Elite Responses to Ethnic Diversity
and Interethnic Contact

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Do politicians who work alongside an ethnically diverse group of political elites improve their views toward ethnic outgroups? Political elites serve critical roles as elected representatives and public figures, but we do not know whether the act of political elites working together in an ethnically diverse environment impacts how they view ethnic outgroups. I argue that political elites work in a competitive environment wherein increased ethnic diversity can promote ethnic animosity and worsen outgroup views. However, elites share interests in maximizing resource distribution, which can lead to positive interethnic contact, improving outgroup views. I test these arguments by collecting original data from municipal government committee members in India. I show that elite outgroup views shift only to a limited extent in response to either increased committee diversity or engaging in interethnic contact. While interethnic contact shows the most promise for improving outgroup views, neither diversity nor contact alone seem to be solutions to intra-elite ethnic animosity.

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Sitting around a conference table in Delhi Secretariat, state cabinet ministers and bureaucrats arguing over who to blame for local pollution problems all agreed that the answer was to do whatever was necessary to shift responsibility to politicians in other states. In the process of taking action to achieve a common political goal, these politicians unified across ethnic differences in the hope that they all would benefit. As a prominent scholar of Indian ethnicity told me, "although the ritually symbolic hierarchies [of ethnicity] might be maintained — the ethnic minority elected official might sit on the floor — but sharing the money will be the same."[1] When political elites from different ethnic groups serve and work together are these relationships purely transactional or do they have the potential to improve elites' views toward ethnic outgroups?

Parry defines elites as those who "play an exceptionally influential part in political and social affairs" (Parry, 1969, 13). Political elites experience ethnicity within their ranks both based upon the ethnic composition of elites (diversity) and if they choose to develop interpersonal relationships (contact) with elites from ethnic outgroups. Understanding how elites react to elite ethnic diversity and intra-elite contact is important for promoting widespread ethnic tolerance since ethnic diversity among political elites has increased in recent years (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). In societies where ethnicity is a salient cleavage, political elites' views toward ethnic outgroups factor into their decision-making, resulting in either increased ethnic inclusion and minority-friendly public policies or animosity and exclusionary policies (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Lee, 2018; White, Nathan and Faller, 2015). Despite elites' importance, existing work has not evaluated whether ethnic diversity and interethnic contact among elites improves their outgroup views.

I take on this task by focusing on political elites in legislative committees. I evaluate how ethnic diversity among elites — both in the numeric composition of legislative committees and attention drawn to diversity — and interethnic contact between elites influence their ethnic outgroup views. As ethnic diversity in a legislative committee increases, I follow a

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[1]Respondent 7. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Chennai. Replication data and code for the quantitative analysis are available at the Harvard Dataverse: `https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JQKIFP`.

long line of existing literature studying members of the public that argues that elites' see the need to compete with elites from other ethnic groups for committee resources. This need for competition worsens elites' feelings toward the committee (affect), which in turn sours their perceptions of committee competence. Lower perceived committee competence resulting from increased ethnic diversity then leads elites to blame outgroups for committee competition, worsening elite attitudes toward outgroups. Interethnic contact between elites has the potential, I argue, to mitigate these impacts by fostering productive relationships among elites across ethnic groups, thereby improving affect toward the committee, perceptions of committee competence, and outgroup attitudes.

To test these arguments, I conduct a survey experiment and an observational study with municipal legislative committee members in India, the world's largest democracy. The Indian case allows me to sample from a large population of elite politicians with varying levels of diversity present in the committees to which they belong. I focus on how ethnic diversity and contact impact affect toward the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes. I find that increasing committee diversity does not have the widespread negative effects on elite outgroup views that many scholars have found when studying members of the public. Ethnic diversity and interethnic contact shift outgroup views only to a limited extent. Interethnic contact does seem to improve some elite outgroup attitudes, but it worsens perceptions of committee competence. Hence, elite responses to ethnic diversity and interethnic contact are more muted than public responses, implying that country leaders may wish to try to improve elite outgroup views by combining increased ethnic diversity and interethnic contact with other tolerance-improving strategies.

This study is the first to examine the effects of ethnic diversity and contact among political elites, a crucially important group of decision-makers. It also contributes by identifying theoretical mechanisms — affect toward the committee and perceptions of the committee — by which outgroup attitudes may change. Since political leaders most often want to influence outgroup attitudes, this study traces theoretically and empirically how political elites think

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through changes in elite ethnic diversity and intra-elite interethnic contact. The views and behavior of political elites in response to institutional changes like increased ethnic diversity have thus far been overlooked, and this study exemplifies how political elites' responses to ethnic diversity and interethnic contact are important to investigate in their own right.

Ethnic Diversity

International organizations have long highlighted the important role that elite ethnic diversity may play in turning ethnic tensions into positive outgroup relationships (Binningsbo, 2013). Practitioners have advocated for increasing elite ethnic diversity in all types of multiethnic democracies (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). For example, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proclaims that "States should strive for adequate representation of the diverse groups in their society ...in all relevant structures of public administration" in order to provide "a sense of shared belonging" (OSCE, 2012, 18, 46). In essence, the OSCE is calling for increased elite ethnic diversity in order to promote ethnic inclusion (e.g., Lemarchand, 2007).

Though never focused specifically on elite behavior, a long literature has theorized about how ethnic diversity may influence outgroup views (van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Much existing scholarship has argued that increasing diversity — absent interethnic contact — worsens outgroup views. There is substantial debate about this finding, with ethnic diversity producing positive effects in some specific contexts (Gundelach, 2014) and many authors arguing that theoretical and methodological nuance is required to interpret the litany of results (Hooghe et al., 2009). Even in cases where elite ethnic diversity appears to be successful, there are troubling signs that minority groups are still disadvantaged within government (Lemarchand, 2007). This lack of theoretical clarity calls for a more systematic investigation of the effects of ethnic diversity on elites' outgroup views.

I adopt the standard explanation from existing literature on members of the public which,

applied to the elite context, argues that ethnic diversity among elites worsens elites' outgroup views. This argument is plausible because of the unique way in which elites operate. Elites form a relatively small group in society, particularly at the legislative committee level. While there may be hundreds of elites in a legislature, legislative committees have relatively fewer members — sometimes fewer than a dozen. This means that the number of co-ethnic legislative committee members is often small. Ethnic differences are exacerbated in legislative committees because of perceived competition between elites belonging to different ethnic groups.

Absent contact, elites tend to operate independently or in co-ethnic groups. This is because political competition (Htun, 2004) and resource distribution (Chandra, 2004) often occur along ethnic lines. So it is natural for elites introduced into a legislative committee setting to turn inward toward their ethnic ingroup because that ingroup is more familiar (Putnam, 2007; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The small size of legislative committees makes this tendency more pronounced because elites need to interact on a personal level with one another more so than in the legislature as a whole. The result in a legislative committee with increased ethnic diversity, but without interethnic contact, is often gridlock. Committee members feel like they are competing with members of ethnic outgroups, but they simultaneously cannot necessarily get things done by operating only within their own ethnic group.[2]

As a result of separating into distinct groups, elites see the need to compete for finite resources with members of other ethnic groups (Bobo, 1988). This highlights differences between ethnic groups, which, I argue, prompts negative emotional responses toward the committee and its members. These emotional responses — known as affect — are multidimensional and can include strong positive emotions, strong negative emotions, mixed emotions, or lack of an emotional response. A committee member's affect toward the committee

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[2]Importantly, gridlock might prompt committee members to engage in interethnic contact (e.g., Posner, 2004), but this section of the theoretical argument is examining the impact of increasing ethnic diversity *without* changing the level of interethnic contact. Indeed, the section about interethnic contact argues that contact shows committee members that they can and need to work together to achieve similar political aims.

influences how they perceive the committee and its productivity (Esses and Dovidio, 2002; Gubler and Karpowitz, 2019). Negative emotional responses lead elites to perceive committee members as less productive, less reliable, and less effective. Elites then generalize from this negative experience, attributing these negative perceptions of the committee to the presence of ethnic outgroup members who are seen as responsible for creating committee gridlock. The result is a lack of elite cooperation and worsened outgroup views (Mehler, 2009; Schneckener, 2002).

Elites experience ethnic diversity in two ways. "Numeric diversity" refers to ethnic group membership among elites. If a legislative committee contains elites belonging to many different ethnic groups, then numeric diversity is high. The impact of numeric diversity on outgroup views is straightforward: increasing numeric diversity increases perceptions of outgroup differences that lead to negative views of the outgroup.

However, perceptions of outgroup differences can also increase when elites' attention is drawn to ethnic diversity by mentioning it explicitly — what I call "attention to diversity." These ethnic diversity cues occur for myriad reasons and are initiated by different actors. Elites themselves mention ethnic diversity in order to argue for additional resources for their ethnic group (Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002). Similarly, members of the public often advocate for increased resources or representation for their ethnic group (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). In essence, elites frequently receive ethnic cues from various sources that encourage them to think about elite ethnic diversity. Mentioning ethnic diversity increases the salience of ethnicity (Anderson et al., 2020; Domke et al., 2000) and serves to distinguish ethnic groups from one another (e.g., Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Using the same mechanisms as above, I expect that drawing attention to elite ethnic diversity worsens outgroup views.[3]

Hypothesis 1a: As numeric diversity in a legislative committee increases, elite outgroup

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[3]Elite cooperation may be explicitly referenced, but without such qualifiers, mentioning ethnicity should distinguish the in and outgroup.

views will become less favorable.

Hypothesis 1b: When elites receive a cue about elite ethnic legislative committee diversity, elite outgroup views will become less favorable.

Interethnic Contact

Is there a way for political leaders to promote ethnic diversity in order to be inclusive to minority ethnic groups while not suffering from intra-elite animosity? Putnam suggests that interethnic contact can achieve this type of positive between group interaction (Putnam, 2007, 164). Contact theory originated with the observation that, under certain conditions, interactions between individuals of different ethnicities leads to improved attitudes about outgroup members (Allport, 1954). Hundreds of studies have assessed the impact of contact on the public's attitudes toward outgroup members since the development of the original theory (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011).

Findings among members of the public are decidedly mixed (Brown and Hewstone, 2005; Hayward et al., 2017). Additionally, we gain little clarity by assuming that political elites act in ways similar to employees in workplace groups (Laurence, Schmid and Hewstone, 2018; Kokkonen, Esaiasson and Gilljam, 2014). Hence, it is an open question whether contact among political elites belonging to legislative committees improves or worsens outgroup views. Elites may react to contact differently from the public because elites have different political preferences (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Elites are calculating political actors who are willing to cooperate with political rivals if doing so can help them achieve their goals (Gilens and Page, 2014). Yet, elites also have stable preferences meaning that their views toward other ethnic groups are less likely to be influenced by interacting with outgroup elites (Jennings, 1992). Given the importance of legislative committees in making decisions that can impact a large number of members of the public, assessing the impact of interethnic

contact on elite outgroup views is critical.

Allport famously established four criteria — equal status, cooperative interdependence, common goals, and supportive norms — that help to promote positive interethnic interactions (Allport, 1954). On the face of it, these criteria seem to be plausibly met among elites working in legislative committees. Each committee member wields some political power (Strom, 1998), committee members need others' support to approve policies, each committee member wants to win re-election, and committees have norms of behavior (Hasson, 2010; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).

While committee structure can help shape elite behavior and promote positive interethnic contact, I argue that the political nature of elites makes this result all the more likely. Elites' primary goal is to maintain popularity by winning re-election, benefiting from delivering patronage, and/or advancing within their political party. The main way that elites do this is by obtaining and distributing resources to their constituents (Stokes et al., 2013). Intra-elite interactions are framed with these goals in mind. While elites may have short-term incentives to fight over resources among themselves, I argue that there are longer-term incentives for elites to cooperate that result in them overlooking outgroup differences in order to maximize resource distribution (Gibson and Hoffman, 2013).

