Ethnic Representational Priorities and Political Engagement in Deeply Divided Societies

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When do individuals in deeply divided societies participate in political activities aimed at increasing ethnic representation in cabinet ministries? I develop a cost-benefit framework to explain political engagement based on individuals' ethnic group membership and preferences for descriptive and substantive representation in cabinet ministries. Drawing on an original survey in North Macedonia, I find that ethnic Macedonians who value substantive representation are more likely to attend public meetings compared to Macedonians who value descriptive representation, but that the opposite is true for ethnic Albanians. I also consider how willingness to attend public meetings changes when individuals value both descriptive and substantive representation. The results suggest that policy makers cannot assume that all members of the public have the same motivations for arguing for increased representation.

Keywords: deliberative democracy, ethnic representation, political participation, public meetings, North Macedonia.

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What prompts people to become politically engaged in deeply divided societies? In North Macedonia in 2017, several hundred ethnic Macedonians protested the election of an ethnic Albanian parliamentary speaker, resulting in violent clashes with police. While the protesters' anger was clear, it was difficult to discern their motivations. How did concerns about their government representatives looking more like them (descriptive representation) and the potential policies that Albanian leaders might put in place (substantive representation) motivate their protest participation (Pitkin 1967)? Political leaders must clearly understand how representational concerns prompt political engagement in order to mount an effective response. In this article, I investigate how individuals' ethnic group status and preferences for descriptive and substantive representation in cabinet ministries impact their willingness to become politically engaged in advocating for these issues.

Previous work has examined how people react to gaining representation (e.g., Barreto et al. 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003) and how political engagement influences elected representatives' behavior (Gillion 2012; Leighley and Oser 2018). These findings do not explain what prompts people to become politically active on issues related to representation. I theorize that members of politically over and underrepresented ethnic groups have similar representational priorities, but that they find themselves in different stages of obtaining representation. Members of overrepresented ethnic groups who value substantive representation are more likely to become politically engaged compared to members who value descriptive representation, whereas the opposite is true for members of underrepresented ethnic groups.[1] I also consider how willingness to politically participate changes when individuals value a mix of both descriptive and substantive representation.

I conduct a survey of Albanians and Macedonians in North Macedonia to explore the relationship between representational priorities in cabinet ministries, ethnic group status, and political engagement, where I focus on public meeting attendance as a measure of political engagement. The North Macedonian context is ideal for this study because ethnic representation is a particularly divisive topic and public meetings have been proposed as a potential way to better understand public needs. The results suggest that members of overrepresented groups are willing to attend public meetings for different reasons than members of underrepresented groups. Country leaders cannot assume that the public has uniform representational preferences and participates for the same reasons. This article is the first to disentangle how individuals think about ethnic representation and how ethnic representation manifests into political participation — one of the most important ways in which the public expresses opinions.

Events and Representation

My argument centers on what I term group-based political events — those where the number of attendees helps to determine event success (see Finkel and Opp 1991). Participating in group-based political events (e.g., protests or public meetings) requires a non-trivial investment of time and resources. Thus, event participation is a meaningful signal of the extent to which people are willing to advocate for increased representation in a way that low-cost forms of political engagement, like signing a petition, are not.

People become politically engaged when the perceived value of doing so outweighs the cost (Jacquet 2017). I propose a simple model where individuals' value derived from political engagement is their value derived from descriptive representation plus their value derived from substantive representation or $v = d + s$.[2] The value of descriptive and substantive representation

can be decomposed into the utility gained by receiving representation (u) and the probability of receiving representation as a result of becoming politically engaged (p). That is $v = (u_d \times p_d) + (u_s \times p_s)$, where subscripts refer to descriptive or substantive representation. Prior literature has concluded that the utility derived from substantive representation is generally higher than that derived from descriptive representation. This is because substantive representation has the potential to provide financial and policy-based benefits more than does descriptive representation (Cameron et al. 1996; Lublin 1999). However, the probability of obtaining descriptive representation is at least somewhat greater than the probability of obtaining substantive representation. Providing descriptive representation, researchers have found, is an easier political commitment for leaders to make because it does not necessarily involve changing the ways in which leaders distribute resources (Arriola and Johnson 2014).

With these conditions in mind, I hypothesize that members of overrepresented and underrepresented ethnic groups differ in the ways in which they assess the utility derived from and the probability of obtaining descriptive and substantive representation. For members of overrepresented groups, co-ethnics tend to dominate government positions, meaning that there are decreasing returns to increasing majority descriptive representation. That is, the marginal benefit of adding another member of an overrepresented group to the government is low because widespread descriptive representation in government has already been achieved. Hence, while the probability of obtaining additional descriptive representation is higher than that of obtaining additional substantive representation, the utility derived from additional descriptive representation is substantially lower than that derived from substantive representation.

As a result, members of overrepresented groups will tend to derive more value from increased substantive representation than increased descriptive representation. This difference in

value directly translates into an increased willingness for overrepresented individuals who value substantive representation to become politically engaged advocating for substantive representation because they have more to gain from political engagement than do overrepresented individuals who value descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 1a: Overrepresented individuals will value substantive representation more than descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 1b: Overrepresented individuals who value substantive representation are more likely to be politically engaged compared to overrepresented individuals who value descriptive representation.

For members of underrepresented ethnic groups, the probability of obtaining descriptive representation is much greater than the probability of obtaining substantive representation. This difference in probabilities overwhelms the higher utility derived from substantive representation. As a result of historical marginalization, underrepresented individuals tend to be suspicious of the promises of substantive representation and instead are motivated by the concrete nature of descriptive representation (e.g., Howell and Fagan 1988), seeing it as an important initial step toward achieving full inclusion in government. Consequently, underrepresented individuals tend to value descriptive representation, and those underrepresented individuals who value descriptive representation are more likely to be politically engaged because of the potential gains from increased descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 2a: Underrepresented individuals will value descriptive representation more than substantive representation.

Hypothesis 2b: Underrepresented individuals who value descriptive representation are more likely to be politically engaged compared to underrepresented individuals who value substantive representation.

Hypotheses 1b and 2b compare the influence of valuing descriptive representation on political engagement to that of valuing substantive representation. Of course, people can value both descriptive and substantive representation at the same time. What impact, if any, does valuing both descriptive and substantive representation have on political engagement? Valuing both descriptive and substantive representation indicates less clear preferences about representation, what public opinion researchers call "differentiation." Respondents who work through the utility and probability calculations described in Hypotheses 1b and 2b end up valuing either descriptive or substantive representation and being motivated to become politically engaged based on those values. These respondents are able to differentiate between the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, to make the resulting utility calculations, and to decide whether to become politically engaged. Other respondents may have less clearly defined preferences, thinking about descriptive and substantive representation as all a part of the same concept and, therefore, developing similar preferences about them (Reuning and Plutzer 2020; Yan, 2008). Respondents who differentiate when asked about their opinions on related, but distinct topics demonstrate that they understand that preferences for representation are nuanced. These kinds of clearly defined and nuanced preferences can prompt political engagement (Celis

2008; de Kadt and Lieberman 2020). Therefore, people who differentiate by valuing only one type of representation have more nuanced preferences that result in them being more likely to be politically engaged compared to individuals who value both descriptive and substantive representation.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who value only one type of representation are more likely to be politically engaged compared to individuals who value both descriptive and substantive representation.

Case Selection and Empirical Strategy

I test these hypotheses by fielding a purpose-built survey about descriptive and substantive representational preferences in cabinet ministries in North Macedonia (herein Macedonia). Macedonia is one country context where three key conditions are met: ethnic identity is clearly defined, the underrepresented group has faced a history of discrimination, and the underrepresented group is large enough to practically field a survey (see Hislope 1998). Ethnic Macedonians are about 65 per cent of the population, while ethnic Albanians are about 25 per cent.

Ethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians have long been challenging. In terms of descriptive representation, Albanians have been included in the cabinet and the legislature since independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 (Crowther 2017; Hislope 2003). Despite this, Albanians lack political power, a fact that became evident when Albanian nationalists demanding increased political representation began fighting with the Macedonian army in 2001. The resulting Ohrid Agreement ended the conflict and purported to address Albanian descriptive

and substantive representation (Piacentini 2019). One way that the Agreement provided descriptive representation was by requiring new legislative committees to be set-up with Albanian representatives.[3] Albanians received substantive representation in the form of a requirement that "laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education…must receive a majority of votes" from ethnic Albanian legislators.[4] In 2016, a corruption scandal resulted in a new governing coalition that began making efforts to address Albanian substantive representation (Stewart 2019). When this study was conducted in 2020, the cabinet had 30 ministers (including the Prime Minister) with approximately 7 Albanians (23 per cent). At the same time, nationalist Macedonian political parties were advocating for eliminating Albanian cabinet representation (Saveski and Sadiku 2012). Similar tensions are present in government employment. While the Ohrid Agreement's call for "equitable representation" in civil service has increased Albanian civil service employment, Albanians remain underrepresented and are often assigned government jobs without meaningful job duties (Marusic 2016).[5]

I focus on political engagement regarding representation in cabinet ministries for four reasons. First, cabinet ministries are the most important and influential positions in government, apart from the country leader (Laver and Shepsle 1994). The purpose of a cabinet is to facilitate resource delivery to the public. Cabinets do this work by writing budgets, drafting legislation, managing the bureaucracy, and interacting with one another. In this way, cabinets are an intermediary between people and government resources. Second, while many key government functions in Macedonia are decentralized (Lyon 2015), national-level representation is critically important for determining resource allocation to local governments (Jackson 2021). Third, much of Macedonia is ethnically homogeneous, so the potential for ethnic descriptive and substantive representation is largely relegated to the national government (Koktsidis 2019). Finally, as

discussed below, non-governmental organizations have facilitated local political engagement opportunities for many years. Asking about political engagement at the national level ensures that respondents do not base their answers on any specific prior experiences that they may have had with these local political engagement opportunities.

The survey was conducted by Ipsos on their quarterly, face-to-face omnibus in February 2020.[6] Ipsos oversampled Albanians to collect 784 responses equally divided between Albanians and Macedonians. Since the survey was conducted as part of an omnibus panel, respondents had already provided basic demographic information including ethnicity, eliminating priming effects.

Representational Preferences

I measure preferences for descriptive and substantive representation using several survey questions.[7] These questions are designed to capture the utility respondents' assign to descriptive and substantive representation. Respondents answered two questions about descriptive representation on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree): whether the ministry should invest in hiring (*Hiring*) or having employees (*Employee*) from the respondents' ethnic group. I use these two questions because they should elicit responses about different varieties of descriptive representation. *Hiring* focused on proactive action to increase representation, while *Employee* examines the demographic makeup of the ministry.[8] Similarly, substantive representation is divided into providing additional financial resources (*Financial*) and responding to concerns (*Concerns*) of "my family and my ethnic group." Both questions measure substantive representation, but again, focus on different types --- monetary and policy-related substantive representation respectively.

