094 (0.199)	-0.244 (0.168)	0.062 (0.096)	0.019 (0.070)	0.263 (0.196)
Female	-0.051 (0.085)	-0.113* (0.051)	-0.108* (0.051)	-0.107* (0.051)	-0.110* (0.051)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education	-0.002 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.043)	-0.0003 (0.043)	-0.0001 (0.043)	0.082 (0.070)
Unemployed	-0.066 (0.058)	-0.069 (0.058)	-0.068 (0.058)	-0.039 (0.096)	-0.066 (0.058)
Married	0.123* (0.051)	0.123* (0.051)	0.141 (0.087)	0.123* (0.051)	0.123* (0.051)
April	0.047 (0.079)	0.048 (0.079)	0.049 (0.079)	0.046 (0.079)	0.045 (0.079)
May	0.273*** (0.079)	0.268*** (0.079)	0.274*** (0.079)	0.273*** (0.079)	0.271*** (0.079)
June	0.293*** (0.077)	0.290*** (0.077)	0.294*** (0.077)	0.291*** (0.077)	0.290*** (0.077)
July	0.124 (0.079)	0.121 (0.079)	0.125 (0.079)	0.120 (0.079)	0.122 (0.079)
Tr 1 x Covariate	-0.125 (0.121)	0.002 (0.003)	0.016 (0.122)	-0.084 (0.136)	-0.121 (0.097)
Tr 2 x Covariate	-0.049 (0.122)	0.006 (0.003)	-0.073 (0.124)	-0.003 (0.138)	-0.131 (0.100)
Constant	-0.145 (0.205)	0.063 (0.198)	-0.069 (0.178)	-0.064 (0.174)	-0.209 (0.201)
Observations	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608

Note: Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SI.6.3: Approve Violence Subgroup Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Approve Violence				
	Gender	Age	Married	Unemployed	Education
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	-0.061 (0.178)	-0.038 (0.148)	0.056 (0.088)	0.078 (0.064)	0.185 (0.176)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	-0.188 (0.181)	-0.039 (0.154)	0.166 (0.088)	0.072 (0.065)	0.353* (0.179)
Female	-0.201* (0.079)	-0.117* (0.046)	-0.115* (0.046)	-0.116* (0.046)	-0.115* (0.046)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Education	-0.141*** (0.040)	-0.141*** (0.040)	-0.140*** (0.040)	-0.139*** (0.040)	-0.072 (0.065)
Unemployed	0.055 (0.053)	0.055 (0.053)	0.055 (0.053)	0.055 (0.088)	0.055 (0.053)
Married	0.073 (0.047)	0.074 (0.047)	0.112 (0.081)	0.073 (0.047)	0.073 (0.047)
April	-0.041 (0.073)	-0.042 (0.073)	-0.038 (0.073)	-0.041 (0.073)	-0.043 (0.073)
May	0.026 (0.072)	0.026 (0.072)	0.030 (0.072)	0.027 (0.072)	0.025 (0.072)
June	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.037 (0.071)	-0.032 (0.071)	-0.037 (0.071)	-0.039 (0.071)
July	-0.014 (0.072)	-0.009 (0.072)	-0.003 (0.072)	-0.009 (0.072)	-0.009 (0.072)
Tr 1 x Covariate	0.089 (0.110)	0.003 (0.003)	0.038 (0.113)	-0.003 (0.124)	-0.058 (0.090)
Tr 2 x Covariate	0.168 (0.111)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.158 (0.113)	-0.0004 (0.125)	-0.152 (0.092)
Observations	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608	2,608

Note: Ordered Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Regional Analysis

Muslim respondents in different regions may react differently to the treatment because of their experiences in either the ethnically mixed Bosnian Federation or the primarily Serb controlled Republika Srpska (Richardson, Berlouis and Cameron, 2017). Sectarian tensions are higher in Republika Srpska in part because of its leadership's desire to merge with Serbia or to create an independent, fully Serbian state (Toal, 2013). Republika Srpska has a long history of being unwelcoming to Muslims, so anti-Muslim rhetoric may not resonate with Muslims living there.

To evaluate whether this is the case, we conduct subgroup analysis by splitting our sample into Muslim respondents in Republika Srpska (RS) and those in the rest of Bosnia (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FBiH). If sectarian tensions are indeed attenuating the effect of statements from foreign leaders, then we expect that treatment effects on the anti-Muslim treatment will be significantly weaker than in areas where Muslims are relatively more accepted.

Table SI.6.4 presents the results. Treatment effects for the anti-Islam rhetoric remain insignificant across both regions, indicating that there are no systematic differences in how Muslim respondents interpret anti-Islam statements based on the level of sectarian tensions surrounding them. Treatment effects for pro-Islam rhetoric are also consistent across regions with the exception that such rhetoric does not increase U.S. favorability in RS. Hence, it is not clear that sectarian tensions have a moderating effect: the null effects persist in both regions.

Of course, it is likely that Muslims choosing to remain in RS in spite of hostile anti-Muslim rhetoric are systematically different than Muslims choosing to live in FBiH. RS leaders have been quite effective at pushing remaining Muslims into FBiH. This is also clear from the small number of Muslims in RS in our representative sample.

Table SI.6.4: Regional Subgroup Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Muslim Identity		U.S. Favorable		Approve Violence	
	RS	FBiH	RS	FBiH	RS	FBiH
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tr 1: Islam Positive	-0.208 (0.189)	0.077 (0.054)	0.318 (0.209)	0.145* (0.063)	0.034 (0.205)	0.076 (0.057)
Tr 2: Islam Negative	-0.173 (0.205)	-0.014 (0.054)	0.332 (0.224)	-0.003 (0.063)	0.235 (0.210)	0.050 (0.058)
Female	0.307 (0.175)	-0.092* (0.046)	-0.138 (0.194)	-0.097 (0.053)	0.016 (0.184)	-0.129** (0.048)
Age	0.006 (0.005)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.011 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.001)
Education	0.051 (0.139)	0.038 (0.039)	0.184 (0.156)	-0.005 (0.045)	-0.173 (0.152)	-0.143*** (0.042)
Unemployed	0.376 (0.209)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.067 (0.229)	-0.076 (0.061)	0.332 (0.224)	0.058 (0.055)
Married	0.095 (0.169)	0.019 (0.046)	0.053 (0.188)	0.133* (0.054)	-0.204 (0.180)	0.098* (0.049)
April	-0.257 (0.294)	-0.041 (0.071)	-0.386 (0.335)	0.071 (0.082)	-0.119 (0.311)	-0.023 (0.075)
May	-0.395 (0.263)	-0.117 (0.071)	-0.602* (0.302)	0.334*** (0.082)	-0.109 (0.275)	0.051 (0.075)
June	-0.008 (0.256)	-0.066 (0.070)	-0.194 (0.291)	0.315*** (0.081)	-0.094 (0.258)	-0.026 (0.074)
July	0.335 (0.282)	-0.060 (0.071)	-0.447 (0.306)	0.155 (0.082)	-0.742* (0.304)	0.046 (0.075)
Constant			0.593 (0.712)	-0.074 (0.180)		
Observations	212	2,396	212	2,396	212	2,396

Note: Ordered Probit and Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference month is March. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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