Elites needing short-term political gains may be tempted to see committee resources as finite and to compete with other committee members for them. A quick injection of political patronage can be an effective strategy to gain political support (Driscoll, 2018; Kopecký, 2011) and can serve to satisfy local power brokers (Baldwin, 2013). However, by viewing committee resources as zero sum and singularly focusing on the short-term, elites reduce the potential for intra-elite collaboration to maximize long-term resource procurement.

Elites can more effectively distribute resources to their constituents if they work together. Indeed, a long line of work in many institutional settings shows that elites who are *more* concerned with re-election or long term popularity increase intra-elite cooperation (e.g., Slater and Simmons, 2012). This is because strategic elites know that short-term resource

delivery only sometimes works to increase political support (Remmer, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Focusing on short-term, zero sum resource delivery ignores long-term political aims both because politicians alienate other elites by taking resources for themselves and because politicians waste the opportunity to work together throughout their term in office.

A more effective method is to establish a stable system of resource delivery in collaboration with other elites in a committee setting. That is, elites can find positive sum opportunities to cooperate over the long-term. Such a system leverages economies of scale to increase elites' collective ability to distribute resources to constituents. When committee members work together, their reputation improves (Olivella, Kanthak and Crisp, 2017) and productivity increases (Battaglini, Sciabolazza and Patacchini, 2020). Resource distribution is, therefore, no longer zero sum (Wonka and Haunss, 2020). For example, elites who collaborate can more effectively determine how to distribute resources that benefit multiple constituencies. A road project in one constituency can leverage labor from a key business in another constituency in order to benefit multiple elites.

To cooperate in this way, elites must have contact with one another. Elite contact differs from contact among the public because it is structured by political motivations to maximize resource distribution. The political nature of contact implies that elites are more willing to set aside differences because doing so helps them achieve political goals (Micozzi, 2014; Muraoka, 2020). By limiting themselves to only working with and having contact with co-ethnics, elites artificially reduce their ability to distribute resources. Even when an ethnic group dominates committee membership, elites collectively profit from politically colluding with minority committee members (Bormann, 2019; Beiser-McGrath and Metternich, 2021) and by maintaining some minimum level of interethnic contact (Ringe, Victor and Gross, 2013). Therefore, elites' primary goal of ensuring re-election structures intra-elite interactions by providing resource maximizing incentives for elites to cooperate with one another that extend across ethnic lines. While ethnicity remains a salient political cleavage, elites are better off engaging in interethnic cooperation and contact because cooperation improves elites' welfare

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more than is possible when working alone or in co-ethnic groups.

By cooperating with one another, elites recognize that they all share the common goals of popularity and resource maximization. These shared interests form the basis of a common identity which improves affect toward the legislative committee because elites perceive each other as alike. Improved affect reinforces the belief that elites are all politicians at heart working toward the same political goals, meaning that elites' perceptions of the competence of committee members increases as contact increases. If elites see outgroup committee members as politicians working toward the same goals, then they should be willing to trust those outgroup committee members to spend money wisely and to have valid opinions. This, in turn, leads to improved attitudes toward outgroups since elites believe that outgroup politicians have similar goals and objectives as themselves and, therefore, ethnic groups are more alike than elites previously thought (Butler and Tavits, 2021).[4]

Hypothesis 2: When elite interethnic contact is high, elite views of the outgroup will be more favorable than when elite interethnic contact is low.

Case Selection

I study elite diversity and interethnic contact in municipal legislative committees in India, the world's largest democracy. Ethnicity in India is multi-faceted, comprising caste, religion, region, and language, among other identities. I focus on ethnicity as the combination of caste and religious categories. Both caste (Parikh, 1997) and communal (religious) (Brass, 2011) conflicts and animosity are common across India. Thus, when different caste and religious groups gain political power, these cleavages are visible to elites.[5]

India has a federal structure where small groups of elites are constituted in similar ways

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[4]Improved attitudes toward outgroups may themselves consist of improved affect toward outgroups, a possibility I consider further in SI.4.

[5]I define the ethnic majority as forward caste members, whereas non-forward castes and members of other religions are ethnic minority groups.

at different levels of government. Since elite ethnic diversity cannot be experimentally manipulated, I must rely on existing variation in the ethnic diversity of committees. I focus on India's urban municipal government because urban areas tend to contain caste and religious diversity, and politicians elected in municipal governments represent a large number of constituents (Aijaz, 2008; John, 2007). By doing sub-national research, I am able to control for many contextual factors that are problematic in cross-national research while still achieving significant variation in elite committee diversity.

Specifically, I study Indian municipal corporations (MCs). Municipal governance in India is determined by municipality size. All cities with more than 100,000 people are governed by a municipal corporation; there are roughly 200 MCs in India. MCs can be as large as states. Mumbai, the largest MC, has a population of 14 million, making it larger than twelve Indian states. By using MCs, I capture variation across the amount and salience of ethnic diversity in different committees without needing to move to cross-national data where ethnic categorizations between countries differ significantly.

The public elects the legislature of the municipal corporation, which serves as the corporation's main decision-making body. To provide elected elites (called corporators or councillors) with further control over day-to-day operations in the MC, corporators constitute three types of committees. First, most corporations have ward committees with corporators representing adjacent geographic areas. Second, corporators elect some of their own to the corporation standing committee.[6] The standing committee is the chief elected body in the corporation, and it is in charge of overseeing all corporation decisions and controlling high level budget and planning functions (Rosenthal, 1970). Third, other committees are often constituted that report to the standing committee (Aijaz, 2008; Datta, 1995). These other committees have specified corporation-wide duties. For example, many corporations have public works committees, garden committees, and solid waste committees. The standing committee gives these other committees authority to make decisions and to manage corporation affairs within

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[6]This committee is sometimes called the executive committee.

the purview of the committee.

Though the exact mechanism differs across corporations and states, both standing committees and other committees are elected by the corporators themselves. Political party leaders coordinate their candidates for membership on various committees and negotiate with other parties to create electoral coalitions (FinancialExpress, 2020). Just like corporation elections, committee elections are hotly contested. As a result, party leaders face an optimization problem when selecting committee candidates as they consider corporators' preferences alongside party needs (Shepsle, 1975). Party leaders care most about ensuring that committees contain members sharing their policy priorities (Back, Debus and Muller, 2016), while potential committee members are most concerned with the purview of different committees (Adler and Lapinski, 1997). Further, it is not the case that committees simply reflect the level of diversity or tolerance among the public in the corporation. Indeed, the mean range of committee diversity (on a 0 to 1 scale) within corporations surveyed in this study is 0.35.

What does contact among committee members look like? Shared committee membership facilitates at least three types of contact. Most obviously, committee members have opportunities for contact during committee meetings (Oldenburg, 1976), which occur at least once per month.[7] Apart from the somewhat more formal structure of committee meetings, committee members meet and work with each other on committee related business.[8] Third, shared committee membership may foster contact for reasons outside of the business of the committee.[9] For example, committee members who work closely together on a project related to the committee may discover that they have other shared political interests and, therefore, continue to have contact to discuss these issues.[10]

In these three settings, contact among committee members at least partially fulfills Allport's conditions that I argue are the key reason that elite contact improves outgroup views

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[7]Respondents 2 and 3. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

[8]Respondent 15. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

[9]Respondent 5. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

[10]Respondent 14. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

(Allport, 1954). Committee members treat each other as political equals, regardless of their social standing.[11] There is also cooperative interdependence because committee members often control bureaucratic or civil society organizations whose approval is required for municipal projects to be enacted.[12] The common goal of all corporators is re-election and potentially amassing additional political power.[13] Finally, while the local political environment can hardly be called supportive, there are norms of collaboration and collusion to help one another stay in power over the relatively long five year terms.[14] To summarize, committee members are elected representatives who chiefly interact and have contact along political lines with common goals and relatively wide ranging impact. For these reasons, interactions among committee members are likely to be cooperative, setting up the opportunity for contact to improve outgroup views.

On the flip side, while committees encourage contact, contact is by no means guaranteed. Committee meetings are highly structured, and there are strong social pressures to work to gain resources for co-ethnics only. So while the committee setting is an ideal place for contact to occur, elites can operate in committees without engaging in contact. Indeed, the mean level of contact among corporators surveyed was 0.62 on a 0 to 1 scale.

I selected five Indian states in which to conduct experimental and observational work on municipal corporation committee members: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. The 55 municipal corporations in these five states represent more than a quarter of municipal corporations in India and over a third of the population of the country ($\approx$ 500 million). These states also vary significantly in the powers given to municipal corporators, the salience of caste and its important cleavages, and geography. Finally — though this study is the first to collect data on municipal corporation committees — state municipalities acts suggest that these five states contain the most committee members.[15]

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[11]Respondent 7. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Chennai.
[12]Respondent 6. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Chennai.
[13]Respondent 15. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[14]Respondent 12. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[15]Number of committees multiplied by members per committee.

Research Design

To test my hypotheses about the implications of elite diversity and interethnic contact, I collect data on and field a survey experiment among Indian MCs.[16] The first task was to collect new data on Indian municipal corporator committee membership in the five selected states.[17] No centralized information on municipal corporators exists at either the national or state level. This data collection effort resulted in complete contact information for all committee members in 25 municipal corporations, amounting to 872 corporators on 146 committees and representing 55 million constituents. SI.2 discusses the data collection process in detail.[18]

Numeric Diversity

I hypothesize about two different measures of committee diversity: the ethnic composition of the committee (*Numeric Diversity*) and the attention drawn to committee diversity (*Attention to Diversity*). I use corporator committee membership to construct my main measure of numeric diversity. This is an observational measure, and corporator committee membership is not randomly assigned. Yet, given the important role that political parties play in whipping votes for committee elections and the fact that committee diversity within corporations varies significantly, it is not the case that a diverse public living in a corporation necessarily produces diverse committees. Political competition also subsumes any desire to intentionally prioritize selecting committee members who are the most likely to work well together; maximizing political power is corporators' overriding concern. I employ corporation fixed effects to capture public-level numeric diversity in the corporation. I also include a robustness check controlling for crimes against minority groups at the corporation level to capture the overall

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[16]In addition to my own fieldwork, Morsel Research and Development undertook the data collection and fielded the survey experiment between November 2019 and June 2020.

[17]The full data collection and experimental protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board #201910066 and was registered with EGAP. See Supplemental Information (SI) 1 for question wording.

[18]It is possible that some corporations intentionally choose not to constitute committees because of long-standing ethnic animosity. Lack of strong local political leadership is the most likely explanation for missing corporation committees.

state of outgroup views in the corporation.[19]

Conceptualizing and measuring numeric diversity in India is challenging. I categorize ethnicities into the most salient (predominantly caste-based) distinctions: Brahmin, Other Forward (OF), Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), Other Backward Caste (OBC), and Other Religion.[20] This categorization is used on the largest social survey in India (Desai and Vanneman, 2015).

To identify membership in a particular ethnic category, I use a hybrid archival and surname based classification approach. Though I do ask survey respondents to self-identify their ethnic category, I need to categorize all committee members, not just survey respondents. Further, ethnic self-identification is frequently quite different from how ethnicity is perceived socially. Social perceptions are what matter most for determining how people interact with each other. The hybrid approach uses government data on caste reserved seats, surname classification, full name classification, and archival analysis. All corporators in reserved seats are coded first, followed by surnames and full names clearly discernible to a trained local Indian coder (Jayaraman, 2005) and archival investigation that involved contacting local coders who interviewed journalists and collected other local information about ethnic categorization. SI.5 contains additional details about this categorization procedure. I define committee ethnic *Numeric Diversity* using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, with each of the six categories listed above (Lancee and Dronkers, 2011; Robinson, 2020). The formula is $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{6} p^2$ where p is the proportion of the committee controlled by a given group (Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015).