Table 1 displays the mean responses to these questions for Albanian and Macedonian respondents and results from *t*-tests comparing Albanians and Macedonians. We can see that in all cases, Macedonian respondents value representation more than do Albanian respondents. These differences are significant in all cases except *Hiring*.

Moving to differences in preferences for descriptive and substantive representation among Macedonian respondents, I conducted pairwise *t*-tests comparing responses for the four descriptive and substantive representation questions. These *t*-tests can be used to evaluate Hypotheses 1a and 2a that compare preferences for descriptive and substantive representation. Table 1 shows that all *t*-tests were significant, meaning that Macedonians valued *Employee* least, followed by *Hiring*, *Financial*, and *Concerns*. This result supports Hypothesis 1a, wherein overrepresented individuals tend to value substantive representation over descriptive representation. Among Albanian respondents, Table 1 again shows that all *t*-tests were significant. Albanians valued *Employee* least, followed by *Financial*, *Concerns*, and *Hiring*. In line with Hypothesis 2a, Albanians valued the *Hiring* form of descriptive representation most. However, Albanians also valued *Employee* least, so Albanians may be thinking particularly about descriptive representation in hiring decisions, as this indicates that the ministry is taking *proactive* action to increase descriptive representation.

Public Meeting Attendance

The dependent variable is respondents' willingness to attend a public meeting directly impacting the descriptive or substantive representation that respondents' value (Button and Mattson, 1999). Public meetings in Macedonia and many developing and transitional states are forums for grievance expression (e.g., Nichter and Peress 2017) and allow attendees to present more

nuanced arguments that may get lost in other forms of political engagement. Attending a public meeting incurs the cost of participating, but other costs (e.g., arrests) are rare (Jacquet 2017).

Macedonia's accession to the European Union requires them to devise and implement ways to solicit and to incorporate public feedback into the policy making process (EC 2019). Yet, opportunities for public input into government decision-making in Macedonia remain limited (EC 2020). A 2015 survey found that 9.8 per cent of Albanians and 13 per cent of Macedonians had "engaged in activities to address a social or community problem during the last 12 months," suggesting that the public is relatively un-involved in government decision-making (Warne et al. 2015: 105).

Lack of public participation and government support, however, hides decades of effort from non-governmental organizations to set-up robust public input mechanisms. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation began the Community Forums Program in 2006. This program organizes public-politician meetings where people are invited to express their preferences on various local issues. Initial Community Forums held in 25 North Macedonian municipalities between 2006 and 2010 focused on public input into local development projects (Mohmand and Acosta 2012). Feedback on these Forums was mostly positive, with local mayors saying that they valued the chance to meet with constituents and members of the public appreciating the direct link between their suggestions and project implementation (Mohmand and Acosta 2012). The Community Forums program continued until at least 2018, with more than 100 Forum sessions and 7,500 participants (UNDP 2020).

Recently, non-government organizations have focused on participatory budgeting as a way to facilitate public-politician interactions. A participatory budgeting program sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development took place between 2017 and 2020 in

eight Macedonian municipalities and consisted of a series of public meetings about public budget priorities (Tumanoska et al. 2020). While participatory budgeting exercises are certainly beneficial, they are targeted toward providing substantive representation, not descriptive representation. The eight municipalities with the participatory budgeting meeting program were dominated by Macedonian residents and 94.5 per cent of meeting participants were ethnic Macedonians (Tumanoska et al. 2020). The theoretical argument suggests that Macedonian meeting participants should value substantive representation. Indeed, of the 99 budgetary proposals evaluated in 2019, only 10 per cent of proposed projects and 1 per cent of implemented projects were about social protection, education, and culture --- the budgetary category most closely approximating descriptive representation (Tumanoska et al. 2020). This suggests that descriptive representation was rarely a topic discussed by ethnic Macedonians in participatory budget meetings. However, the lack of Albanian participants and the fact that budgetary meetings are most closely linked with substantive representation means that a better empirical test is needed.

Respondents in the original survey conducted for this study were asked about their likelihood of attending a hypothetical public meeting on a scale from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 5 (extremely likely), with responses scaled between 0 and 1. The question (*Meeting*) stated that "the [cabinet] ministry you identified as most important to you [as part of an earlier question in the survey] is developing a five-year plan that will determine who it will hire, the policies it will implement, and the programs it will fund" and is seeking input at a hypothetical public meeting. The number of meeting participants was characterized as unknown. This is meant to simulate a potential uncertain situation where the costs of participating could be high (i.e., few people show up and have to make all of the arguments for their representational priorities). The question

asked respondents their likelihood of attending if the meeting was in their town and if they were available.[9]

Returning to Table 1, Macedonians were significantly more likely than Albanians to be willing to attend the meeting, indicating an overall higher level of political engagement. However, both groups' enthusiasm for attending was relatively low (below 0.50 on a 0 to 1 scale). Neither group seems to have much confidence that the government would respond to their concerns, perhaps because promises made during and after the Ohrid Agreement for more effective government representation have largely gone unfulfilled.

Empirical Strategy

To test Hypotheses 1b and 2b, I split the sample into Albanian and Macedonian respondents. I display linear regression models with robust standard errors. There are four pairs of descriptive and substantive representation measures: I display the most conservative coefficient estimates in the main text.

Next, I evaluate Hypothesis 3 by adding an interaction between these descriptive and substantive representation measures to determine if there is an additive impact of representational preferences on meeting attendance. All models presented throughout the article contain demographic controls. Fixed effects for region, urban area, the cabinet ministry the respondent selected as most important, and treatment assignment in an unrelated vignette experiment that occurred prior to these questions are also included. See SI.2, SI.3, and SI.4 for robustness checks using ordered logistic regression models and including a control for the ethnicity of the cabinet minister the respondent selected as most important.

Results

Figure 1 displays results for Hypotheses 1b and 2b split into Albanian and Macedonian respondents. In line with Hypothesis 1b, Macedonians who prioritized substantive representation were more likely to attend the meeting, while descriptive representation had no impact. Albanians were significantly more likely to attend the meeting if they valued descriptive representation in *Hiring* practices. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 2b since Albanians were not more likely to attend if they valued diverse *Employees*. One potential reason for this difference is that hiring diverse people indicates more of a public commitment on behalf of the ministry, whereas the *Employee* question is passive — the ministry is not framed as taking action to increase employee diversity. The relationships between substantive representation for Macedonians and descriptive representation for Albanians and attendance are substantively meaningful: increasing the value placed on descriptive or substantive representation for Albanians or Macedonians respectively by one Likert scale point increased willingness to attend the meeting by about 5 per cent

I now consider the interaction between preferences for descriptive and substantive representation to determine whether preferences for one type of representation moderate the impact of the other type of representation on public meeting attendance (Hypothesis 3). More than 42 per cent of Macedonians and 36 per cent of Albanians provided different responses to the descriptive and substantive representation questions. Results are consistent within different ethnic groups. The interaction between descriptive and substantive representation among Macedonians is not significant. This non-finding is not because Macedonians care less about descriptive representation compared to Albanians. In fact, Macedonians' value all forms of representation at least 2 per cent more than Albanians. Not only is substantive representation a

bigger motivator for Macedonians, but Macedonians place little value on additional descriptive representation, presumably because they already have it. In a sense, descriptive representation may not motivate Macedonians because Macedonia is their ethnic homeland, a place where descriptive representation is taken as a given (Adamson and Jovic 2004).

For Albanians, there is a significant interaction between preferences for descriptive and substantive representation. Figure 2 displays *Concerns* moderating the effect of *Hiring* on *Meeting*; other marginal effects plots for Albanians look substantively the same.[10] As expected, Albanians' likelihood of attending a public meeting is higher when they value one type of representation compared to both types. The interaction effect is highest when the value of descriptive representation is high (5) and the value of substantive representation is low (1).

Discussion and Conclusion

Many approaches to representation suggest that substantive representation is the public's priority. This article presents initial evidence that underrepresented groups in deeply divided societies may be more likely to act when they prefer descriptive representation, likely because substantive benefits are often lost in the political system to corruption, to brokers, or to the overrepresented group. Disconnects between promises for substantive representation and actual results can prompt underrepresented individuals to rally around descriptive representation and for those who believe more strongly in descriptive representation to become politically engaged.

The emphasis on hiring prompting public meeting participation while employee characteristics does not fits with this explanation as hiring is visible, while employee backgrounds are opaque. It is also possible that Albanians view hiring as a potential avenue for future substantive representation, as those who are newly hired may try to generate patronage

benefits for Albanians. Though this line of reasoning may eventually result in substantive representation, it is substantially less direct than advocating for financial benefits or responding to concerns.

Political participation is a fundamental form of free expression and using it to advocate for representation shows the substantial importance that political representation plays in the lives of many members of the public. Representation offers people both the feeling that they are being included and potentially life-changing benefits. As such, people have different reasons for choosing to participate politically to advocate for representation. Apart from incidental factors (e.g., availability to go to a public meeting), these results suggest that people think about representation in fundamentally different ways. Politicians and government leaders, therefore, cannot satisfy public demands for representation by implementing one-size-fits-all solutions.

A key takeaway for future research is that in deeply divided societies, individuals' representational values influence their political participation in different ways depending on ethnic group status. Politicians need to understand this heterogeneity because what individuals want impacts how they vote and politicians' chances for re-election. Because of their non-zero cost of attendance, public meetings provide one way for politicians to learn about individuals' most important representational issues. Future work would do well to extend this study to different country contexts, first by examining ethnic representational priorities in other deeply divided societies. In societies without longstanding ethnic divisions, future research could also investigate whether individuals value different types of representation. Further, emphasis should be placed on measuring the representational attitudes of attendees at political events and those who knew about said events but decided not to attend to see if intended public meeting attendance aligns with actual attendance. For now, scholars and politicians should think carefully

about how different forms of representation may influence individuals' attitudes and how

responses to political events should take into account this diversity in representational

preferences.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Macedonian Mean	Albanian Mean	t-value	p-value
Employee	3.17*	3.01*	1.71	0.08
Hiring	3.60*	3.52*	0.93	0.35
Concerns	3.99*	3.46*	6.60	0.00
Financial	3.84*	3.38*	5.41	0.00
First Meeting	0.47	0.40	3.11	0.00

∗ significantly different from other measures of descriptive or substantive representation among either Albanian or Macedonian respondents.