There are 146 committees across the 25 municipal corporations. Corporators serve on an average of 1.18 and a maximum of 5 committees. Mean committee size is 7.08 members, with twenty committees having two or fewer members and the Siliguri Borrow committee having 32 members.[21] Jamnagar had the most committees (16), followed by Bangalore (14).

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[19]See SI.6.

[20]In keeping with colloquial usage, I refer to varnas as castes.

[21]Some committees do actually have only a single member. Committees with only one or two members were excluded.

Ten corporations had only one committee. Standing committees were most common (16), followed by planning (11) and health committees (10).

Respondents were surveyed about 108 of these committees. On a 0 to 1 scale, the mean level of committee *Numeric Diversity* was 0.56, with Kanpur's Standing committee as the most diverse (0.79) and three committees in Bangalore (Education, Social, and Tax) with 0 diversity.

Survey Description

I conducted a phone survey experiment with 406 corporators.[22] Phone is the most common method used to reach corporators (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2021), who typically give out their phone numbers to constituents to call in case they have grievances or need assistance. Since I am interested in contact occurring within committee settings, I asked each corporator about their membership in a single committee.[23] I created a call sheet that was block randomized on corporation and caste reserved seat. This ensured that those corporators responding to the survey were representative of the corporation and reservation status diversity of the 872 corporators.

Enumerators went to great lengths to reach all corporators on the call sheet to preserve the quality of the sample. The survey completion rate was 90%, extremely high for an elite survey (Bussell, 2018). Enumerators were native to the state being surveyed, and the survey text was translated and back-translated into Hindi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Kannada.[24]

Interethnic Contact

The survey began by measuring self-reported contact with other committee members. Most existing work on interethnic contact has used surveys to develop measures of self-reported

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[22]The experiment has sufficient power to detect small effect sizes.

[23]Corporators belonging to more than one committee were asked about a single committee (see SI.2).

[24]The survey text was prepared in English and translated by a Hindi professor who identified problematic words, phrases, and concepts. Translation discrepancies were rectified so that questionnaires had the same meaning across languages.

contact similar to those employed here (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). One alternative is to shadow elites and to record their interactions with one another (Berenschot, 2010; Bussell, 2020). Both methods can suffer from social desirability bias: respondents are likely to self-report more frequent contact and elites being shadowed are likely to act differently than if no one was shadowing them. According to Pettigrew and Tropp's meta-analysis (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), self-reported contact has a significantly smaller effect on outgroup views than does observed contact. Hence, using self-reported contact should bias against finding an effect of interethnic contact on outgroup views.

As mentioned earlier, corporators can have contact with each other in many different settings. I asked about the frequency of contact among committee members without specifying the exact setting where contact occurred. Each corporation committee operates differently. Some committees meet formally with few opportunities for contact outside of the committee meeting. Other committees rely on informal contact to get things done. For this reason, I did not want to restrict contact to that just occurring in the formal committee setting. Additionally, it is quite difficult to delineate between political and social contact in Indian MCs. Many activities that seem like social contact — party or dinner invitations, for example — are highly choreographed political events.[25] By asking about the frequency of contact with other committee members, I can encompass the diverse settings in which politically motivated contact occurs.

Enumerators started measuring self-reported contact by telling respondents that they were interested in respondents' experiences on the committee that I pre-selected. I then randomly chose four members of the committee, block randomized by caste reservation, to ask respondents "how frequently do you talk to [name of committee member]?" (Lowe, 2021). Respondents answered on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 meant never talking to that person and 5 meant talking every day. Much existing research asks about contact with a specifically named outgroup. By asking about contact with individual committee members in a random

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[25]Respondent 5. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

order, I reduce social desirability cues. Given time constraints and survey fatigue, it was impractical to ask about the frequency of contact with every committee member.

Using these responses, I constructed a measure of outgroup contact by adding up the reported frequency of contact with outgroup members and dividing by the maximum level of contact.[26] For example, if the respondent was Brahmin and the committee members asked about were Brahmin (reported contact frequency of 4), OBC (3), SC (2), and ST (5), then the index used the contact frequency for the latter three corporators or $\frac{3+2+5}{5\times4}$ (see SI.5). Outgroup *Contact* ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 means no contact with outgroups and 1 means daily contact with outgroups.[27]

The mean level of outgroup *Contact* at the committee level was 0.62 with a maximum of 0.85 in the Bangalore Architecture and Jamnagar Education committees, whereas the Jamnagar Sanitation, Works, and Slums committees had the lowest levels of contact (under 0.25). Four corporators reported having daily contact with all outgroup members asked about in the survey.

It is worth noting that 82% of respondents reported having cooperative as opposed to conflictual or neutral contact. This provides some credence to my argument that corporation committees are places where the conditions that promote positive interethnic contact occur.

Attention to Diversity

After these questions about outgroup contact, I proceeded to measure elites' responses to drawing attention to the level of diversity on the committee. Though the measure of *Numeric Diversity* is inherently observational, I can experimentally manipulate *Attention to Diversity* to reflect cues mentioning the diversity of the committee as a way to increase the salience of ethnic diversity.

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[26]I am interested in the absolute amount of contact with outgroup elites, not the relative comparison between in and outgroup elite contact because my argument is about the total amount of outgroup elite contact.

[27]Only survey respondents who were asked about their contact with at least one outgroup corporator were included in the analysis.

Respondents were assigned to either a treatment or control condition block randomized based on whether the respondent held a general or a reserved legislative seat. Respondents in the treatment condition were primed to think about the ethnic composition of the committee when answering subsequent questions about outgroup views. The purpose of this prime was to draw attention to the ethnic diversity on the committee. Because I am interested in elites' responses to the prime, not to a specific sender, I kept the sender ambiguous. By referencing caste and religious diversity by name, the prime emphasizes distinctions between ethnic groups. Hence, the prime should distinguish in and outgroups and result in worsened outgroup views. The only difference between the two conditions is that the treatment condition primed respondents directly on "caste and religious differences" (Koopmans and Veit, 2014) while the control condition did not identify the source of said differences.[28]

Control: "As you know, committees often contain different types of members. Committee members often have very different viewpoints and policy priorities."

Treatment: "As you know, committees often contain members belonging to different caste and religious groups. Because of caste and religious differences, committee members often have very different viewpoints and policy priorities."

Outgroup Views

Following the administration of a prime, respondents were asked about their outgroup views in three ways: affect toward the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes.

The amount of interethnic contact and committee diversity may alter respondents' affect toward working with others on the committee. Affect is a key building block of outgroup attitudes (Esses and Dovidio, 2002), as attitudes change through an inextricably linked mix of emotions and cognition (McDermott, 2004). I asked four questions about respondents' affect

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[28]SI.3 contains randomization and balance checks.

toward the committee: their *Enthusiasm*, *Anger*, *Hopefulness*, and *Resentfulness*. Using these four emotion questions, I classified respondents into having *Pleasant*, *Unpleasant*, *Mixed* (high pleasant and unpleasant affect), or *Weak* (low pleasant and unpleasant affect) affect toward the committee (Thornton, 2011). See SI.4 for details.

Perceptions of the committee refers to a set of scenario-based questions asking respondents about their opinion of other members on the committee. Ethnicity is not mentioned in these questions to reduce the social desirability bias inherent in directly asking about one's views of others (Oberg, Oskarsson and Svensson, 2011). I developed three questions: one about the likelihood of a committee member *Spending Money Wisely*, one about being willing to take committee members' *Opinions* into account, and one about taking concerns from a committee member "with a different background and experiences from you" into account (*Valid Concerns*). These questions tap into attitudes about committee member trust (Robinson, 2020) and equality (McIntosh et al., 1995). Finally, I asked if respondents felt that the committee was a collection of individuals or *One Group*.

I then asked questions about ethnic group membership. First, I asked about the degree to which the respondent trusts committee members from different ethnic groups (*Trust*). I then asked questions about general outgroup attitudes including willingness to live next to an outgroup *Neighbor* and to *Talk* to an outgroup member (Doebler, McAreavey and Shortall, 2018). The latter two questions were not restricted to the committee context in order to see if committee diversity and contact improve overall outgroup attitudes.

Finally, I included a behavioral measure of policy preferences. The question (*Donation*) asked if respondents wanted to donate an honorarium to a charity that helps lower caste betterment instead of to a charity that helps with disaster aid (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; Mironova and Whitt, 2014).

At the end of the survey, I asked several demographic questions including age, education, caste identification, and previous employment. I also included a question about social media use because social media could increase the salience of ethnicity, decreasing interethnic

contact and tolerance.

Empirical Strategy

To test Hypothesis 1a, I examine the relationship between numerical diversity and outgroup views. For Hypothesis 1b, I use a dichotomous treatment indicator to evaluate the effect of attention to diversity on outgroup views. I examine the correlation between contact and outgroup views to test Hypothesis 2.

In the main text, I discuss results from linear regression models with fixed effects by corporation and cluster robust standard errors with dependent variables scaled to be between 0 and 1 and standard demographic controls. SI.6 contains full regression results and robustness checks with logistic and ordered multilevel models, conceptualizing numerical diversity as just forward and backward caste membership, using self-reported numerical diversity, employing state instead of corporation fixed effects, and including a measure of crimes against minority groups. All robustness checks are consistent with the results presented here.

Results

I start by examining the relationship between ethnic diversity and outgroup views. Figure 1 displays coefficients from regression models on the dependent variables listed. Dependent variables are grouped into affect about the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes. Both committee diversity (numeric and attention) and contact are included.

Numeric Diversity largely does not correlate with views of the outgroup including affect, cabinet perceptions, and outgroup attitudes. Respondents in committees that are more numerically diverse tend to display more pleasant and less unpleasant affect. However, these results are the opposite of my expectations in Hypothesis 1a: high levels of *Numeric Diversity* are not associated with negative outgroup views. If anything, numeric diversity correlates

Figure 1: Ethnic Diversity, Interethnic Contact, and Outgroup Views

Note: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with Contact, Attention to Diversity, and Numeric Diversity as independent variables and dependent variables from three groups — affect, perceptions, and outgroup attitudes — shown. Dependent variables scaled between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, cluster robust standard errors, and standard demographic control variables included. 95% confidence intervals.

with higher pleasant affect.

Turning to *Attention to Diversity*, I examine the effect of receiving the treatment on outgroup views. Hypothesis 1b expects that when elites receive the treatment drawing their attention to committee diversity, outgroup views will worsen. Here again, Figure 1 shows that this is not the case. In all measures of outgroup views, drawing attention to elite ethnic diversity had either null or *positive* effects on outgroup views. Respondents' willingness to *Talk* to members of the ethnic outgroup increased when they received the prime.

Moving to Hypothesis 2 and affect toward the committee, increased *Contact* is associated with increased *Mixed* affect and decreased *Weak* affect. *Pleasant* and *Unpleasant* affect are unchanged. This result indicates that respondents who had more frequent contact with their committee members developed relationships with them such that weak affect turned into mixed affect, i.e., they developed stronger preferences about members of the committee. Not only is this finding intuitive, but it suggests that the contact measure is indeed capturing the relationships between committee members.

In terms of perceptions of the committee, respondents who had more contact with other committee members were less likely to believe that committee members would *Spend* money wisely and were less likely to listen to the *Opinions* of other committee members. More frequent *Contact* is associated with committee members relying at least somewhat more on their own judgment and not valuing those with different perspectives. Though the substantive size of these results is small, they still go against my expectations in Hypothesis 2, where increasing interethnic contact is hypothesized to improve perceptions of the competence of committee members.

Considering outgroup attitudes: individuals who had more contact with outgroup members were more willing to have these individuals as *Neighbors* and to *Talk* with them.[29] The size of these effects are large: 0.25 on a 0 to 1 scale. This indicates that if *Contact* is 1 instead of 0, then willingness to have an outgroup *Neighbor* or to *Talk* to an outgroup

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[29]Recall that these models use corporation fixed effects to control for the overall level of ethnic diversity in the corporation.

member will be more than 1 point higher on a 1 to 5 scale. On balance, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. High levels of contact are not associated with improved affect toward the committee or perceptions of committee competence. Contact is associated with two indicators of outgroup attitudes, but not the behavioral donation measure. In other words, contact is not unambiguously associated with improved outgroup views.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results from this study underline the fact that increasing elite diversity and contact are not universal ways to improve outgroup views. First, although neither numeric nor attention-based committee diversity produced much backlash, they were largely not associated with improved outgroup views either. Descriptive representation has long been proposed as a way to improve ethnic relations. While these benefits may exist for members of the public looking at the ethnic composition of committees, in this study elites do not alter outgroup views simply because of changing committee diversity. Second, interethnic contact may be associated with some improvements in outgroup attitudes, but these potential improvements are overshadowed by null and negative results for other kinds of outgroup views. This study highlights that we cannot assume that elites react to ethnic outgroup members in the same way as do members of the public. Elite outgroup views are highly influential, and this study should be the first of many to examine the ways in which elite interactions improve elite tolerance and whether these attitudes are reflected in policy changes.

Of course, changing committee diversity is a much more tangible policy than is increasing elite interethnic contact. Party leaders and municipal corporators will have a more difficult time figuring out how to encourage frequent interethnic contact among committee members. One suggestion that is within the control of these leaders is increasing committee meeting frequency. Though most committees are assigned to meet monthly and to be renewed yearly, evidence from corporation meeting records in Delhi suggests that several committees meet

with less regular frequency or hold pro-forma meetings where few members attend. Holding corporators accountable for frequent committee meetings may help to encourage both a collaborative working environment and one where opportunities for contact increase.

Municipal corporators remain largely understudied in India, but local government is critical to improving public services and to fostering community engagement. Efforts by nonprofit organizations are underway to better equip and train municipal corporators so that they can improve their job performance and be held publicly accountable for their actions. In this environment, corporators are under pressure to work together to provide solutions to crippling public service inequities. Though interethnic contact is by no means *the* solution to these problems, contact could be combined with other strategies to help improve elites' understanding of outgroups.

Future work would do well to expand these results to other government contexts. Unlike public contact, which can be randomized after some degree of difficulty, elite contact is essentially observational and self-reported. The types of contact most likely to be helpful in improving outgroup views are multi-year relationships, not telling a politician that their governing body is diverse or facilitating short-term interactions between political leaders. Local government offers an ideal setting for studying contact because of the mix of important governing responsibilities and a relatively large number of such bodies in any given country, thereby maximizing committee diversity and opportunities for contact. The fact that elite outgroup views are largely unchanged by both ethnic diversity and interethnic contact is all the more reason to consider future interventions further investigating intra-elite relationships in order to avoid backlash effects while trying to promote improved outgroup views.

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Supplemental Information:
Elite Responses to Ethnic Diversity and Interethnic Contact

Contents

Replication data and code is available at the Harvard Dataverse: `https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JQKIFP`. This project was pre-registered with EGAP (Registration ID 20191125AA), and the pre-analysis plan is available at `https://osf.io/n8z9w`.

SI.1:   Survey Questions

- Pre-Survey Questions:

    1. Name of corporator.
    2. Female: 1-Female, 0-Male.
    3. Caste Reservation: 1-Constituency is caste reserved, 0-Otherwise.
    4. State: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.
    5. Corporation: Name of corporation.
    6. Constituency: A description of the constituency the corporator represents (usually a ward number).
    7. Political Party: Name of corporator's political party. Recoded into BJP: 1-If party is BJP, 0-Otherwise and INC: 1-If party is Indian National Congress, 0-Otherwise.
    8. Committees: List of committees the corporator serves on.
    9. Number Committees On: Total number of committees the corporator serves on.
    10. Times Elected: Number of times elected to the corporation. Recoded into number of years in office and dichotomized for those serving more than 5 years (one term).
    11. Corporator phone number (redacted).
    12. Committee Asked About: Name of committee each corporator was asked about.
    13. Committee Diversity: Herfindahl-Hirschman index with six caste categories (Brahmin, OF, SC, ST, OBC, Other Religion) coded using the method described below for each committee.

- Pre-Treatment Questions:

    14. UniqueIDFinal: Unique respondent ID.
    15. Contact: Using the committee asked about, a list of up to four corporators was selected for inclusion in this survey question. A respondent was asked about four corporators if the committee had five or more members; a respondent was asked about the entire committee if there were fewer

than five members. Block randomization by caste reserved seat was used to select the four corporators to ask about in committees with more than five members. This helped ensure that each respondent was asked about at least one non-coethnic committee member.

This question was repeated up to four times, once for each of the selected committee members: "I am going to ask you how frequently you talk to other members on the {name of committee asked about} committee. Please answer on a scale from 1 meaning you never talk to this person to 5 meaning you talk to this person every day. How frequently do you talk to {name of committee member}?"

Each committee member asked about was then caste coded, and coethnic committee members were excluded. Among non-coethnic committee members, I added up the reported frequency of contact and divided by the total number of committee members asked about. This is the main measure of contact used. I also measured contact between just forward and backward castes where Brahmin and OF are forward castes and all other categories are backward castes.

16. "Would you say that your interactions with other committee members are mostly cooperative, mostly conflictual, or some of both?" (Record response where 0-mostly conflictual, 1-some of both, 2-mostly cooperative).

- Treatment Administration:

  – Control: "As you know, committees often contain different types of members. Committee members often have very different viewpoints and feel that different policies are important."

  – Treatment: "As you know, committees often contain members belonging to different caste and religious groups. Because of caste and religious differences, committee members often have very different viewpoints and feel that different policies are important."

  – Recorded as 1-Treatment administered, 0-Control administered. Block randomized by caste reservation. Enumerators were instructed to read the text slowly and clearly and to wait a few seconds after reading it. Since this was a phone survey, we can ensure that the control or treatment were fully administered.

- Dependent Variables:

  17. Spend Wisely: "Suppose a member of the {the name of the committee recorded in question 4} committee receives money to work on a policy of great importance to you. How likely is it that they spend the money wisely?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

  18. Opinions: "In general, how likely are you to take the opinions of other member of the committee into account when you make decisions?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

  19. Valid Concerns: "Consider a situation in which a member of the committee who has a different background and experiences from you disagrees with you. How likely are their concerns to be valid?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

  20. One Group: "To what extent do you think of the committee as one group as opposed to a collection of individuals with different experiences?" (Record response where 1-collection of individuals and 5-one group). Note that the initial scale was 0-collection of individuals and 1-one group, but that the survey was implemented with a 1 to 5 scale.

  21. Enthusiastic: "How enthusiastic do you feel when working with others on the {the name of the committee being asked about} committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

  22. Angry: "How angry do you feel when working with others on the {the name of the committee being asked about} committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

  23. Hopeful: "How hopeful do you feel when working with others on the {the name of the committee being asked about} committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

  24. Resentful: "How resentful do you feel when working with others on the {the name of the committee being asked about} committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

25. Donation: "We would like to give some money to an Indian NGO to thank you for your taking this survey. Would you like us to give to a charity that supports the betterment of lower castes or a charity that helps with disaster aid?" (Record response where 0-disaster relief and 1-caste betterment). Note that I donated to the India Development and Relief Fund and Dalit Solidarity respectively.

26. Caste Trust: "I have just a few more questions for you before we finish. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means very much disagree and 5 means very much agree, how much would you agree with the following statements?" "Members of the {the name of the committee asked about} committee who are from different caste or religious backgrounds keep their word and do what is agreed on." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree).

27. Neighbor: "You would be uncomfortable if someone who was a member of a different caste or religious group moved in next door to you." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree). Reverse coded.

28. Talk: "You would be happy to talk to someone who was a member of a different caste or religious group." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree).

- Post-Treatment Demographics:

29. Age: "What is your age?" (Enter age in years).

30. Social Media: "Are you never, sometimes, or frequently professionally active on social media?" (0-never, 1-sometimes, 2-frequently). Recoded where 1-Sometimes or frequently and 0-Never.

31. Education: "How many standards or years of education have you completed?" (Code response in years where: no formal education-0, 1st class-1, 5th class-5, Secondary-10, Bachelors-15, Above Bachelors-16). Recoded where 1-Completed Bachelors and 0-Otherwise.

32. Self-Reported Caste: "Are you: Brahmin, General/Forward, Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe, Other Backward Class, or non-Hindu/other religion?" (Code response as: Brahmin, General/Forward, Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe, Other Backward Class, or non-Hindu/other religion).

33. Occupation: "What was your primary occupation before being elected to the municipal corporation?" (Record response).

- Survey Information:

34. Times Called: Number of times the respondent was called before responding to the survey.

35. Interview Language: Language of the interview.

36. Interviewer: Name of the survey enumerator.

37. Date: Date the interview was conducted.

Table SI.1.1 lists descriptive statistics for key independent and dependent variables at the individual level. We might be concerned here with floor or ceiling effects. Indeed, the mean values of most dependent variables are in the "agree" range. This is likely because of social desirability bias in the survey. However, there is substantial variation across dependent variables, and a significant number of respondents chose 3 or less on the 1 to 5 scale.

To what extent are socially desirable responses a problem? First, respondents are likely to provide socially desirable responses to all questions including the frequency of contact, outgroup views, and ethnic self-identification. The independent variables of interest are measured indirectly, meaning that the respondent would have to know more information about the survey than is available to them in order to provide a socially desirable response. For the measures of outgroup views, initial questions start out without explicitly mentioning ethnicity in order to reduce socially desirable responses. When ethnicity is mentioned, all respondents are likely to respond in similar socially desirable ways, not somehow conditioning their socially desirable responses based on their measures of inerethnic contact and committee diversity. Finally, we know from the mixed nature of the results — views of committee members slightly worsen whereas outgroup attitudes improve in response to increased contact — that social desirability is not a major concern or else we would be quite unlikely to see the combination of these two results simultaneously.

Table SI.1.1: Individual Level Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min	Max	SD	Mean	Median
Diversity	0.00	0.79	0.15	0.59	0.64
Pct. Not Forward	0.00	1.00	0.26	0.50	0.45
Contact	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.62	0.60
Contact (Forward/Backward)	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.62	0.60
Spend Wisely	1.00	5.00	1.03	4.12	4.00
Opinions	1.00	5.00	0.88	4.31	5.00
Valid Concerns	1.00	5.00	1.32	3.55	4.00
One Group	1.00	5.00	0.87	4.17	4.00
Caste Trust	1.00	5.00	0.93	3.68	4.00
Talk	1.00	5.00	0.90	4.10	4.00
Neighbor	1.00	5.00	1.24	3.66	4.00
Committee Positive Interaction	0.00	1.00	0.38	0.82	1.00
Enthusiastic	1.00	5.00	0.75	4.43	5.00
Angry	1.00	5.00	1.04	1.88	2.00
Hopeful	1.00	5.00	1.44	3.49	4.00
Resentful	1.00	5.00	1.02	1.84	2.00
Donation	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.11	0.00
Age	24.00	70.00	7.72	47.38	48.00
Female	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.44	0.00
Year Elected	1974.00	2019.00	5.73	2012.17	2015.00
Caste Reservation	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.20	0.00
Brahmin	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.09	0.00
OF	0.00	1.00	0.49	0.42	0.00
OBC	0.00	1.00	0.43	0.24	0.00
SC	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.10	0.00
ST	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.03	0.00
Other Religion	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.12	0.00
BJP	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.55	1.00
INC	0.00	1.00	0.36	0.15	0.00
Bachelors Degree	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.55	1.00
Multi-Term	0.00	1.00	0.47	0.33	0.00
Social Media Active	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.43	0.00
Called Three Times	0.00	1.00	0.48	0.36	0.00

SI.2: Sampling Procedure and Treatment Assignment

This study relies on data from data from municipal corporations in five Indian states. In this section, I explain the process for selecting the states from which to collect data, the data collection process, the sampling process, and the treatment assignment.