Figure 1: Macedonian and Albanian Meeting Attendance

Note: Coefficient plots from linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Figure 2: Albanian Marginal Effects

Albanian Meeting Attendance

Note: Marginal effects plot for concerns and hiring on meeting attendance. Linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Endnotes

[1] Over and underrepresentation refer to historical levels of representation in North Macedonia. In this context, the majority ethnic group by population (ethnic Macedonians) is overrepresented and the minority ethnic group (ethnic Albanians) is underrepresented.

[2] Symbolic representation could also be added to the total value.

[3] Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, Signed at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001. Annex A, Article 78.

[4] Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, Signed at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001. Annex C, Section 5.2.

[5] Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, Signed at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001. Section 4.2.

[6] The hypotheses, design, and analysis were pre-registered with EGAP. The survey protocol was approved by the university Institutional Review Board # 202001032.

[7] See Supplemental Information (SI) 1 for question wording.

[8] Since the survey is framed in terms of cabinet ministry policies, respondents are unlikely to believe that they themselves will be hired and instead that hiring is a form of descriptive representation.

[9] Respondents were asked a follow-up question about attendance at a second meeting. The results are substantively the same and are presented in the SI.

[10] See the marginal effects plot of concerns on hiring in SI.4.

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Supplemental Information: Ethnic Representational Priorities and Political Engagement in Deeply Divided Societies

Contents

Replication data and code for all empirical analysis is posted on the author's website.

SI.1:   Survey Questions

- Pre-Survey Questions:

    1. Female: 1-Female, 0-Male

    2. Age (in years)

    3. Married: 1-Yes, 0-No

    4. Education: 1-No formal education, 2-Incomplete primary school, 3-Completed primary school, 4-Completed secondary school, 5-Some college, 6-Graduated college, 7-Advanced Degree

    5. Albanian: 1-Albanian, 0-Macedonian

    6. Region: 1-Skopje, 2-North West, 3-South West, 4-East (Region 4 is dropped in Albanian only models due to too few observations)

    7. Urban: 1-Yes, 2-No

- Pre-Cabinet Choice Questions:

    8. News: "I watch or read the news daily." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

    9. Equal Opportunity: "North Macedonia provides equal opportunities for all individuals to be successful." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

    10. Authoritarian: "What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

11. Knowledge: "How many members of parliament are in the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia? Is it 75, 100, 120, 140, or 150?" (1-Answered 120, 0-Otherwise)

- Cabinet Choice: "Think about the cabinet ministry that is most consequential to the life of you and your family. What cabinet ministry are you thinking of?" (1-Foreign Affairs; 2-Health; 3-Justice; 4-Transport and Communications; 5-Economy; 6-Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Supply; 7-Information Society and Administration; 8-Education and Science; 9-Local Government; 10-Culture; 11-Environment and Physical Planning; 12-Finance; 13-Internal Affairs; 14-Labor and Social Policy; 15-Communications; 16-Diaspora; 17-Situation of Roma; 18-Foreign Investment; 19-Foreign Affairs; 20-Foreign Investment; 21-Regulation; 22-Defense; 23-Political System and Inter-Community Relations)

  - Culture: 1-If ministries 9, 10, 16, 17, or 23; 0-Otherwise
  - Welfare: 1-If ministries 2, 3, 8, or 11; 0-Otherwise
  - Security/International: 1-If ministries 1, 13, 19, or 22; 0-Otherwise
  - Economy: 1-If remaining ministries; 0-Otherwise

- Representation Preferences:

12. Hiring: "The ministry should invest heavily in hiring more employees from my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

13. Employee: "The ethnicity of the minister and those who work for the ministry matters a great deal to me." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

14. Financial: "The ministry should devote more financial resources to develop programs designed to help my family and my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

15. Concerns: "The ministry's ability to respond to the concerns of and provide solutions to challenges my ethnic group faces matters a great deal to me." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

- Meeting Attendance:

16. First Meeting: "Suppose that the ministry you identified as most important to you is developing a five-year plan that will determine who it will hire, the policies it will implement, and the programs it will fund. A public meeting has been scheduled in your town where ministry officials will hear citizens' priorities and take them into consideration when drafting the plan. You do not know how many people will attend the meeting and share your priorities. Given that the meeting will take place in your town and you are available, how likely are you to attend on a scale from 1 meaning not at all likely to 5 meaning extremely likely?" (1-not at all likely to 5-extremely likely)

17. Second Meeting: "Now suppose that many people showed up at the first meeting, meaning that the minister has called a second meeting to collect more public comments on the ministry's five-year plan. This will be the final opportunity to voice your priorities for the ministry before the minister writes the plan. The minister will personally attend this meeting. Given that the meeting will take place in your town and you are available, how likely are you to attend?" (1-not at all likely to 5-extremely likely)

- Experimental Controls: Prior to responding to the questions about attending public meetings, respondents were presented with a randomized vignette as part of an unrelated survey experiment. The vignette randomized the following components, which I control for in all regression models.

18. ProfileNumber: 0, 1, 6, or 10 Albanian ministers
19. ProfileSDSM: 1-SDSM mentioned, 0-Not mentioned
20. ProfileSubstantive: 1-Substantive mentioned, 0-Not mentioned
21. ProfileCooperation: 1-Cooperation mentioned, 0-Not mentioned

One concern when asking these questions is that respondents will all be thinking about different cases of descriptive or substantive representation. For example, respondents with children may think about the education ministry, whereas farmers may think about the agriculture ministry. To address this problem, I first ask respondents to state the cabinet ministry that they believe is "most consequential to the life of you and your family." This provides me with a control variable to ensure that I can measure preferences for descriptive and substantive representation accurately.

Survey respondents' assessments of which cabinet ministry was most consequential split along ethnic lines. Table SI.1.1 shows the percentage of respondents selecting a ministry in one of four categories. Albanians were significantly more likely to select a ministry responsible for either cultural or welfare-related issues, while Macedonians were significantly more likely to select a ministry responsible for security, including international affairs and defense. These stark differences suggest that Macedonians and Albanians view cabinet ministries and their importance in very different ways.[1] Analyzing results separately for Macedonians and Albanians will be particularly important.

Although prioritizing descriptive representation in hiring necessarily leads to employees with descriptively diverse backgrounds, the correlation between these two measures was 0.50 for Macedonian and 0.60 for Albanian respondents. This suggests that respondents perceive differences between these two measures, likely caused by the symbolic and psychological importance of prioritizing hiring of descriptively representative employees.[2] The correlation between substantive representation measures was 0.74 for Macedonian and 0.76 for Albanian

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[1]It is true that Albanians tend to be appointed to culture and welfare ministries, whereas Macedonians are appointed to other ministries. The results hold when controlling for the ethnicity of the minister (see SI.3). However, the survey question asked about the ministry, not about a specific minister, and ministers change very often, so it is unlikely that Albanians' preference for culture and welfare ministries is wholly determined by co-ethnic ministers.

[2]As such, satisficing and non-differentiation appear to have been mitigated (Roberts et al., 2019).

Table SI.1.1: Most Consequential Ministry

Category	Macedonian	Albanian	t-value	p-value
Culture	2.30	19.39	8.00	0.00
Welfare	28.06	36.99	2.68	0.01
Security	29.59	3.83	10.29	0.00
Economy	40.05	39.80	0.07	0.94

Category is coded from the 23 cabinet ministries. Percentages for Macedonians and Albanians displayed with a two sample t-test and corresponding p-value.

respondents. The correlation between the descriptive and substantive representation measures ranges from 0.40 to 0.78, indicating that descriptive and substantive representation are indeed measuring distinct concepts.

Macedonians' preferences for attending remained relatively stable between the two meetings: only 21% of Macedonian respondents changed their likelihood of going to the second meeting compared to the first meeting whereas 39% of Albanians changed. Macedonians were fairly equally split on whether they increased or decreased their likelihood of attending the second meeting (55% increased and 45% decreased), though almost all of the changes occurred between being unlikely and neither likely nor unlikely to attend. Albanians who varied also did so between being unlikely and neither likely nor unlikely to attend, though 60% became more likely to go to the second meeting whereas 40% became less likely. On the other hand, Macedonians were more likely to attend both meetings.[3] So while Macedonians were more likely to attend either meeting, Albanians were more likely to be persuaded to attend the second meeting after having heard about the success of the first meeting.

Table SI.1.2 provides descriptive statistics. The last seven variables are controls from an unrelated survey experiment preceding these survey questions.

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[3]The first meeting was 2.89 versus 2.60 for Albanians (t-value=3.11, p-value=0.00) and the second meeting was 2.93 versus 2.68 (t-value=2.64, p-value=0.01).

Table SI.1.2: Descriptive Statistics

	Albanian		Macedonian	
	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
First Meeting	0.40	0.25	0.47	0.50
Second Meeting	0.42	0.50	0.48	0.50
Employee	3.01	3.00	3.17	3.00
Hiring	3.52	3.00	3.60	4.00
Concerns	3.46	3.00	3.99	4.00
Financial	3.38	3.00	3.84	4.00
Female	0.49	0.00	0.51	1.00
Age	42.60	41.00	43.86	42.00
Married	0.33	0.00	0.67	1.00
Education	3.73	4.00	4.30	4.00
Household Size	4.74	5.00	3.59	4.00
Skopje	0.31	0.00	0.29	0.00
North West	0.58	1.00	0.12	0.00
South West	0.11	0.00	0.25	0.00
East	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.00
Urban	0.45	0.00	0.69	1.00
News	3.18	3.00	2.97	3.00
Equal Opportunity	2.24	2.00	2.07	2.00
Authoritarian	2.59	2.50	2.51	2.00
Knowledge	0.70	1.00	0.83	1.00
ProfileNumberZero	0.14	0.00	0.14	0.00
ProfileNumberOne	0.29	0.00	0.29	0.00
ProfileNumberSix	0.29	0.00	0.29	0.00
ProfileNumberTen	0.29	0.00	0.29	0.00
ProfileSDSM	0.43	0.00	0.43	0.00
ProfileSubstantive	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
ProfileCooperation	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50

Descriptive statistics for survey questions. Scale for each item is described in the survey question text.

SI.2: Results

The results, interaction models, and robustness checks all show Albanian and Macedonian attendance at two different meetings: a first meeting and a subsequent meeting. The study was pre-registered with questions about these two meetings under the idea that the incentives to attend would be different for the second meeting compared to the first meeting. In fact, the results for the first and second meetings are substantively the same, so the main text was simplified and a full description of both meetings can be found here.

Figure SI.2.1 shows linear regression model results for both meetings.

Figure SI.2.1: Macedonian and Albanian Meeting Attendance for Both Meetings

Linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Tables SI.2.1 and SI.2.2 display the linear regression results used to create Figure 1 in

the main text and Figure SI.2.1 in the Supplemental Information.

Table SI.2.1: Macedonian Linear Regression

		Dependent variable:						
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.001 (0.018)	0.010 (0.018)			0.004 (0.018)	0.008 (0.017)		
Employee			−0.001 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)			0.007 (0.016)	0.007 (0.016)
Financial	0.065*** (0.019)		0.066*** (0.017)		0.047** (0.019)		0.046*** (0.017)	
Concerns		0.056*** (0.019)		0.060*** (0.017)		0.044** (0.019)		0.046*** (0.017)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.009 (0.061)	−0.003 (0.061)	−0.009 (0.061)	−0.003 (0.061)	0.020 (0.062)	0.023 (0.062)	0.020 (0.062)	0.024 (0.062)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.014 (0.059)	−0.001 (0.059)	−0.014 (0.059)	−0.002 (0.059)	0.016 (0.061)	0.025 (0.061)	0.016 (0.060)	0.024 (0.060)
ProfileNumber 10	0.011 (0.060)	0.025 (0.060)	0.011 (0.060)	0.025 (0.060)	0.018 (0.060)	0.028 (0.060)	0.018 (0.060)	0.027 (0.060)
ProfileSDSM	−0.023 (0.038)	−0.035 (0.039)	−0.022 (0.038)	−0.035 (0.039)	−0.040 (0.039)	−0.050 (0.039)	−0.040 (0.039)	−0.049 (0.039)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.066* (0.035)	−0.059* (0.035)	−0.066* (0.035)	−0.060* (0.036)	−0.074** (0.035)	−0.069* (0.035)	−0.072** (0.035)	−0.067* (0.036)
ProfileCooperation	0.025 (0.036)	0.030 (0.036)	0.026 (0.036)	0.030 (0.036)	0.009 (0.036)	0.013 (0.036)	0.008 (0.036)	0.011 (0.036)
Female	0.0004 (0.037)	0.002 (0.037)	0.0005 (0.037)	0.003 (0.037)	0.016 (0.037)	0.017 (0.037)	0.015 (0.037)	0.017 (0.037)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)
Married	0.071 (0.049)	0.062 (0.050)	0.071 (0.048)	0.061 (0.050)	0.033 (0.048)	0.026 (0.050)	0.033 (0.048)	0.025 (0.049)
Education	0.009 (0.021)	0.013 (0.021)	0.009 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	0.017 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)
Household Size	0.004 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)
North West	−0.105 (0.064)	−0.105 (0.064)	−0.104 (0.063)	−0.099 (0.064)	−0.095 (0.064)	−0.095 (0.064)	−0.095 (0.064)	−0.092 (0.064)
South West	0.120*** (0.047)	0.120** (0.047)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.121*** (0.047)	0.119** (0.047)	0.119** (0.047)	0.118** (0.047)	0.119** (0.047)
East	0.034 (0.046)	0.038 (0.046)	0.033 (0.046)	0.036 (0.046)	0.048 (0.047)	0.050 (0.046)	0.050 (0.047)	0.051 (0.046)
Urban	−0.004 (0.040)	−0.012 (0.040)	−0.004 (0.040)	−0.014 (0.040)	−0.008 (0.040)	−0.014 (0.040)	−0.007 (0.040)	−0.014 (0.040)
News	0.038** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.015)	0.039** (0.015)	0.037** (0.015)	0.039*** (0.015)
Equal Opportunity	0.040** (0.017)	0.039** (0.017)	0.041** (0.017)	0.039** (0.017)	0.031* (0.018)	0.030* (0.018)	0.030* (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)
Authoritarian	0.012 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)	0.016 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)
Knowledge	0.025 (0.047)	0.040 (0.046)	0.024 (0.047)	0.040 (0.046)	0.083* (0.045)	0.094** (0.044)	0.084* (0.045)	0.094** (0.044)
Cabinet Culture	0.160* (0.090)	0.176** (0.087)	0.161* (0.090)	0.176** (0.085)	0.180* (0.097)	0.190* (0.099)	0.176* (0.096)	0.187* (0.096)
Cabinet Welfare	0.049 (0.045)	0.056 (0.045)	0.049 (0.045)	0.057 (0.046)	0.048 (0.045)	0.053 (0.045)	0.046 (0.045)	0.052 (0.045)
Cabinet International	0.073* (0.043)	0.074* (0.043)	0.073* (0.043)	0.076* (0.043)	0.089** (0.043)	0.090** (0.043)	0.089** (0.044)	0.091** (0.044)
Constant	−0.102 (0.164)	−0.116 (0.167)	−0.097 (0.163)	−0.101 (0.166)	−0.126 (0.164)	−0.144 (0.166)	−0.136 (0.162)	−0.146 (0.165)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Linear regression with robust standard errors with dependent variables scaled between 0 and 1.

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Table SI.2.2: Albanian Linear Regression

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | |
| | First Meeting | | | | Second Meeting | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.043** (0.017)	0.052** (0.020)			0.036** (0.016)	0.031* (0.018)		
Employee			−0.012 (0.016)	−0.011 (0.016)			0.003 (0.015)	−0.001 (0.015)
Financial	0.002 (0.017)		0.036** (0.016)		0.003 (0.016)		0.025* (0.014)	
Concerns		−0.011 (0.021)		0.034** (0.017)		0.009 (0.018)		0.033** (0.015)
ProfileNumber 1	0.001 (0.042)	0.001 (0.042)	−0.001 (0.043)	−0.007 (0.042)	−0.024 (0.041)	−0.024 (0.041)	−0.029 (0.042)	−0.030 (0.041)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.024 (0.044)	−0.024 (0.044)	−0.032 (0.045)	−0.032 (0.045)	−0.070* (0.041)	−0.069* (0.041)	−0.076* (0.041)	−0.074* (0.041)
ProfileNumber 10	0.009 (0.043)	0.009 (0.043)	0.006 (0.044)	−0.003 (0.043)	−0.025 (0.041)	−0.026 (0.040)	−0.030 (0.042)	−0.034 (0.041)
ProfileSDSM	0.004 (0.028)	0.004 (0.028)	−0.001 (0.028)	0.006 (0.028)	0.026 (0.027)	0.027 (0.027)	0.023 (0.027)	0.028 (0.027)
ProfileSubstantive	0.0005 (0.027)	0.001 (0.026)	−0.001 (0.027)	0.002 (0.027)	0.004 (0.025)	0.004 (0.025)	0.001 (0.026)	0.003 (0.025)
ProfileCooperation	−0.013 (0.027)	−0.013 (0.027)	−0.012 (0.027)	−0.011 (0.027)	−0.006 (0.026)	−0.006 (0.026)	−0.004 (0.026)	−0.004 (0.026)
Female	−0.054** (0.027)	−0.053** (0.027)	−0.054** (0.027)	−0.055** (0.027)	−0.070*** (0.026)	−0.071*** (0.026)	−0.070*** (0.026)	−0.071*** (0.026)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.002** (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)
Married	−0.038 (0.037)	−0.038 (0.037)	−0.041 (0.037)	−0.039 (0.037)	−0.044 (0.036)	−0.044 (0.036)	−0.047 (0.036)	−0.045 (0.035)
Education	0.015 (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	0.007 (0.014)	0.007 (0.014)	0.007 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)
Household Size	−0.009 (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.011** (0.005)	−0.011** (0.005)	−0.011** (0.005)	−0.011** (0.005)
North West	−0.057* (0.031)	−0.057* (0.031)	−0.058* (0.031)	−0.053* (0.031)	−0.082*** (0.030)	−0.081*** (0.030)	−0.083*** (0.030)	−0.079*** (0.030)
South West	0.083 (0.069)	0.086 (0.069)	0.091 (0.070)	0.097 (0.068)	0.030 (0.068)	0.029 (0.068)	0.038 (0.068)	0.036 (0.067)
East	0.085 (0.070)	0.090 (0.070)	0.070 (0.072)	0.044 (0.069)	−0.023 (0.072)	−0.028 (0.072)	−0.036 (0.073)	−0.054 (0.071)
Urban	0.006 (0.030)	0.006 (0.030)	−0.004 (0.030)	−0.003 (0.030)	−0.017 (0.028)	−0.017 (0.028)	−0.022 (0.028)	−0.022 (0.028)
News	0.007 (0.014)	0.007 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)	0.008 (0.014)
Equal Opportunity	0.054*** (0.017)	0.055*** (0.017)	0.049*** (0.017)	0.049*** (0.017)	0.061*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.057*** (0.016)	0.057*** (0.016)
Authoritarian	−0.042*** (0.014)	−0.042*** (0.014)	−0.044*** (0.014)	−0.043*** (0.014)	−0.026* (0.014)	−0.026* (0.014)	−0.027** (0.014)	−0.027** (0.014)
Knowledge	0.021 (0.030)	0.021 (0.029)	0.019 (0.030)	0.023 (0.030)	0.054* (0.030)	0.054* (0.030)	0.053* (0.030)	0.055* (0.030)
Cabinet Culture	−0.015 (0.033)	−0.015 (0.033)	−0.012 (0.033)	−0.016 (0.034)	−0.041 (0.031)	−0.042 (0.031)	−0.040 (0.031)	−0.042 (0.032)
Cabinet Welfare	−0.008 (0.033)	−0.008 (0.033)	−0.005 (0.033)	−0.009 (0.033)	0.002 (0.031)	0.002 (0.032)	0.004 (0.032)	0.001 (0.031)
Cabinet International	−0.193*** (0.074)	−0.193*** (0.073)	−0.194*** (0.074)	−0.189** (0.075)	−0.081 (0.064)	−0.080 (0.064)	−0.078 (0.066)	−0.077 (0.066)
Constant	0.305*** (0.115)	0.311*** (0.116)	0.375*** (0.112)	0.362*** (0.116)	0.418*** (0.111)	0.413*** (0.111)	0.468*** (0.108)	0.442*** (0.110)
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390

| Note: | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Linear regression with robust standard errors with dependent variables scaled between 0 and 1.

SI.3: Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks

Table SI.3.1 displays the main models pooled among both Albanian and Macedonian respondents with a dummy variable to indicate Albanian respondents. Linear hypothesis tests between the descriptive and substantive representation measures are also shown. Table SI.3.2 displays these same results using linear regression models.

Table SI.3.3 and Table SI.3.4 subset the data by ethnicity and contain the full models with controls. Finally, Table SI.3.5 contains the full sample with an interaction between the Albanian dummy and descriptive and substantive representation variables.

Table SI.3.6 and Table SI.3.7 use a control for whether the cabinet has an ethnic Albanian minister leading it or not instead of the control for the type of ministry. Results are substantively the same.

The analysis listed here was described in the pre-analysis plan. The organization of the hypothesis was changed slightly from the pre-analysis plan: the original hypothesis about those who prefer representation being more likely to attend a public meeting was moved to a baseline condition, and the discussion about individuals who prefer both descriptive and substantive representation was made into a hypothesis. All of the intuition remains the same, and the rest of the analysis was conducted as planned. The robustness check for the ethnicity of the minister was added.