The goal in selecting states in which to conduct the survey was to maximize the number of municipal corporations and municipal corporation committees that I could survey. To achieve this goal, I began by accessing and reading the municipal corporation acts for each of the 27 Indian states. In reading these documents, I determined basic information about the composition of the municipal corporation and the number of committees. States set the structure of their corporations to either include only ward committees or to include one or more general (sometimes called standing) committees usually with ward committees. I excluded all states that only had ward committees with no general committees. I then attempted to calculate the number of committees and the number of councillors on each committee to get an estimate of total sample size. I based this estimate off of available committee lists on the websites of as many municipal corporations as I could access. Most municipal corporations do not list committee membership on their websites, so this is a biased estimate.

As a result of this process, eight states emerged where I estimated that there were many committees with many members on each committee. These states were: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Tamil Nadu was excluded because no elected councillors existed at the time of the survey; elections had been postponed for many years and bureaucrats ran the government. I also excluded Orissa and Rajasthan because they had fewer municipal corporations than other states and because the remaining five states provided good geographic variance, variance in caste salience, and variance in municipal corporation authority.

These five states (Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) collectively have 55 municipal corporations. The survey firm Morsel collected contact information for councillors in these 55 corporations from November 2, 2019 through March 27, 2020. The data collection process worked as follows:

- File a Right to Information Act request with each municipal corporation for the list of councillors and their phone numbers.

- Wait one month for the reply to the RTI. If no response, call the corporation secretary and inquire about the RTI status. File a second RTI if necessary.

- If a corporation still did not reply to the RTI (few did), send a trained survey enumerator to each corporation to attempt to collect the information in person. This procedure typically required several visits to the corporation offices and a lot of persistence.

After going through this procedure, Morsel obtained complete contact information for 25 of the 55 municipal corporations. Included corporations: Agra, Aligarh, Allahbad, Ayodhya, Bariely, Gorakhpur, Jhansi, Kanpur, Morabad, Saharanpur, Varanasi, Siliguri, Bangalore, Mysore, Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodra, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Jamnagar, Kollam, Thrissur, Kochi, Kozhikode, and Thiruvananthapuram.

There were three reasons why Morsel was unable to obtain contact information for committee members in a municipal corporation:

- No Committee: Despite the state municipal corporation acts expressly dictating that each corporation contain a certain number of committees, 15 corporations lacked any committee. Hence, no contact information could be obtained. Faizabad, Lucknow, Meerut, Mathura, Shahjahanpur, Ghaziabad, English Bazar, Maheshtala, Barasat, Dum Dum, Baharampur, Mangaluru, Tumkuru, and Shivamogga.

- Not Available: In 9 corporations, data is theoretically available, but could not be collected. Part of the data collection occurred during the coronavirus pandemic. Though Morsel was able to complete contact information collection in most corporations before the March 24, 2020 Government of India lockdown, some corporations still had not responded by that date. For this reason, these corporations were necessarily excluded. Hubbali, Kalaburgi, Belagavi, Davangere, Ballari, Vijaypura, Junagdh, Gandhinagar, and Kannur.

- No Authority: Many corporations in West Bengal claimed that Morsel did not have proper authority to obtain contact information for municipal councillors and that permission was needed from the Chief Minister or litigation was required. Neither of these options were feasible. Kolkata, Asansol, Durgapur, Bidhannagar-Rajarhat, Serampore, Chandannagar, and Barrackpore.

Upon obtaining the names and phone numbers for each corporator, Morsel phoned each corporator and asked the pre-survey questions. This was done to ensure that the corporator had a working phone number and to collect information about corporators whose phone numbers did not work. For example, Morsel asked other corporators in the corporation to verify information about a corporator who could not be reached via phone.

As a result of this process, Morsel collected contact information for 872 corporators. I took this contact information and assigned Morsel to ask each corporator about a specific committee to which they were a member. There are 146 committees across the 25 municipal corporations. I only asked corporators about committees with at least three members, as two members constitute a pair, not a committee. In Uttar Pradesh (except Muradabad), Karnataka, Kerala, and West Bengal, each corporator belonged to only one committee, so I asked about that committee. In Gujarat, each corporator belonged to up to five committees. I assigned each corporator to a committee to maximize the number of committees I asked about in the survey.

I then prepared a call sheet for Morsel to use to complete the survey consisting of half of the total corporators. Corporators were block randomized into the call sheet based on whether the corporator's seat was reserved or not. The call sheet was then purely randomized. Morsel was instructed to survey each person on the call sheet so as not to only collect information from those who answered their phone the first time Morsel called. Indeed, respondents were called up to ten times in order to get them to complete the survey. After completing the call sheet, Morsel contacted 45 additional respondents from the other half of the total corporators, starting with those at the top of the list of remaining corporators.

Only 48 of 455 respondents contacted did not participate for a completion rate of 90%.[1] This completion rate is incredibly high, so there is no concern about selection bias for only surveying those available or willing to participate. Of those who refused, the most common reasons were not being interested or not having time.

SI.3:   Randomization and Balance Checks

Table SI.3.1 shows a multinomial logistic regression model where the dependent variable is the treatment indicator used in the survey experiment. Age is the only variable that predicts assignment to the treatment, supporting the claim that the treatment was randomly assigned. The Wald Test assesses whether the covariates have more combined predictive power than a restricted model with just an intercept; it is not significant.

Table SI.3.2 displays mean values for treated and control units as well as a Welsh Two Sample t-test indicating whether the covariate individually predicts the treatment assignment. Only two individual covariates significantly predict treatment assignment. Thus, individual covariates were successfully randomized across the treatment and control conditions.

Table SI.3.3 displays the caste composition of different groups of corporators along with p-values that result from t-tests comparing the mean caste composition. The first column shows the caste composition of committee members whose names were selected for inclusion in one of the four survey questions asking survey respondents about their contact with committee members. The second column is the mean caste composition of survey respondents with p-values from a Welch two sample t-test following. Column four displays the mean caste composition of those individuals selected to be on the call sheet (i.e., survey respondents plus those selected to respond to the survey who refused to do so). Column six displays the mean caste composition of those individuals not selected to be on the call sheet. No t-tests produce statistically significant p-values. Therefore, we can be confident that the committee members whose names were selected for inclusion in one of the four survey questions asking survey respondents about their contact with committee members are not different from survey respondents and corporators within the selected corporations as a whole.

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[1]Twenty-eight of the 45 respondents from the other half of the corporators responded; no data is recorded for the remaining 17 respondents.

Table SI.3.1: Randomization Check

	Dependent variable:
	Treated
Female	−0.112
	(0.227)
Age	0.037**
	(0.015)
Social Media Active	0.393
	(0.237)
BA	−0.124
	(0.239)
Multi-Term	−0.291
	(0.245)
BJP	−0.611
	(0.355)
INC	−0.299
	(0.368)
Called Three Times	0.138
	(0.253)
Caste Reservation	−0.072
	(0.311)
Constant	−0.200
	(1.100)
Wald Test	1.52
Corporation Fixed Effects	✓

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Multinomial logistic regression.

Table SI.3.2: Individual Covariate Balance

	Mean 1	Mean 0	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Female	0.42	0.46	-0.04	0.05	0.48
Age	48.46	46.32	0.01	0.00	0.01
Social Media	0.48	0.38	0.10	0.05	0.06
Education	0.55	0.55	0.00	0.05	0.99
Years Served	0.31	0.36	-0.07	0.05	0.22
BJP	0.49	0.62	-0.14	0.05	0.01
INC	0.16	0.15	0.02	0.07	0.75
Times Called	0.34	0.38	-0.05	0.05	0.34
Reserved	0.19	0.22	-0.05	0.06	0.42
Brahmin	0.08	0.11	-0.08	0.09	0.32
OF	0.40	0.43	-0.03	0.05	0.54
SC	0.09	0.10	-0.01	0.08	0.89
ST	0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.15	0.77
OBC	0.26	0.23	0.05	0.06	0.39
Other Religion	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.35

OLS regressions of each covariate on the specified attribute with standard errors and p-values. Mean 1 refers to when the specified attribute was 1, Mean 0 refers to when the specified attribute was 0. OLS p-values are equivalent to Welch Two Sample t-tests.

Table SI.3.3: Caste Composition of Sample

	Mean Asked About	Mean Respondents	*p*-value	Mean Called	*p*-value	Mean Not Called	*p*-value
Brahmin	0.09	0.09	0.93	0.09	0.68	0.08	0.54
OF	0.40	0.41	0.70	0.41	0.79	0.39	0.74
SC	0.10	0.09	0.95	0.10	0.73	0.09	0.56
ST	0.02	0.03	0.37	0.04	0.24	0.02	0.78
OBC	0.27	0.25	0.39	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.27
Other Religion	0.12	0.12	0.82	0.12	0.71	0.12	0.92

Caste composition of committee members whose names were selected for inclusion in one of the four survey questions asking survey respondents about their contact with committee members, survey respondents, individuals on the call sheet, and individuals not on the call sheet. *p*-values from Welch Two Sample *t*-tests.

SI.4: Affect Toward the Cabinet Classification

I use seven different methods for classifying affect toward the cabinet from the four emotion questions that appear post-treatment. According to Gubler and Karpowitz (2019), the minimum residual Bartlett method is the most accurate. Thus, the main text presents results from the minimum residual Bartlett method. I start by taking the four emotion questions and seeing how well they load on two two dimensions: one for pleasant (enthusiastic, hopeful) and one for unpleasant (angry, resentful) emotions. I generate bi-plots to show that the four emotion questions do load onto two dimensions. I then run the seven different types of factor analysis with two factors and compare the correlation between pleasant and unpleasant factors. These correlations are consistently above 0.80 between different factor analysis methods, indicating that all the methods are essentially identifying the same two underlying factors. Pseudo-correlations using Cramer's V (Table SI.4.1) are all above 0.80. I then plot the two factors and identify the four affective states — weak (neither pleasant nor unpleasant), mixed (both pleasant and unpleasant), pleasant, and unpleasant — by splitting axes at their zero lines. Next, I compare the affective state classification between different factor analysis methods. The majority of respondents' affective state classifications were consistent across all seven factor analysis methods. Finally, I create dichotomous dependent variables indicating that a respondent belonged to a given affective state.

Table SI.4.1: Cramer's V Correlation Between Categorical Variables

	Minres Reg	Minres Bartlett	Maxlik Reg	Maxlik Bartlett	PA Reg	PA Bartlett	PCA
Minres Reg	1.00	0.82	0.99	0.82	0.91	0.83	0.83
Minres Bartlett	0.82	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.89	0.98	0.86
Maxlik Reg	0.99	0.82	1.00	0.82	0.90	0.82	0.83
Maxlik Bartlett	0.82	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.89	0.98	0.86
PA Reg	0.91	0.89	0.90	0.89	1.00	0.90	0.84
PA Bartlett	0.83	0.98	0.82	0.98	0.90	1.00	0.84
PCA	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.84	0.84	1.00

Pseudo-correlation between seven affective state classifications.