Table SI.3.1: Pooled Albanians and Macedonians Ordered Logit

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.075 (0.073)	0.090 (0.075)			0.053 (0.073)	0.042 (0.074)		
Employee			−0.033 (0.062)	−0.025 (0.062)			0.022 (0.061)	0.016 (0.062)
Financial	0.178** (0.074)		0.239*** (0.066)		0.134* (0.075)		0.157** (0.066)	
Concerns		0.151* (0.079)		0.224*** (0.069)		0.155** (0.079)		0.175** (0.069)
Albanian	0.176 (0.195)	0.174 (0.195)	0.160 (0.195)	0.163 (0.196)	0.272 (0.196)	0.286 (0.197)	0.275 (0.197)	0.288 (0.198)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.042 (0.223)	−0.060 (0.223)	−0.050 (0.223)	−0.079 (0.222)	−0.021 (0.222)	−0.033 (0.222)	−0.029 (0.222)	−0.041 (0.222)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.119 (0.223)	−0.109 (0.222)	−0.137 (0.222)	−0.123 (0.222)	−0.165 (0.222)	−0.154 (0.222)	−0.172 (0.222)	−0.159 (0.222)
ProfileNumber 10	0.034 (0.223)	0.015 (0.222)	0.029 (0.223)	0.001 (0.222)	−0.066 (0.221)	−0.077 (0.221)	−0.071 (0.221)	−0.082 (0.221)
ProfileSDSM	−0.146 (0.141)	−0.141 (0.141)	−0.141 (0.141)	−0.132 (0.141)	−0.127 (0.142)	−0.121 (0.142)	−0.124 (0.142)	−0.118 (0.141)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.202 (0.130)	−0.186 (0.130)	−0.210 (0.130)	−0.187 (0.130)	−0.203 (0.130)	−0.191 (0.130)	−0.205 (0.130)	−0.191 (0.130)
ProfileCooperation	0.116 (0.130)	0.123 (0.130)	0.117 (0.130)	0.126 (0.130)	0.090 (0.131)	0.094 (0.131)	0.088 (0.131)	0.094 (0.131)
Female	−0.071 (0.132)	−0.066 (0.132)	−0.072 (0.132)	−0.067 (0.132)	−0.105 (0.133)	−0.102 (0.133)	−0.107 (0.133)	−0.103 (0.133)
Age	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)
Married	0.109 (0.142)	0.098 (0.143)	0.101 (0.142)	0.084 (0.142)	0.026 (0.144)	0.013 (0.144)	0.023 (0.143)	0.010 (0.144)
Education	0.076 (0.070)	0.083 (0.070)	0.074 (0.070)	0.083 (0.070)	0.071 (0.070)	0.073 (0.070)	0.069 (0.070)	0.072 (0.070)
Household Size	−0.028 (0.035)	−0.028 (0.034)	−0.028 (0.035)	−0.028 (0.034)	−0.036 (0.035)	−0.037 (0.035)	−0.036 (0.035)	−0.037 (0.035)
North West	−0.279 (0.177)	−0.246 (0.177)	−0.269 (0.177)	−0.221 (0.177)	−0.399** (0.176)	−0.371** (0.176)	−0.397** (0.176)	−0.365** (0.175)
South West	0.642*** (0.212)	0.667*** (0.212)	0.656*** (0.212)	0.693*** (0.212)	0.548** (0.214)	0.568*** (0.214)	0.556*** (0.214)	0.576*** (0.213)
East	0.334 (0.234)	0.368 (0.233)	0.286 (0.234)	0.329 (0.233)	0.382 (0.235)	0.405* (0.233)	0.372 (0.235)	0.400* (0.233)
Urban	−0.005 (0.146)	−0.005 (0.146)	−0.022 (0.146)	−0.023 (0.146)	−0.125 (0.145)	−0.125 (0.146)	−0.128 (0.146)	−0.128 (0.146)
News	0.131** (0.058)	0.135** (0.058)	0.142** (0.058)	0.148** (0.058)	0.128** (0.058)	0.133** (0.058)	0.132** (0.058)	0.137** (0.058)
Equal Opportunity	0.359*** (0.067)	0.360*** (0.067)	0.357*** (0.067)	0.358*** (0.067)	0.339*** (0.067)	0.339*** (0.067)	0.338*** (0.067)	0.338*** (0.067)
Authoritarian	−0.119** (0.054)	−0.119** (0.054)	−0.122** (0.054)	−0.122** (0.054)	−0.063 (0.054)	−0.065 (0.054)	−0.064 (0.054)	−0.065 (0.054)
Knowledge	0.130 (0.157)	0.156 (0.157)	0.123 (0.158)	0.159 (0.157)	0.442*** (0.158)	0.457*** (0.157)	0.440*** (0.158)	0.457*** (0.157)
Cabinet Culture	0.206 (0.220)	0.199 (0.220)	0.219 (0.220)	0.208 (0.220)	0.062 (0.222)	0.060 (0.222)	0.062 (0.222)	0.060 (0.223)
Cabinet Welfare	0.113 (0.157)	0.113 (0.157)	0.124 (0.158)	0.124 (0.158)	0.170 (0.157)	0.171 (0.157)	0.168 (0.158)	0.170 (0.158)
Cabinet International	0.094 (0.207)	0.098 (0.207)	0.116 (0.207)	0.125 (0.207)	0.303 (0.207)	0.307 (0.207)	0.308 (0.207)	0.311 (0.207)
Observations	781	781	781	781	781	781	781	781
Hyp. Test	0.61	0.19	6.23***	4.94**	0.38	0.67	1.54	2.04

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered logistic regression with dummy variable for Albanian respondents.

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Table SI.3.2: Pooled Albanians and Macedonians OLS

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.041	0.054			0.034	0.028		
	(0.051)	(0.054)			(0.050)	(0.051)		
Employee			−0.030	−0.025			0.008	0.004
			(0.046)	(0.046)			(0.044)	(0.044)
Financial	0.141***		0.183***		0.108**		0.126***	
	(0.051)		(0.045)		(0.050)		(0.044)	
Concerns		0.127**		0.176***		0.123**		0.140***
		(0.056)		(0.047)		(0.054)		(0.046)
Albanian	0.024	0.030	0.016	0.026	0.108	0.119	0.108	0.121
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.035	−0.039	−0.038	−0.044	−0.029	−0.033	−0.033	−0.036
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.148)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.063	−0.047	−0.074	−0.055	−0.106	−0.093	−0.112	−0.097
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.147)
ProfileNumber 10	0.048	0.046	0.045	0.040	−0.021	−0.022	−0.025	−0.026
	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.148)
ProfileSDSM	−0.094	−0.093	−0.091	−0.090	−0.084	−0.084	−0.082	−0.083
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.136	−0.122	−0.143	−0.126	−0.141	−0.131	−0.143*	−0.132
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
ProfileCooperation	0.070	0.074	0.071	0.077	0.041	0.045	0.040	0.045
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Female	−0.060	−0.056	−0.062	−0.056	−0.062	−0.060	−0.062	−0.060
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Age	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Married	0.080	0.071	0.078	0.064	0.023	0.013	0.021	0.010
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Education	0.045	0.048	0.042	0.046	0.050	0.051	0.048	0.050
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Household Size	−0.019	−0.019	−0.018	−0.019	−0.021	−0.021	−0.021	−0.021
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
North West	−0.180	−0.168	−0.172	−0.154	−0.247**	−0.235**	−0.241**	−0.228**
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
South West	0.415***	0.429***	0.425***	0.444***	0.340**	0.350**	0.345**	0.356**
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)
East	0.210	0.225	0.179	0.195	0.214	0.217	0.205	0.209
	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.164)
Urban	−0.006	−0.012	−0.018	−0.027	−0.058	−0.062	−0.061	−0.066
	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
News	0.081*	0.085**	0.087**	0.093**	0.082**	0.085**	0.084**	0.087**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Equal Opportunity	0.219***	0.217***	0.220***	0.217***	0.206***	0.205***	0.206***	0.204***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Authoritarian	−0.066*	−0.069*	−0.068*	−0.072*	−0.036	−0.039	−0.036	−0.039
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Knowledge	0.125	0.144	0.120	0.145	0.306***	0.321***	0.305***	0.322***
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Cabinet Culture	0.098	0.093	0.108	0.101	0.018	0.015	0.018	0.015
	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.129)
Cabinet Welfare	0.077	0.075	0.085	0.083	0.099	0.099	0.101	0.100
	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Cabinet International	0.048	0.048	0.063	0.067	0.164	0.168	0.171	0.175
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Constant	1.409***	1.362***	1.520***	1.461***	1.568***	1.500***	1.608***	1.530***
	(0.369)	(0.377)	(0.365)	(0.379)	(0.362)	(0.370)	(0.354)	(0.368)
Hyp. Test	1.29	0.66	8.98***	7.55***	0.72	1.47	2.81*	3.58*
Observations	781	781	781	781	781	781	781	781

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression with robust standard errors and dummy variable for Albanian respondents.

Table SI.3.3: Macedonians Only

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.035	0.068			0.053	0.062		
	(0.094)	(0.091)			(0.093)	(0.089)		
Employee			0.011	0.018			0.051	0.049
			(0.083)	(0.082)			(0.082)	(0.082)
Financial	0.346***		0.362***		0.231**		0.241***	
	(0.102)		(0.093)		(0.102)		(0.092)	
Concerns		0.317***		0.344***		0.244**		0.256***
		(0.100)		(0.094)		(0.099)		(0.094)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.064	−0.067	−0.066	−0.072	0.090	0.086	0.091	0.087
	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.327)	(0.325)	(0.325)	(0.325)	(0.326)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.115	−0.075	−0.122	−0.086	0.047	0.077	0.040	0.070
	(0.322)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.322)
ProfileNumber 10	0.029	0.067	0.024	0.063	0.094	0.125	0.092	0.124
	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.323)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.319)
ProfileSDSM	−0.119	−0.169	−0.114	−0.163	−0.219	−0.261	−0.207	−0.250
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.204)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.322*	−0.293	−0.321*	−0.289	−0.361*	−0.344*	−0.348*	−0.332*
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.188)
ProfileCooperation	0.132	0.156	0.131	0.157	0.040	0.055	0.032	0.048
	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Female	−0.028	−0.020	−0.030	−0.022	0.057	0.062	0.051	0.058
	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Age	−0.008	−0.008	−0.008	−0.009	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Married	0.436*	0.378	0.435*	0.369	0.192	0.150	0.187	0.142
	(0.259)	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.257)
Education	0.041	0.072	0.039	0.070	0.081	0.097	0.077	0.093
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Household Size	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.008	0.038	0.035	0.043	0.039
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)
North West	−0.652*	−0.648*	−0.639*	−0.618*	−0.645*	−0.648*	−0.646*	−0.640*
	(0.343)	(0.344)	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.344)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.344)
South West	0.624**	0.637**	0.627**	0.643**	0.601**	0.614**	0.595**	0.609**
	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)
East	0.181	0.221	0.173	0.208	0.245	0.275	0.243	0.271
	(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)
Urban	−0.101	−0.137	−0.104	−0.148	−0.137	−0.152	−0.135	−0.155
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)
News	0.222***	0.235***	0.223***	0.238***	0.209***	0.220***	0.211***	0.223***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Equal Opportunity	0.233**	0.224**	0.233**	0.224**	0.175*	0.168*	0.173*	0.167*
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Authoritarian	0.041	0.040	0.040	0.038	0.079	0.077	0.081	0.077
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Knowledge	0.084	0.145	0.082	0.149	0.423*	0.458*	0.422	0.459*
	(0.263)	(0.259)	(0.263)	(0.259)	(0.257)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.255)
Cabinet Culture	0.720	0.821	0.718	0.824	1.061	1.108*	1.036	1.088*
	(0.602)	(0.598)	(0.603)	(0.597)	(0.652)	(0.651)	(0.650)	(0.648)
Cabinet Welfare	0.260	0.317	0.259	0.319	0.268	0.309	0.256	0.300
	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.237)
Cabinet International	0.429*	0.445*	0.434*	0.457**	0.525**	0.536**	0.523**	0.536**
	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.230)	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.231)
Hyp. Test	3.30*	2.32	5.89**	5.03**	1.09	1.26	1.72	2.05
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered logistic regression restricted to Macedonian respondents.

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Table SI.3.4: Albanians Only

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.271**	0.352**			0.253**	0.242*		
	(0.124)	(0.140)			(0.125)	(0.137)		
Employee			−0.095	−0.086			0.013	−0.011
			(0.103)	(0.104)			(0.102)	(0.104)
Financial	−0.014		0.201*		−0.023		0.129	
	(0.119)		(0.105)		(0.119)		(0.102)	
Concerns		−0.124		0.183*		−0.006		0.175
		(0.140)		(0.111)		(0.137)		(0.110)
ProfileNumber 1	0.047	0.052	0.026	−0.022	−0.123	−0.118	−0.151	−0.159
	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.320)	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.322)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.199	−0.209	−0.254	−0.260	−0.467	−0.465	−0.500	−0.488
	(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.325)
ProfileNumber 10	0.049	0.052	0.056	−0.010	−0.197	−0.190	−0.210	−0.232
	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.325)	(0.321)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.322)
ProfileSDSM	−0.004	−0.008	−0.016	0.022	0.172	0.167	0.145	0.176
	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.208)
ProfileSubstantive	0.030	0.032	0.022	0.045	0.021	0.018	0.004	0.022
	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.192)
ProfileCooperation	−0.089	−0.095	−0.094	−0.085	0.049	0.049	0.057	0.057
	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Female	−0.313	−0.309	−0.312	−0.315	−0.572***	−0.572***	−0.563***	−0.570***
	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.203)
Age	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.015**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	−0.289	−0.284	−0.338	−0.325	−0.374	−0.375	−0.406	−0.406
	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)
Education	0.119	0.122	0.122	0.118	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.043
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Household Size	−0.063	−0.061	−0.061	−0.060	−0.090**	−0.090**	−0.091**	−0.091**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
North West	−0.364	−0.377	−0.388	−0.327	−0.640***	−0.645***	−0.657***	−0.618**
	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.242)
South West	0.631	0.640	0.694	0.754*	0.239	0.233	0.344	0.341
	(0.422)	(0.420)	(0.422)	(0.416)	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.425)	(0.422)
East	0.668	0.724	0.554	0.410	−0.098	−0.088	−0.183	−0.278
	(1.663)	(1.664)	(1.660)	(1.657)	(1.728)	(1.729)	(1.724)	(1.723)
Urban	0.170	0.171	0.104	0.127	−0.073	−0.074	−0.114	−0.108
	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)
News	0.082	0.076	0.159	0.159	0.022	0.022	0.072	0.075
	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Equal Opportunity	0.427***	0.429***	0.391***	0.399***	0.489***	0.488***	0.461***	0.463***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Authoritarian	−0.296***	−0.290***	−0.312***	−0.307***	−0.169*	−0.171*	−0.183*	−0.181*
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Knowledge	0.128	0.121	0.100	0.136	0.448**	0.445**	0.440**	0.452**
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.222)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Cabinet Culture	0.029	0.037	0.055	0.038	−0.208	−0.207	−0.190	−0.202
	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.273)
Cabinet Welfare	−0.019	−0.011	−0.002	−0.022	0.083	0.085	0.085	0.073
	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)
Cabinet International	−1.358**	−1.358**	−1.401**	−1.338**	−0.356	−0.361	−0.344	−0.334
	(0.550)	(0.547)	(0.546)	(0.545)	(0.519)	(0.518)	(0.522)	(0.520)
Hyp. Test	1.68	3.32*	2.70	2.07	1.53	0.95	0.44	1.00
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered logistic regression restricted to Albanian respondents.

Table SI.3.5: Full Sample with Albanian Dummy

				Dependent variable:				
		First Meeting				Second Meeting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.034	0.079			0.025	0.048		
	(0.097)	(0.093)			(0.097)	(0.093)		
Employee			0.021	0.037			0.063	0.068
			(0.085)	(0.084)			(0.085)	(0.084)
Albanian	1.366***	1.483***	1.618***	1.623***	1.233**	1.337**	1.439***	1.459***
	(0.503)	(0.523)	(0.499)	(0.521)	(0.502)	(0.525)	(0.493)	(0.518)
Financial	0.408***		0.416***		0.319***		0.303***	
	(0.105)		(0.095)		(0.106)		(0.096)	
Concerns		0.361***		0.385***		0.309***		0.304***
		(0.104)		(0.097)		(0.104)		(0.098)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.106	−0.096	−0.111	−0.120	−0.073	−0.068	−0.076	−0.074
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.165	−0.143	−0.185	−0.163	−0.209	−0.188	−0.214	−0.193
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)
ProfileNumber 10	−0.024	−0.001	−0.021	−0.022	−0.113	−0.093	−0.111	−0.099
	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.222)
ProfileSDSM	−0.106	−0.140	−0.103	−0.119	−0.089	−0.120	−0.090	−0.109
	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.141)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.176	−0.166	−0.177	−0.157	−0.187	−0.181	−0.185	−0.172
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.131)
ProfileCooperation	0.106	0.112	0.104	0.114	0.084	0.090	0.081	0.087
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Female	−0.087	−0.074	−0.092	−0.081	−0.119	−0.111	−0.125	−0.118
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Age	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.005	−0.006	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Married	0.123	0.096	0.115	0.084	0.030	0.006	0.026	0.003
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Education	0.068	0.084	0.067	0.082	0.068	0.077	0.066	0.073
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Household Size	−0.021	−0.023	−0.020	−0.021	−0.031	−0.033	−0.030	−0.031
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
North West	−0.269	−0.282	−0.274	−0.250	−0.401**	−0.404**	−0.410**	−0.395**
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.176)
South West	0.716***	0.736***	0.723***	0.755***	0.593***	0.606***	0.599***	0.613***
	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.214)
East	0.309	0.372	0.301	0.362	0.352	0.409*	0.368	0.420*
	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.234)
Urban	0.027	0.008	0.003	−0.014	−0.106	−0.116	−0.117	−0.125
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
News	0.132**	0.138**	0.155***	0.164***	0.128**	0.136**	0.141**	0.150**
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Equal Opportunity	0.350***	0.350***	0.336***	0.337***	0.330***	0.328***	0.319***	0.320***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Authoritarian	−0.106*	−0.110**	−0.105*	−0.109**	−0.052	−0.057	−0.049	−0.054
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Knowledge	0.115	0.137	0.109	0.144	0.432***	0.451***	0.431***	0.452***
	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Cabinet Culture	0.172	0.209	0.184	0.203	0.045	0.063	0.043	0.056
	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.222)
Cabinet Welfare	0.089	0.129	0.100	0.126	0.153	0.180	0.151	0.172
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Cabinet International	0.118	0.121	0.124	0.133	0.328	0.326	0.324	0.324
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.207)
Hiring x Albanian	0.118	0.123			0.085	0.047		
	(0.146)	(0.153)			(0.147)	(0.151)		
Employee x Albanian			−0.098	−0.110			−0.073	−0.094
			(0.126)	(0.127)			(0.125)	(0.126)
Financial x Albanian	−0.451***		−0.320**		−0.353**		−0.260**	
	(0.151)		(0.132)		(0.151)		(0.131)	
Concerns x Albanian		−0.475***		−0.301**		−0.329**		−0.236*
		(0.165)		(0.139)		(0.162)		(0.139)
Observations	781	781	781	781	781	781	781	781

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered logistic regression with Albanian dummy interacted with descriptive and substantive representation variables.

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Table SI.3.6: Macedonians with Albanian Minister Control

	Dependent variable:							
	firstmeeting				secondmeeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.055	0.092			0.077	0.091		
	(0.093)	(0.090)			(0.093)	(0.089)		
Employee			0.028	0.044			0.072	0.074
			(0.082)	(0.082)			(0.082)	(0.081)
Financial	0.334***		0.354***		0.214**		0.229**	
	(0.101)		(0.093)		(0.101)		(0.092)	
Concerns		0.289***		0.320***		0.211**		0.228**
		(0.100)		(0.094)		(0.099)		(0.093)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.128	−0.131	−0.131	−0.137	−0.009	−0.015	−0.005	−0.012
	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.322)	(0.322)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.127	−0.087	−0.139	−0.104	0.014	0.041	0.006	0.033
	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.322)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.321)
ProfileNumber 10	0.042	0.080	0.034	0.072	0.080	0.107	0.075	0.105
	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.320)	(0.317)	(0.316)	(0.317)	(0.317)
ProfileSDSM	−0.145	−0.199	−0.134	−0.186	−0.249	−0.289	−0.230	−0.271
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.320*	−0.294	−0.315*	−0.283	−0.367**	−0.354*	−0.352*	−0.337*
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.188)	(0.188)
ProfileCooperation	0.147	0.167	0.144	0.167	0.088	0.100	0.076	0.089
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.188)
Female	−0.023	−0.013	−0.027	−0.017	0.057	0.064	0.049	0.057
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.192)
Age	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.004	−0.005	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Married	0.429*	0.379	0.426*	0.368	0.181	0.145	0.174	0.134
	(0.258)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.257)
Education	0.055	0.087	0.052	0.085	0.101	0.118	0.095	0.113
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Household Size	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.006	0.031	0.029	0.039	0.036
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.072)
North West	−0.611*	−0.602*	−0.595*	−0.570*	−0.577*	−0.575*	−0.579*	−0.567*
	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.343)	(0.342)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.344)
South West	0.673***	0.683***	0.674***	0.687***	0.681***	0.691***	0.671***	0.682***
	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)
East	0.181	0.223	0.174	0.214	0.251	0.279	0.251	0.278
	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)
Urban	−0.044	−0.077	−0.045	−0.087	−0.048	−0.062	−0.044	−0.063
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.212)
News	0.214***	0.224***	0.216***	0.228***	0.207***	0.215***	0.210***	0.220***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Equal Opportunity	0.244***	0.235***	0.242***	0.233**	0.186**	0.179*	0.184**	0.178*
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Authoritarian	0.052	0.052	0.051	0.051	0.097	0.096	0.099	0.096
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)
Knowledge	0.074	0.134	0.072	0.138	0.416	0.450*	0.413	0.451*
	(0.261)	(0.257)	(0.260)	(0.257)	(0.255)	(0.253)	(0.255)	(0.253)
Albanian Minister	0.455	0.406	0.447	0.389	0.845**	0.816**	0.834**	0.796**
	(0.368)	(0.369)	(0.368)	(0.369)	(0.360)	(0.362)	(0.359)	(0.360)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391

Ordered logistic regression.