I focus on affect toward the committee because I argue that affect toward the committee is an initial emotional response to increasing ethnic diversity or interethnic contact that may then have impacts on perceptions of the competence of the committee and outgroup attitudes. Outgroup attitudes may themselves be impacted by affect toward the outgroup. In other words, when perceptions of the competence of the committee improve, elites may develop positive feelings toward ethnic ougroups. These positive feelings are then what influences what we traditionally call outgroup attitudes (e.g., willingness to have an outgroup neighbor or to talk to an outgroup member). Affect is partially baked into these measures of outgroup attitudes because these questions assume that talking to an outgroup member or having an outgroup neighbor are items that elites support only when they have generated positive (or at least neutral) feelings about an ethnic outgroup. Elites gain no utility from talking to an outgroup member or having an outgroup neighbor beyond a potentially positive emotional response. Therefore, it could be interesting to explicitly

evaluate affect toward outgroups as an intermediate step between perceiving that members of a committee are competent and improved outgroup attitudes. Slightly different outgroup attitudes questions may be required in order to more cleanly distinguish between affect toward outgroups and acts of outgroup tolerance.

SI.5:   Committee Diversity and Contact Coding

The measures of committee diversity and contact used in this analysis rely on identifying the ethnicity of municipal corporators. The committee diversity measure uses ethnic group membership directly by aggregating ethnicity at the committee level. The contact measure captures contact by retaining only the frequency of contact with outgroup members and, thus, relies on successfully identifying members of the outgroup.

The first step is to decide on the appropriate ethnic categories used to categorize municipal corporators. In the United States, ethnic categorization has become relatively standardized because social and political ethnic categories tend to align. In India, no such consensus exists because caste groupings are socially constructed in different ways in the social and political sphere and across cities and states. Therefore, I need to be precise in my conceptualization of politically relevant caste groupings, as the categorization system I choose will necessarily impact the results I obtain.

I define ethnic categorization as the combination of caste and religion. The term "caste" traditionally refers to jatis or sub-jatis of which there are thousands of such groups. Much of the political conversation surrounding caste occurs at the varna level, where each varna comprises a large number of jatis. Castes are typically classified into one of four varnas as dictated by the Rig Veda: Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra. Some individuals are termed Backward Classes and are granted special provisions — or reservations — by the government. Castes and tribes may petition the government to be included as a member of a Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), or Other Backward Class (OBC). Those not included in reservations are considered forward castes and are typically separated into Brahmins and other forward castes (OF).

I am interested in classifying individuals into salient, caste-based political groups that are relevant across Indian states. As such, my focus is on caste categories, not on jatis or sub-jatis. I group individuals into six caste categories: Brahmin, OF, SC, ST, OBC, and Other Religion (Muslim, Christian, Sikh, et. cetera). These categories represent the most politically salient ethnic distinctions that are relevant across Indian states. Political representation of SCs, STs, and OBCs in legislatures and cabinets is an ongoing topic of conversation throughout India. The distinction between Brahmins and all other forward caste members reflects the traditional predominance of Brahmins in politics and the low salience of the other varnas with respect to one another.[2]

Ethnicity coding is an incredibly complex topic, and there is no method that guarantees accuracy. There are two existing approaches: name classification and archival research.

Name classification involves making an educated guess about caste or religious membership based on the corporator's name. The basic intuition is that names have been historically linked to particular caste categories such that hearing a given name will trigger an association with a caste category (Banerjee et al., 2009; Jayaraman, 2005). Experts (Mateos, Webber and Longley, 2007), online workers on crowdsourcing sites (Shah and Davis, 2017), and many different algorithms can be used to classify names. Algorithmic classification is becoming an increasingly popular way to code caste, and the typical algorithmic method uses training data from matrimonial website profiles (Chen, Chittoor and Vissa, 2015; Vissa, 2011).

An alternative to name classification is to conduct archival research. Archival research entails trying to find caste information about specific individuals, not just those who happen to share a person's name (Narain and Sharma, 1972). As such, if we are trying to classify Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, we would need to find information stating Modi's caste category; we would not rely on any signal that the surname Modi provided or our knowledge of the caste category of other people named Narendra Modi.

Finally, corporators could be asked to reveal their caste on a survey. Though caste membership is a common political topic, asking for caste identification on a survey is relatively rare.

Accuracy is an important question to consider when employing any of these methods. One concern is social desirability bias. Social desirability bias can occur whenever individuals are asked to self-report their

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[2]Another reason for adopting these six categories is replicability and comparability; the largest social survey in India (Desai and Vanneman, 2015) uses these categories.

caste or religious membership. Matrimonial website data severely under-reports individuals from lower castes likely due in part to users mis-representing or hiding their caste membership (Rajadesingan, Mahalingam and Jurgens, 2019).

Similarly, ethnic categorization is a contentious topic, and asking individuals to self-identify may produce socially desirable responses. The ethnic categorization question on this survey experiment appears at the very end to eliminate any treatment contamination. As a result, respondents have been asked a number of questions about inter-ethnic relations including a donation question that explicitly asks respondents to donate to backward caste welfare. Socially desirable responses in this context are both those wherein a backward caste respondent affiliates with a forward caste and where a forward caste respondent affiliates with a backward caste. In the former case, the respondent is cued on caste and does not wish to reveal her backward caste status and, therefore, claims forward caste membership. However, in the latter case, the respondent learns from the content of the survey that the questions are directed toward backward caste welfare and identifies as that group because they believe that is what the survey enumerator wants.

Second, there are often differences between ways in which caste or religion are employed. Caste (and to a lesser extent religious) categories can be constructed in at least four ways: self-identification, government identification, political construction, and social construction. Self-identification refers to how individuals classify themselves. These self-categorizations may change depending on the context in which the question is asked or based on events and life experiences. Government identification in India refers mostly to caste categories that need to register in order to obtain certain government benefits. Political construction is based on how caste and caste identity is portrayed in politics. A political party can target a certain group of people and assert that they are part of a shared caste category, for example. Finally, social caste relations are based on relationships among members of the public and the caste categories people perceive each other belonging to. These four ways that caste is employed often align, but sometimes diverge.

For the purposes of this study, I am most interested in how others perceive someone's caste or religious category, not necessarily how people self-identify. Outward perceptions of ethnicity are wrapped up in government, political, and social conceptions of caste and religion. For example, if someone holds a reserved seat in the corporation, then I argue that this person will be outwardly perceived as belonging to the caste category associated with that reserved seat, even if the person self-identifies differently. Similarly, cues about a person's caste categorization — like their name or what local people think their caste categorization is — are more influential for how others perceive them and their caste compared to self-identification.

Classification Approach

To classify the caste of these corporators, I first cross-reference corporator names with official Indian election results and code all corporators who won seats reserved for SCs, STs, or OBCs. The caste coding for these individuals is exact: we know for certain that a corporator is a SC, ST, or OBC if they were elected in such a constituency (even if they may self-identify otherwise).

Of course not all individuals who are SCs, STs, or OBCs run in reserved constituencies, and public records do little to help classify individuals into other ethnic categories. Absent a coding based on electoral lists, I moved to expert name classification. Local knowledge is key to successful name-caste or religious coding: I employed a specially trained native Indian coder to perform the coding and provided detailed instructions about how the coding should proceed. I worked with this coder on name classification tasks for several years, and I have validated her work alongside a second coder and a reference dataset of coded names. First, I provided the coder with a list of all unique surnames that remained to be coded in the dataset. The coder was instructed to only classify surnames where the surname clearly indicated caste or religious affiliation. Each name coding was accompanied by a confidence level of high (90%+ confident), medium (75%-90% confident), or low (less than 75% confident). I then manually reviewed each surname coding and compared it to both local knowledge and archival research conducted on approximately 5% of the sample. I deemed a surname coding accurate when it was coded with either high or medium confidence and passed the manual review.

After completing surname classification, I took all remaining names and provided the coder with the full name of the corporator, their state of residence, gender, and the name of the corporation. This information helped her classify names that often belong to different castes depending on state. It also enabled her to perform basic Internet research on the history of certain surnames similar to Damaraju and Makhija (2018)'s

approach. Again, the coder provided confidence levels for her coding and I conducted a spot check of 5% of the sample. All names not classified with at least a medium level of confidence were left for more intensive review.

Remaining surnames were subjected to a more intensive evaluation of archival records.[3] First, additional Internet research was performed in order to try to find available caste or religious information about specific corporators. If this failed, a second local Indian coder contacted journalists and local sources in the corporator's municipal corporation to obtain an exact coding. I worked with this coder on name classification over a several year period. His expertise was in archival research and having connections to local sources.

This classification approach is used in the main analysis.

Self-Coding Classification

In addition to the classification approach discussed above, corporators that participated in the survey experiment were asked to self-identify their ethnic category. This question was necessarily included at the very end of the survey as a post-treatment demographic variable.

Apart from the issues with ethnic self-identification described above, the post-treatment nature of this question meant that respondents were fully aware that the survey was about ethnic relationships and even, based on the donation question, that the survey was asking about their experiences with lower caste individuals. Thus, social desirability bias is likely extremely high in this situation.

Further, I would highlight that the survey took place on the phone which is more impersonal than a face-to-face interview, so corporators are freer to self-identify with whatever ethnicity they so choose without fear of retribution.

As a robustness check, I substituted the available ethnic self-identification for the main classification method. The particular method used did not substantively impact the results.

Calculating Diversity

The diversity measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, written as $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{p} x_i^2$ where x_i represents the percentage of each of the ethnic categories present in a given committee and p is the number of caste categories (6) (Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015; Lancee and Dronkers, 2011; Tallman and Li, 1996).[4] If one caste category dominates the committee, the index is low (close to 0); if groups are relatively equal in size, the index is high (close to 1) (Harrison and Klein, 2007).

The correlation between coded classification and self-reported classification exceeds 0.75 for both diversity and contact measures, likely explaining why there are consistent results across measures.

Beyond correlating these two measures, I wanted to investigate specific discrepancies that occurred in the ethnicity coding to better understand why these discrepancies took place. A discrepancy is any difference in caste categorization between self-reported classification and coded classification. Table SI.5.1 shows the overall number of corporators coded in a given state and the number of discrepancies identified in a given state. There are slight differences, but in general, the percentage of discrepancies is in line with the percentage of corporators in each state.

Table SI.5.1: Overall and Discrepancies by State

Method	Overall (Pct.)	Discrepancies (Pct.)
Gujarat	323 (0.37)	116 (0.46)
Karnataka	85 (0.10)	17 (0.07)
Kerala	317 (0.36)	91 (0.36)
Uttar Pradesh	114 (0.13)	23 (0.09)
West Bengal	33 (0.04)	6 (0.03)

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[3]In previous work, I have used the *People of India Project* (Singh, 1996) book to provide further surname classification, but this book has proved to have limited use.

[4]This index is also known as Blau's Index, Hirschman's Index, Herfindahl's Index, or Simpson's Index. Teachman's Index is quite similar (Harrison and Klein, 2007, 1212).

Table SI.5.2 shows the overall number of corporators coded with a given method and the number of discrepancies identified with this method. As is evident from the table, discrepancies do not occur based on the coding method. What is also interesting to note is that a quarter of the discrepancies that occurred resulted from corporator names coded using reservation status. There is almost no error in coding reservation status — either a seat is reserved for a particular caste or it is not. So these discrepancies are all individuals whose self-identification contradicts publicly available caste information. Additionally, archival work was just as precise. Experts used local sources to code ethnicity and described both the method used and why each coding was appropriate. Yet, a fifth of the discrepancies came from archival coded names. These two facts reinforce some of the potential issues with coding ethnicity using self-identification in survey responses. Neither ethnic coding method produces "wrong" results, but self-identification may not match the public perceptions of ethnicity that are important for characterizing committee diversity and contact.

Table SI.5.2: Overall and Discrepancies by Coding Type

Method	Overall (Pct.)	Discrepancies (Pct.)
Reservation	188 (0.22)	61 (0.24)
Surname	323 (0.37)	96 (0.38)
Full Name	172 (0.20)	45 (0.18)
Archival	179 (0.21)	47 (0.19)
Guess	10 (0.01)	4 (0.02)

With this in mind, I move to discussing the specific discrepancies. For each discrepancy, I first consulted with local Indian coders about the specific discrepancy and why it might be occurring. Second, I conducted archival research on ethnic categorization in each state to determine the likelihood of this discrepancy occurring. The goal was to provide some rationale for why each discrepancy might exist. I coded each discrepancy on a two point scale: 1 indicated that there was no reason to doubt the combined local coder and archival ethnicity coding method, whereas 0 indicated that the accuracy of the coding method was in question. Based on these criteria, a discrepancy was coded "0" when the difference between the ethnicity coding and self-identification was not plausible or when the self-identification method was most likely correct. When the discrepancy made sense or the ethnicity coding method was most likely correct, the discrepancy was coded as "1."

Starting in Gujarat, of the 116 discrepancies, 100 were coded as 1 and 16 were coded as 0, meaning that 86% of the ethnicity codings in Gujarat made sense. Most of the discrepancies that were coded as "1" were the result of corporators who were coded as OF claiming to be SC, ST, or OBC. There are widespread movements occurring in Gujarat to redefine OF as a backward caste in order to obtain reservations. On the other hand, there is still a stigma associated with claiming to be a member of a reserved caste category, so a number of SC, ST, or OBC members may be claiming to be OF for this reason.

Of the 17 discrepancies in Karnataka, 15 were coded as 1 and 2 were coded as 0. That is, 88% of Karnataka ethnicity codings made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. Most discrepancies in Karnataka occurred in reserved constituencies, where OBCs tended to self-report that they were OF. This is quite a common type of discrepancy which indicates an unwillingness to reveal ones' actual ethnic category either because of social desirability or potential discrimination.

Moving to Kerala, of the 91 discrepancies 86 were coded as 1 and 5 were coded as 0. Hence, 95% of Kerala ethnicity codings made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. An investigation of the 86 names where ethnicity coding was likely correct revealed several patterns. First, many corporators were ethnicity coded as a backward caste, but self-reported belonging to OF. This is again due to an unwillingness to reveal their actual ethnic category and confusion over the reservations system in Kerala. Toward the latter point, a number of jatis receive reservations, but consider themselves to be OF. Additionally, a large number of corporators self-reported belonging to OF when they were categorized as other religion. This is because Muslims and Christians often place themselves into a caste category (usually OF) instead of identifying only with their religion.

In Uttar Pradesh, of the 23 discrepancies, 20 were coded as 1 and 3 as 0. This represents 87% of ethnicity codings in Uttar Pradesh that made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. The discrepancies that were likely correct were mostly individuals categorized as OF who identified as a backward

caste. Recent BJP actions in Uttar Pradesh have sought to include new groups in the OBC list and to move OBCs to the SC reservation list, meaning that there are incentives for forward caste members to self-identify as backward castes.

Finally, of the 6 discrepancies in West Bengal, 4 were coded as 1 and 2 as 0. This is a relatively low percentage of discrepancies that made sense and were likely correct (67%), but there are few cases to examine.

All told, 225 of the 253 discrepancies (89%) could be explained and justified. 28 discrepancies (11%) were most likely errors in ethnicity coding. Most of the discrepancies that could be justified resulted from differences in the ways in which each coding procedure conceptualized caste and caste identity. Self-identification allowed respondents to profess the caste identity that they felt connected to, regardless of whether it matched their reservation status or the way they are treated in society. Caste groups trying to redefine themselves can do so in the self-identification measure, whereas the caste coding measure attempts to classify individuals based on the prevailing political understanding of their caste. As shown below, robustness checks using either measure do not influence the results. In the main text, I prioritize ethnicity coding over self-identification because the procedure used to arrive at the ethnicity coding is consistent, and ethnicity coding better reflects political realities of how diversity and contact are viewed within a state.

SI.6: Results and Robustness Checks

Table SI.6.1 displays regression results for the treatment, alongside diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.6.2 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables. Since the none of the hypotheses are supported, p-value corrections for multiple comparisons are not particularly informative.

I conducted numerous robustness checks starting by measuring diversity as the Percent Not Forward and contact between only forward and backward castes (Table SI.6.3). I then measure ethnicity using self-reported information where available (Table SI.6.4). Table SI.6.5 displays regression results with state instead of corporation fixed effects. Table SI.6.6 displays regression results including an additional variable, *Crime*, that is the logged total crimes committed against SCs and STs in 2017 as reported by the National Crime Records Bureau for a given corporation. Note that the crime figures for Siliguri include both the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts, since Siliguri is located partly in both districts.

It is important to note that the manuscript argued that diversity and contact will impact views of outgroups in general, not a particular outgroup. This essentially means that a Brahmin who has frequent contact with an Other Forward committee member is treated the same as an Other Forward who has frequent contact with a Scheduled Tribe committee member. Caste is a hierarchical system wherein these two relationships, all else equal, may mean different things. In the former case, contact between two forward castes is not surprising, whereas contact between forward and backward castes may be more likely to go against social norms.

The specific caste structure and norms of interaction differ dramatically by state, corporation, committee, and committee member. Essentially, every citizen thinks about caste and caste relationships slightly differently, meaning that the two relationships described above should be treated as equal in some situations and different in other situations. To address this issue, I conduct the analysis by grouping ethnic categories together into forward (Brahmin and OF) and backward (SC, ST, OBC, and other religion) and looking at committee diversity and contact between these two groups. Individuals belonging to forward castes are clearly different than those belonging to backward castes, so outgroup contact is more meaningful in these cases. The results with only forward caste respondents are displayed in SI.6.7. Here, contact is measured as occurring between forward and backward caste respondents and diversity is measured with only forward and backward castes. These results are consistent with those in the main text.

Table SI.6.1: Main Text Results

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.027	−0.016	0.005	0.039	−0.021	0.031	−0.023	0.024	0.017	0.054	0.062***	0.011
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Diversity	0.421	−0.371	0.167	−0.217	0.018	−0.022	−0.060	−0.010	0.026	0.003	−0.008	−0.132
	(0.232)	(0.243)	(0.171)	(0.257)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.170)	(0.232)	(0.133)	(0.156)	(0.075)	(0.190)
Contact	−0.010	0.108	0.416**	−0.515**	−0.105	−0.107	0.053	0.020	0.130	0.249**	0.227***	0.102
	(0.144)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.150)
Female	0.011	0.006	0.017	−0.033	−0.007	0.014	−0.022	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.020	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0001	0.005**	0.003**	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.164***	−0.014	0.030	−0.179***	−0.035	0.002	−0.085	−0.039	0.066**	0.057	0.095***	−0.006
	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.046)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.034	0.061	0.051	−0.078	−0.040**	−0.049	−0.041	−0.049	0.018	0.088***	−0.003	0.033
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.018	−0.014	0.021	0.011	−0.032	−0.023	−0.038	0.012	−0.028	−0.072***	−0.0004	0.060**
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)
BJP	−0.046	0.053	−0.052	0.045	−0.022	−0.0003	−0.028	0.016	−0.029	0.059	−0.069	0.055
	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.042)
INC	−0.090	0.181**	−0.089	−0.001	−0.008	−0.077**	−0.013	−0.033	−0.049	0.085	−0.065	0.086
	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Called Three Times	−0.109	0.052	0.023	0.034	0.013	−0.005	0.114***	−0.018	−0.046**	0.002	−0.025	−0.090**
	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.039	−0.004	−0.071	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.021	−0.044	0.074**	0.004	−0.044
	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.022)
Constant	−0.161	0.278	−0.221	1.105***	0.723***	0.998***	0.606***	0.962***	0.708***	0.253	0.524***	0.228
	(0.203)	(0.187)	(0.196)	(0.310)	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.156)	(0.203)	(0.141)	(0.131)	(0.056)	(0.144)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.2: Main Text Results Multilevel Models

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
						Dependent variable:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−2.92***	−1.85	−5.50***	4.55***								−2.80*
	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.32)	(1.30)								(1.53)
Treated	−0.14	−0.14	0.10	0.28	−0.22	0.22	−0.11	0.19	0.14	0.31	0.58***	0.22
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Diversity	1.63	−1.53	1.32	−1.24	0.40	−0.47	−0.55	−0.33	0.04	0.70	0.09	−1.01
	(1.01)	(1.03)	(1.05)	(1.04)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.67)	(0.82)	(0.79)	(0.70)	(0.81)	(1.31)
Contact	−0.28	0.74	3.44***	−3.32***	−1.99***	−1.86**	0.66	−0.46	0.81	1.42**	1.68**	1.49
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(0.99)	(1.02)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.73)	(1.20)
Female	−0.04	0.08	0.16	−0.24	−0.09	0.03	−0.03	−0.00	0.01	0.02	0.26	0.17
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Age	0.01	0.02	0.03*	−0.07***	−0.02	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.00	0.03**	0.02*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.88***	−0.01	0.21	−1.42***	−0.27	−0.02	−0.45**	−0.45**	0.68***	0.47**	0.88***	
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	
Bachelor's Degree	−0.23	0.38	0.43	−0.58*	−0.50**	−0.73***	−0.33	−0.54**	0.25	0.44**	−0.05	
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	
Multi-Term	0.05	−0.27	0.11	0.04	−0.13	−0.18	−0.30	0.22	−0.17	−0.52**	0.15	
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	
BJP	0.52	−0.49	−0.78**	1.07**	0.07	0.77***	−0.36*	0.73**	0.04	0.43*	−0.24	0.75
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.54)
INC	−0.05	0.58	−0.76*	0.31	0.06	−0.25	−0.18	−0.08	−0.34	0.50*	−0.40	0.92
	(0.44)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.54)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.64)
Called Three Times	−0.40	0.05	−0.09	0.48	−0.01	0.13	0.42**	−0.00	−0.33	0.03	−0.13	
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)	
Caste Reservation	0.33	−0.03	−0.34	0.11	−0.12	0.05	0.03	−0.15	−0.45*	0.26	0.06	
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.6.3: Diversity and Contact Measured with Forward and Backward Castes