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Table SI.3.7: Albanians with Albanian Minister Control

	Dependent variable:							
	firstmeeting				secondmeeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.286**	0.373***			0.268**	0.263*		
	(0.124)	(0.140)			(0.125)	(0.138)		
Employee			−0.065	−0.054			0.027	0.005
			(0.103)	(0.104)			(0.102)	(0.104)
Financial	−0.008		0.203*		−0.006		0.149	
	(0.120)		(0.106)		(0.121)		(0.104)	
Concerns		−0.126		0.179		0.001		0.189*
		(0.140)		(0.111)		(0.138)		(0.110)
ProfileNumber 1	0.018	0.021	−0.006	−0.058	−0.150	−0.148	−0.181	−0.194
	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.320)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.324)	(0.322)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.209	−0.221	−0.269	−0.267	−0.504	−0.504	−0.541*	−0.523
	(0.328)	(0.329)	(0.327)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.329)	(0.328)	(0.328)
ProfileNumber 10	0.037	0.037	0.039	−0.026	−0.209	−0.207	−0.224	−0.250
	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.325)	(0.321)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.325)	(0.322)
ProfileSDSM	−0.077	−0.079	−0.094	−0.048	0.154	0.152	0.125	0.165
	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.210)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.212)
ProfileSubstantive	0.083	0.086	0.073	0.087	0.083	0.083	0.062	0.078
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)
ProfileCooperation	−0.095	−0.099	−0.098	−0.090	0.058	0.058	0.066	0.063
	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.197)
Female	−0.278	−0.276	−0.273	−0.278	−0.561***	−0.561***	−0.553***	−0.559***
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)
Age	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007	−0.006	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.016**	−0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	−0.244	−0.240	−0.294	−0.278	−0.355	−0.356	−0.384	−0.383
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.248)
Education	0.119	0.121	0.119	0.116	0.042	0.042	0.040	0.035
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Household Size	−0.063	−0.061	−0.062	−0.060	−0.096**	−0.096**	−0.098**	−0.098**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
North West	−0.277	−0.291	−0.306	−0.239	−0.593**	−0.594***	−0.612***	−0.566**
	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.231)	(0.230)
South West	0.756*	0.770*	0.826*	0.882**	0.351	0.350	0.459	0.452
	(0.425)	(0.423)	(0.424)	(0.419)	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.425)	(0.424)
East	0.692	0.746	0.567	0.438	−0.014	−0.013	−0.116	−0.212
	(1.653)	(1.654)	(1.649)	(1.646)	(1.723)	(1.724)	(1.719)	(1.718)
Urban	0.235	0.239	0.170	0.189	0.006	0.006	−0.038	−0.036
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.220)
News	0.069	0.065	0.145	0.143	0.021	0.021	0.072	0.073
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Equal Opportunity	0.434***	0.436***	0.396***	0.404***	0.480***	0.480***	0.450***	0.452***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Authoritarian	−0.321***	−0.314***	−0.339***	−0.331***	−0.183**	−0.184**	−0.197**	−0.195**
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Knowledge	0.184	0.176	0.154	0.197	0.474**	0.473**	0.464**	0.481**
	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.222)
Albanian Minister	0.328	0.340	0.350	0.295	0.205	0.206	0.220	0.175
	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.229)	(0.227)
Observations	383	383	383	383	383	383	383	383

Ordered logistic regression.

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SI.4: Interaction Models

Figure SI.4.1 displays the marginal effects plot for hiring and concerns on first meeting attendance.

Figure SI.4.1: Albanian Marginal Effects

Albanian Meeting Attendance

Marginal effects plot for hiring and concerns on first meeting attendance. Linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables scaled from 0 to 1.

Tables SI.4.1, SI.4.2, SI.4.3, and SI.4.4 display interactions between descriptive and substantive ethnicity variables.

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.459*	0.315			0.417	0.284		
	(0.276)	(0.288)			(0.266)	(0.279)		
Employee			0.089	−0.023			0.344	0.186
			(0.287)	(0.325)			(0.279)	(0.321)
Financial	0.655***		0.409**		0.492**		0.415**	
	(0.217)		(0.188)		(0.206)		(0.185)	
Concerns		0.490**		0.321		0.397*		0.332*
		(0.217)		(0.198)		(0.208)		(0.195)
Hiring x Financial	−0.105				−0.090			
	(0.064)				(0.062)			
Hiring x Concerns		−0.060				−0.054		
		(0.066)				(0.064)		
Employee x Financial			−0.019				−0.069	
			(0.065)				(0.063)	
Employee x Concerns				0.009				−0.031
				(0.071)				(0.070)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.140	−0.083	−0.078	−0.069	0.026	0.074	0.048	0.079
	(0.330)	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.326)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.180	−0.088	−0.135	−0.083	−0.006	0.065	−0.005	0.057
	(0.324)	(0.321)	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.325)	(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.324)
ProfileNumber 10	−0.015	0.071	0.015	0.064	0.054	0.126	0.057	0.116
	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.321)	(0.320)
ProfileSDSM	−0.134	−0.183	−0.116	−0.162	−0.234	−0.272	−0.218	−0.253
	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.205)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.336*	−0.304	−0.322*	−0.288	−0.370**	−0.351*	−0.350*	−0.336*
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.188)
ProfileCooperation	0.156	0.166	0.136	0.156	0.056	0.062	0.048	0.052
	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.189)
Female	−0.036	−0.022	−0.031	−0.022	0.049	0.060	0.046	0.054
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Age	−0.009	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009	−0.006	−0.007	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Married	0.447*	0.376	0.431*	0.368	0.204	0.150	0.174	0.147
	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.260)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.257)	(0.258)
Education	0.045	0.063	0.038	0.071	0.089	0.091	0.077	0.093
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Household Size	0.005	0.004	0.009	0.009	0.034	0.032	0.039	0.035
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)
North West	−0.637*	−0.640*	−0.636*	−0.620*	−0.627*	−0.639*	−0.629*	−0.630*
	(0.342)	(0.344)	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.345)
South West	0.602**	0.624**	0.623**	0.645**	0.578**	0.601**	0.586**	0.602**
	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.259)
East	0.144	0.196	0.169	0.209	0.222	0.256	0.231	0.266
	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.249)
Urban	−0.102	−0.145	−0.102	−0.149	−0.137	−0.161	−0.130	−0.152
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)	(0.214)
News	0.223***	0.235***	0.223***	0.238***	0.209***	0.219***	0.210***	0.221***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Equal Opportunity	0.223**	0.215**	0.232**	0.225**	0.165*	0.159*	0.168*	0.164*
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Authoritarian	0.041	0.038	0.040	0.039	0.079	0.075	0.080	0.076
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Knowledge	0.107	0.177	0.089	0.145	0.442*	0.485*	0.452*	0.472*
	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.260)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.258)	(0.256)
Cabinet Culture	0.713	0.814	0.712	0.832	1.028	1.087*	1.027	1.069*
	(0.598)	(0.596)	(0.603)	(0.599)	(0.648)	(0.650)	(0.650)	(0.648)
Cabinet Welfare	0.243	0.313	0.259	0.319	0.247	0.302	0.253	0.298
	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.237)
Cabinet International	0.434*	0.449*	0.434*	0.456**	0.519**	0.535**	0.513**	0.534**
	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.230)	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.231)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Ordered logistic regression restricted to Macedonian respondents.