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.024	−0.017	−0.009	0.050	−0.037	0.022	−0.015	0.039	0.006	0.038	0.054**	−0.001
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Contact	0.014	0.196	0.249	−0.458***	−0.169	−0.119**	−0.051	0.093	0.117**	0.222**	0.157**	0.150
	(0.158)	(0.194)	(0.168)	(0.146)	(0.094)	(0.060)	(0.123)	(0.158)	(0.057)	(0.102)	(0.076)	(0.144)
Pct. Not Forward	0.468**	−0.162	−0.146	−0.161	−0.141	−0.065	−0.096	0.009	−0.033	0.146	−0.016	0.009
	(0.232)	(0.170)	(0.098)	(0.200)	(0.122)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.232)	(0.077)	(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.179)
Female	0.043	0.046	−0.011	−0.078	−0.014	0.016	−0.043	−0.003	0.022	0.034	0.034	0.009
	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Age	0.006**	0.003**	0.004	−0.013***	−0.0005	−0.003	−0.004	−0.002	0.001	0.007**	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.171***	−0.024	0.038	−0.184***	−0.040	0.002	−0.104**	−0.050	0.072**	0.046	0.090***	−0.013
	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.048)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.023	0.048	0.055	−0.081	−0.027	−0.029	−0.017	−0.048	0.024	0.095***	0.003	0.040
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Multi-Term	−0.038	−0.023	0.048	0.013	−0.037	−0.040	−0.029	0.012	−0.031	−0.119***	−0.022	0.055**
	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.038	−0.021	−0.046	0.105**	−0.003	−0.017	0.015	−0.016	−0.016	0.054	−0.092**	0.017
	(0.047)	(0.075)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.051)
INC	−0.087	0.097	−0.059	0.050	0.010	−0.094***	0.042	−0.075	−0.067**	0.093	−0.097	0.020
	(0.058)	(0.116)	(0.097)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.069)
Called Three Times	−0.096	0.067	0.031	−0.001	−0.006	−0.013	0.095**	−0.031	−0.035	0.045	−0.008	−0.078**
	(0.076)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Caste Reservation	0.033	−0.013	−0.024	0.004	0.008	−0.016	−0.010	0.012	−0.041	0.074	0.003	−0.064**
	(0.075)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.167	0.076	0.014	1.078***	0.798***	1.055***	0.707***	0.945***	0.702***	0.162	0.546***	0.107
	(0.190)	(0.168)	(0.166)	(0.249)	(0.128)	(0.078)	(0.182)	(0.190)	(0.107)	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333

Note:		**p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.4: Self-Reported Contact

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.025	−0.023	0.002	0.047	−0.014	0.037	−0.022	0.027	0.016	0.044	0.055**	0.008
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Self-Reported Contact	0.183	0.209	0.347**	−0.739***	−0.094	−0.019	−0.124	−0.077	0.188	0.341**	0.353***	0.093
	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.156)	(0.223)	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.115)	(0.166)	(0.096)	(0.158)	(0.069)	(0.171)
Self-Reported Diversity	0.015	0.209	−0.093	−0.131	−0.156	−0.171**	−0.134	−0.057	−0.002	0.066	−0.028	0.062
	(0.194)	(0.226)	(0.207)	(0.187)	(0.169)	(0.081)	(0.137)	(0.194)	(0.081)	(0.170)	(0.120)	(0.139)
Female	0.022	0.013	0.018	−0.052	−0.017	0.003	−0.030	−0.003	0.020	0.011	0.026	0.034
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.011***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0002	0.006**	0.003***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.153**	−0.024	0.035	−0.165***	−0.040	0.006	−0.077	−0.035	0.061	0.052	0.083***	0.007
	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.041)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.018	0.062	0.052	−0.095**	−0.034	−0.067**	−0.040	−0.048	0.019	0.088***	−0.002	0.015
	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Multi-Term	−0.023	−0.015	0.038	−0.0004	−0.030	−0.027	−0.026	0.013	−0.020	−0.068***	0.005	0.055**
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.019	0.050	−0.060	0.029	−0.017	−0.005	−0.036	0.017	−0.035	0.060	−0.060	0.041
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.048)
INC	−0.080	0.170	−0.082	−0.009	0.006	−0.079***	−0.005	−0.032	−0.041	0.083	−0.066	0.059
	(0.049)	(0.087)	(0.064)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.057)
Called Three Times	−0.119	0.053	0.014	0.052	0.008	−0.001	0.112***	−0.013	−0.051**	−0.002	−0.026	−0.075
	(0.067)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.067)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.040)
Caste Reservation	0.055	−0.006	−0.062	0.014	0.005	−0.004	0.004	0.019	−0.044	0.082**	0.013	−0.044
	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Constant	−0.027	−0.184	0.014	1.197***	0.867***	1.061***	0.764***	1.043***	0.697***	0.161	0.467***	0.070
	(0.206)	(0.167)	(0.190)	(0.255)	(0.121)	(0.083)	(0.192)	(0.206)	(0.099)	(0.146)	(0.081)	(0.161)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.5: State Fixed Effects

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	Dependent variable:											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.023	−0.019	0.001	0.041**	−0.023	0.029**	−0.021	0.023	0.013	0.067	0.060***	0.023
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.042)	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.031)
Diversity	0.376***	−0.294**	0.077	−0.159	0.066	0.016	−0.092	−0.021	−0.024	0.052	−0.006	−0.080
	(0.137)	(0.130)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.111)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.137)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.091)
Contact	−0.001	0.022	0.446**	−0.467***	−0.091	−0.059	0.075	0.022	0.147	0.297	0.223***	0.125
	(0.109)	(0.285)	(0.224)	(0.176)	(0.061)	(0.088)	(0.127)	(0.109)	(0.075)	(0.173)	(0.073)	(0.175)
Female	0.009	0.009	0.021	−0.039	−0.021	0.012	−0.023	0.004	0.011	−0.003	0.018	0.014
	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.017)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	0.0004	0.005**	0.003***	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Social Media Active	0.166	−0.013	0.032	−0.185**	−0.045**	0.012	−0.085	−0.040	0.075**	0.069	0.097***	0.009
	(0.087)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.089)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.074)	(0.087)	(0.038)	(0.078)	(0.037)	(0.058)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.044	0.078	0.058	−0.092	−0.044***	−0.068***	−0.041	−0.049	0.018	0.078***	−0.007	0.020
	(0.040)	(0.081)	(0.046)	(0.098)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.018)
Multi-Term	−0.002	−0.029	0.020	0.012	−0.015	−0.029	−0.032	0.012	−0.037	−0.086***	−0.011	0.051
	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.015)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.045)
BJP	−0.058	0.018	−0.021	0.062	−0.014	0.011	−0.020	0.025	−0.037***	0.047**	−0.042**	0.049
	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.044)
INC	−0.060	0.133***	−0.072***	−0.002	−0.009	−0.074***	−0.016	−0.042	−0.040***	0.088**	−0.047***	0.070
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.075)
Called Three Times	−0.091	0.038**	0.019	0.034	0.008	−0.005	0.104	−0.018	−0.052	0.002	−0.021	−0.085***
	(0.102)	(0.019)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.060)	(0.102)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Caste Reservation	0.055	−0.010	−0.073	0.027	−0.007	0.011	−0.015	0.010	−0.024***	0.074***	0.013	−0.063***
	(0.062)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.062)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	−0.012	0.099	−0.349***	1.262***	1.003***	1.012***	0.745***	0.998***	0.668***	0.123***	0.531***	0.176***
	(0.136)	(0.195)	(0.111)	(0.214)	(0.051)	(0.095)	(0.060)	(0.136)	(0.080)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.6: Added Crime Control

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.027	−0.016	0.005	0.039	−0.021	0.031	−0.023	0.024	0.017	0.054	0.062***	0.011
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Diversity	0.421	−0.371	0.167	−0.217	0.018	−0.022	−0.060	−0.010	0.026	0.003	−0.008	−0.132
	(0.232)	(0.243)	(0.171)	(0.257)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.170)	(0.232)	(0.133)	(0.156)	(0.075)	(0.190)
Contact	−0.010	0.108	0.416**	−0.515**	−0.105	−0.107	0.053	0.020	0.130	0.249**	0.227***	0.102
	(0.144)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.075)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.150)
Female	0.011	0.006	0.017	−0.033	−0.007	0.014	−0.022	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.020	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0001	0.005**	0.003**	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.164***	−0.014	0.030	−0.179***	−0.035	0.002	−0.085	−0.039	0.066**	0.057	0.095***	−0.006
	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.046)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.034	0.061	0.051	−0.078	−0.040**	−0.049	−0.041	−0.049	0.018	0.088***	−0.003	0.033
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.018	−0.014	0.021	0.011	−0.032	−0.023	−0.038	0.012	−0.028	−0.072***	−0.0004	0.060**
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)
BJP	−0.046	0.053	−0.052	0.045	−0.022	−0.0003	−0.028	0.016	−0.029	0.059	−0.069	0.055
	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.042)
INC	−0.090	0.181**	−0.089	−0.001	−0.008	−0.077**	−0.013	−0.033	−0.049	0.085	−0.065	0.086
	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Called Three Times	−0.109	0.052	0.023	0.034	0.013	−0.005	0.114***	−0.018	−0.046**	0.002	−0.025	−0.090**
	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.039	−0.004	−0.071	0.036	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.021	−0.044	0.074**	0.004	−0.044
	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.022)
SC ST Crime	0.508***	−0.952***	−0.569***	1.013***	0.687***	0.489***	0.376***	0.309**	−0.373***	−0.778***	−0.009	−0.356***
	(0.158)	(0.087)	(0.114)	(0.150)	(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.095)	(0.158)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.090)
Constant	−2.806***	5.236***	2.743***	−4.173***	−2.857***	−1.551***	−1.353**	−0.649	2.651***	4.307***	0.573	2.082***
	(0.945)	(0.549)	(0.738)	(1.022)	(0.627)	(0.382)	(0.583)	(0.945)	(0.451)	(0.658)	(0.591)	(0.561)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.7: Subset to Only Forward Caste

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	0.001	0.022	−0.112	0.088	−0.044	0.021	−0.006	0.015	−0.024	−0.027	0.034	0.013
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.031)	(0.096)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.049)
Contact	0.127	0.208	0.201	−0.536***	−0.176	−0.007	0.029	0.108	0.171	0.278	0.203**	0.024
	(0.209)	(0.152)	(0.266)	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.062)	(0.176)	(0.209)	(0.105)	(0.169)	(0.104)	(0.262)
Pct. Not Forward	0.639**	−0.499	0.071	−0.210	−0.169	−0.093	−0.282**	0.084	0.132	0.084	0.051	−0.008
	(0.263)	(0.287)	(0.254)	(0.226)	(0.210)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.263)	(0.109)	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.338)
Female	0.043	−0.059	0.101	−0.085	−0.027	0.036	−0.066	−0.043	0.055	0.045	0.050	−0.055
	(0.081)	(0.139)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Age	0.006	0.007**	0.009	−0.023***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.009	−0.006	0.003	0.006**	0.006***	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Social Media Active	0.248***	−0.067	0.023	−0.204***	−0.049	−0.029	−0.119**	0.001	0.031	0.069	0.071**	0.032
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.077)	(0.035)	(0.069)	(0.034)	(0.066)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.092	0.112	0.121	−0.141	−0.016	−0.068***	0.009	−0.094	0.073**	0.090	0.016	0.049
	(0.070)	(0.102)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.047)
Multi-Term	−0.037	−0.038	0.090	−0.015	−0.030	−0.015	−0.067	0.011	0.016	−0.157***	0.011	0.083
	(0.073)	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.046)
BJP	0.039	−0.072	−0.088	0.121	−0.027	0.001	−0.072	−0.069	0.021	0.036	−0.104	−0.0001
	(0.138)	(0.143)	(0.107)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.074)	(0.168)	(0.063)	(0.089)
INC	−0.051	0.045	−0.045	0.052	−0.063	−0.026	−0.036	−0.095	0.070	0.047	−0.070	−0.059
	(0.151)	(0.212)	(0.161)	(0.172)	(0.128)	(0.062)	(0.139)	(0.151)	(0.082)	(0.153)	(0.097)	(0.068)
Called Three Times	−0.038	0.023	0.059	−0.044	−0.003	0.036	0.014	−0.065	0.021	0.060	−0.021	−0.104***
	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Constant	−0.410	0.007	−0.329	1.732***	0.942***	1.024***	1.153***	1.174***	0.413***	0.113	0.503***	0.071
	(0.229)	(0.263)	(0.266)	(0.262)	(0.128)	(0.087)	(0.364)	(0.229)	(0.103)	(0.195)	(0.115)	(0.141)
Observations	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

Note: **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

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