Table SI.4.2: Albanians Interaction Ordered Logit

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	1.284***	1.330***			0.954***	1.049***		
	(0.320)	(0.324)			(0.322)	(0.316)		
Employee			1.263***	1.402***			0.974***	0.954***
			(0.325)	(0.358)			(0.322)	(0.349)
Financial	1.160***		1.282***		0.810**		0.892***	
	(0.359)		(0.271)		(0.369)		(0.265)	
Concerns		0.993***		1.270***		0.960***		0.886***
		(0.358)		(0.275)		(0.365)		(0.270)
Hiring x Financial	−0.313***				−0.219**			
	(0.091)				(0.092)			
Hiring x Concerns		−0.299***				−0.253***		
		(0.089)				(0.089)		
Employee x Financial			−0.359***				−0.253***	
			(0.082)				(0.081)	
Employee x Concerns				−0.375***				−0.245***
				(0.086)				(0.085)
ProfileNumber 1	0.075	0.009	0.155	0.154	−0.075	−0.129	−0.029	−0.028
	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.325)	(0.323)	(0.325)	(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.325)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.271	−0.307	−0.231	−0.111	−0.491	−0.527	−0.458	−0.374
	(0.329)	(0.330)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.328)
ProfileNumber 10	0.038	−0.035	0.133	0.117	−0.190	−0.247	−0.127	−0.140
	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.327)	(0.323)	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.324)
ProfileSDSM	−0.032	0.004	−0.073	−0.063	0.117	0.140	0.074	0.109
	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.210)
ProfileSubstantive	0.102	0.096	0.107	0.107	0.077	0.083	0.062	0.063
	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)
ProfileCooperation	−0.084	−0.109	−0.089	−0.068	0.052	0.038	0.056	0.062
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Female	−0.356*	−0.292	−0.350*	−0.323	−0.591***	−0.548***	−0.587***	−0.567***
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.203)
Age	−0.006	−0.008	−0.006	−0.006	−0.014*	−0.015**	−0.014*	−0.014*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	−0.307	−0.292	−0.352	−0.340	−0.378	−0.366	−0.379	−0.377
	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.247)
Education	0.146	0.116	0.154	0.141	0.065	0.041	0.074	0.060
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Household Size	−0.053	−0.052	−0.069	−0.063	−0.083*	−0.082*	−0.097**	−0.094**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)
North West	−0.349	−0.319	−0.515**	−0.336	−0.639***	−0.605***	−0.757***	−0.634***
	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.242)	(0.239)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.242)
South West	0.661	0.682	0.385	0.616	0.232	0.237	0.048	0.194
	(0.415)	(0.417)	(0.422)	(0.417)	(0.426)	(0.424)	(0.434)	(0.423)
East	1.116	0.631	1.160	0.820	0.243	−0.162	0.263	−0.010
	(1.673)	(1.668)	(1.678)	(1.671)	(1.736)	(1.733)	(1.736)	(1.731)
Urban	0.211	0.206	0.073	0.168	−0.053	−0.056	−0.132	−0.086
	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)
News	0.138	0.125	0.240**	0.231**	0.057	0.063	0.120	0.124
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Equal Opportunity	0.366***	0.388***	0.264**	0.315***	0.448***	0.454***	0.373***	0.410***
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.110)
Authoritarian	−0.311***	−0.289***	−0.364***	−0.341***	−0.181*	−0.171*	−0.217**	−0.194**
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Knowledge	0.161	0.179	0.148	0.214	0.485**	0.494**	0.473**	0.498**
	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.222)
Cabinet Culture	−0.030	−0.046	0.025	−0.013	−0.254	−0.280	−0.212	−0.246
	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.275)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Cabinet Welfare	0.039	−0.009	−0.033	−0.097	0.122	0.080	0.048	0.014
	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Cabinet International	−1.389**	−1.348**	−1.463***	−1.380**	−0.341	−0.313	−0.364	−0.378
	(0.550)	(0.546)	(0.539)	(0.540)	(0.520)	(0.519)	(0.523)	(0.520)
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered logistic regression restricted to Albanian respondents.

Table SI.4.3: Macedonian Interaction OLS

	Dependent variable:							
	First Meeting				Second Meeting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.046 (0.044)	0.027 (0.047)			0.056 (0.043)	0.035 (0.047)		
Employee			−0.003 (0.051)	−0.032 (0.060)			0.049 (0.049)	0.015 (0.059)
Financial	0.096*** (0.036)		0.065* (0.034)		0.082** (0.034)		0.070** (0.033)	
Concerns		0.067* (0.036)		0.043 (0.036)		0.062* (0.035)		0.049 (0.036)
Hiring x Financial	−0.011 (0.011)			−0.013 (0.010)				
Hiring x Concerns		−0.004 (0.011)				−0.006 (0.011)		
Employee x Financial			0.001 (0.012)				−0.010 (0.011)	
Employee x Concerns				0.007 (0.013)				−0.002 (0.013)
ProfileNumber 1	−0.018 (0.062)	−0.006 (0.061)	−0.009 (0.062)	−0.001 (0.062)	0.010 (0.062)	0.020 (0.061)	0.013 (0.062)	0.023 (0.062)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.022 (0.059)	−0.003 (0.059)	−0.014 (0.059)	0.002 (0.060)	0.007 (0.060)	0.022 (0.060)	0.007 (0.060)	0.023 (0.061)
ProfileNumber 10	0.005 (0.059)	0.024 (0.060)	0.012 (0.060)	0.028 (0.060)	0.011 (0.059)	0.027 (0.060)	0.011 (0.060)	0.027 (0.060)
ProfileSDSM	−0.024 (0.038)	−0.036 (0.039)	−0.022 (0.038)	−0.035 (0.039)	−0.042 (0.039)	−0.051 (0.039)	−0.041 (0.039)	−0.049 (0.039)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.068* (0.035)	−0.060* (0.035)	−0.066* (0.035)	−0.059 (0.036)	−0.076** (0.035)	−0.070** (0.035)	−0.072** (0.035)	−0.068* (0.036)
ProfileCooperation	0.028 (0.036)	0.031 (0.036)	0.025 (0.036)	0.029 (0.036)	0.013 (0.036)	0.014 (0.036)	0.011 (0.036)	0.012 (0.036)
Female	−0.002 (0.036)	0.002 (0.037)	0.001 (0.037)	0.004 (0.037)	0.012 (0.036)	0.016 (0.036)	0.014 (0.037)	0.017 (0.037)
Age	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)
Married	0.072 (0.049)	0.062 (0.050)	0.071 (0.049)	0.061 (0.050)	0.034 (0.049)	0.026 (0.050)	0.031 (0.049)	0.026 (0.050)
Education	0.009 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	0.009 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	0.018 (0.020)	0.019 (0.020)	0.017 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)
Household Size	0.004 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.008 (0.013)
North West	−0.106* (0.064)	−0.105 (0.064)	−0.104 (0.064)	−0.100 (0.064)	−0.096 (0.064)	−0.095 (0.064)	−0.095 (0.064)	−0.092 (0.064)
South West	0.115** (0.046)	0.118** (0.047)	0.121*** (0.046)	0.125*** (0.047)	0.112** (0.047)	0.116** (0.047)	0.114** (0.047)	0.118** (0.047)
East	0.028 (0.046)	0.036 (0.047)	0.033 (0.046)	0.039 (0.046)	0.042 (0.047)	0.047 (0.047)	0.047 (0.047)	0.050 (0.046)
Urban	−0.003 (0.040)	−0.012 (0.040)	−0.004 (0.040)	−0.015 (0.040)	−0.007 (0.040)	−0.014 (0.040)	−0.006 (0.040)	−0.013 (0.040)
News	0.038*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	0.041*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	0.039** (0.015)
Equal Opportunity	0.039** (0.017)	0.038** (0.018)	0.041** (0.017)	0.040** (0.018)	0.029* (0.018)	0.028 (0.018)	0.029* (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)
Authoritarian	0.012 (0.013)	0.010 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.016 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)	0.016 (0.013)	0.014 (0.014)
Knowledge	0.028 (0.047)	0.042 (0.047)	0.024 (0.048)	0.037 (0.046)	0.087* (0.045)	0.098** (0.045)	0.088* (0.045)	0.095** (0.045)
Cabinet Culture	0.157* (0.088)	0.174** (0.086)	0.161* (0.090)	0.181** (0.085)	0.176* (0.096)	0.189* (0.098)	0.174* (0.096)	0.186* (0.096)
Cabinet Welfare	0.047 (0.045)	0.055 (0.045)	0.049 (0.045)	0.057 (0.046)	0.046 (0.045)	0.052 (0.045)	0.046 (0.045)	0.052 (0.045)
Cabinet International	0.073* (0.043)	0.074* (0.043)	0.073* (0.043)	0.076* (0.043)	0.089** (0.043)	0.090** (0.043)	0.088** (0.044)	0.091** (0.044)
Constant	−0.205 (0.188)	−0.153 (0.186)	−0.092 (0.191)	−0.037 (0.205)	−0.246 (0.190)	−0.199 (0.187)	−0.224 (0.189)	−0.161 (0.200)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression with robust standard errors restricted to Macedonian respondents.

Table SI.4.4: Albanian Interaction OLS

				Dependent variable:				
			First Meeting				Second Meeting	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Hiring	0.166***	0.170***			0.115***	0.125***		
	(0.038)	(0.041)			(0.038)	(0.037)		
Employee			0.167***	0.183***			0.129***	0.132***
			(0.043)	(0.047)			(0.039)	(0.044)
Financial	0.146***		0.174***		0.095**		0.122***	
	(0.044)		(0.038)		(0.048)		(0.036)	
Concerns		0.128***		0.172***		0.119**		0.127***
		(0.047)		(0.039)		(0.047)		(0.037)
Hiring x Financial	−0.038***				−0.024**			
	(0.012)				(0.012)			
Hiring x Concerns		−0.036***				−0.029**		
		(0.012)				(0.011)		
Employee x Financial			−0.046***				−0.032***	
			(0.011)				(0.011)	
Employee x Concerns				−0.048***				−0.033***
				(0.012)				(0.011)
ProfileNumber 1	0.011	0.001	0.021	0.016	−0.018	−0.024	−0.014	−0.014
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
ProfileNumber 6	−0.024	−0.030	−0.019	−0.008	−0.070*	−0.074*	−0.067*	−0.057
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)
ProfileNumber 10	0.015	0.006	0.025	0.016	−0.022	−0.029	−0.017	−0.021
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
ProfileSDSM	−0.005	0.001	−0.011	−0.006	0.021	0.025	0.016	0.020
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
ProfileSubstantive	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.007	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
ProfileCooperation	−0.013	−0.014	−0.012	−0.011	−0.006	−0.007	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Female	−0.057**	−0.050*	−0.056**	−0.055**	−0.072***	−0.069***	−0.071***	−0.072***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	−0.037	−0.034	−0.038	−0.038	−0.044	−0.041	−0.045	−0.044
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Education	0.017	0.015	0.019	0.017	0.009	0.006	0.010	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Household Size	−0.007	−0.007	−0.009*	−0.008	−0.010**	−0.010**	−0.012**	−0.011**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
North West	−0.055*	−0.051	−0.075**	−0.053*	−0.082***	−0.076**	−0.095***	−0.079***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
South West	0.080	0.084	0.053	0.082	0.028	0.027	0.012	0.026
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.066)
East	0.148**	0.083	0.162**	0.100	0.017	−0.033	0.029	−0.016
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Urban	0.009	0.010	−0.007	0.002	−0.015	−0.014	−0.024	−0.018
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
News	0.014	0.011	0.027*	0.026*	0.006	0.006	0.014	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Equal Opportunity	0.046***	0.049***	0.033*	0.038**	0.056***	0.056***	0.046***	0.049***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Authoritarian	−0.045***	−0.042***	−0.051***	−0.047***	−0.028**	−0.026**	−0.032**	−0.029**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Knowledge	0.025	0.026	0.025	0.031	0.056*	0.058**	0.057*	0.061**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Cabinet Culture	−0.022	−0.025	−0.019	−0.026	−0.045	−0.050	−0.045	−0.049
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Cabinet Welfare	−0.0005	−0.008	−0.015	−0.022	0.007	0.002	−0.003	−0.007
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Cabinet International	−0.191***	−0.189***	−0.197***	−0.192***	−0.080	−0.077	−0.079	−0.079
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Constant	−0.157	−0.117	−0.131	−0.190	0.122	0.073	0.112	0.065
	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.147)	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.147)	(0.168)
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression with robust standard errors restricted to Albanian respondents.

References

Roberts, C., Gilbert, E., Allum, N., and Eisner, L. (2019). Satisficing in surveys: A systematic review of the literature. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 83(3):598–626.