# Citizen Responses to Ethnic Representation

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Can country leaders improve citizens' ethnic outgroup views by changing ethnic representation in government? Years of pressure from the international community calling for leaders to make particularly their cabinets more ethnically representative seems to suggest that ethnic representation — conceptualized as descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation — is key to improving citizens' outgroup views. I argue that increasing ethnic representation influences majority and minority citizens differently: minority citizens' outgroup views will become more favorable, while majority citizens' views will worsen. Using a pre-registered vignette experiment with ethnic Albanians and Macedonians in North Macedonia, I show that ethnic representation does not provide the improvements in outgroup relations that many have hoped. Both groups' affect toward and perceptions of the cabinet change somewhat, but increasing ethnic representation does not improve overall outgroup attitudes. These results suggest that ethnic representation alone does not lead to more productive interethnic relationships.

**Keywords:** ethnic representation, outgroup attitudes, political appointments, cabinet, Macedonia.

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Ethnic representation in government is increasing. The last several decades have seen a substantial uptick in three forms of ethnic cabinet representation: the number of cabinet ministers from minority ethnic groups, government benefits provided to minority groups, and elite cooperation between ethnic groups (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). This secular trend toward increased ethnic cabinet representation has been explained in two main ways: 1. pressure from international organizations and 2. leader re-election strategies. Both of these explanations rely on ethnic minority cabinet representation improving citizens' interethnic relations. Yet, this assumption remains untested. Does ethnic cabinet representation improve citizens' views of outgroups?

The Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) is a powerful international player in promoting ethnic cabinet representation. Their 2012 Ljubljana guidelines are a standard by which many international organizations evaluate countries' ethnic inclusion. These guidelines proclaim that "States should strive for adequate representation of the diverse groups in their society ... in all relevant structures of public administration," stating further that "affirmative action for the allocation of cabinet posts" is a key best-practice for country leaders to follow (OSCE, 2012, 46). In the OSCE's mind, the purpose of ethnic cabinet representation is for "everyone to have adequate opportunities to effectively participate in democratic decision-making" (OSCE, 2012, 46). By encouraging numerical representation, favorable policies, and elite cooperation with ethnic minorities, citizens will have their voices heard and develop "a sense of shared belonging" with ethnic outgroup citizens (OSCE, 2012, 18). Pressure from the international community along these lines often results in leaders engaging in ethnic accommodation of minority groups, with the international community hoping that citizens' views about the outgroup will improve as a result (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Rothchild, 1997; Sisk, 1996).

At the same time, country leaders have their own motivations for promoting ethnic cabinet representation that involve citizens. Leaders need to develop coalitions in order to win re-election, and allocating influence and patronage through the cabinet is a simple

way to do this in ethnically divided societies (Arriola, 2009; Chandra, 2004). Here cabinet representation functions as a credible commitment to provide benefits to minority ethnic groups in return for political support (O'Brochta, 2020). Leaders hope that benefits from an ethnically representative cabinet will prompt citizens to improve their opinion of not only the leader, but of the majority ethnic group as a whole for two reasons. First, improving interethnic relations means improved country stability, which is necessary for the majority group to avoid citizen-led coups and civil unrest (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). Second, if overall ethnic relations improve as a result of providing representation, then majority ethnic group politicians can enjoy continued support from traditionally hostile minority citizens without needing to distribute as many influence or patronage benefits.

Both scenarios provide rationales for country leaders increasing ethnic minority cabinet representation, and both scenarios rely to varying extents on the hope and promise that increased ethnic cabinet representation will improve citizen outgroup relations. Previous literature focuses on how elites use divisive rhetoric to exacerbate ethnic tensions and potentially to provoke civil conflict (Kaufman, 1996; Kifordu, 2011; Somer, 2001; van Dijk, 1992). While it has received significantly less attention, a calming effect of elite actions has also been posited. "If elites from the majority group approach minorities in a spirit of flexibility, inclusiveness, and tolerance, the odds are that tensions can be defused" (Hislope, 1998, 141; see also Steen and Kuklys, 2010). In either case, existing literature predominately considers the influence of elite rhetoric without taking into account how actual country leader decisions about ethnic representation impact citizens. This could be due to the fact that most existing work examines ethnic representation in legislatures. I study ethnic cabinet representation because country leaders' have significant power to alter it.

Citizen responses to ethnic representation matter because they fundamentally shape a country's political environment. Elite responses are also important, but ethnic intolerance persists unless it is addressed directly among citizens. Not only can citizens collectively organize, demanding changes in the amount of ethnic representation, but ethnic representation

has wide-reaching micro-level consequences. First, citizens emotionally respond to ethnic cabinet representation. Anger and discontent make citizens more wary of the cabinet and make it more difficult for the cabinet to effectively address citizen concerns. Additionally, ethnic cabinet representation can change citizens' perceptions of the cabinet and its ability to represent them, slowing down policy implementation and leading to calls that the cabinet is out-of-touch with citizen views. Finally, ethnic cabinet representation may influence citizens' outgroup attitudes — the ways they think about and interact with outgroup citizens. Worsening outgroup attitudes are a key factor increasing ethnic tensions and making the entire political system more ethnically polarized. Getting the ethnic representational balance wrong in terms of numerical diversity, policy priorities, or elite cooperation can have disastrous consequences. Arnesen and Peters (2018) show that members of the public strongly associate government legitimacy with coethnic representation (see also Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo, 2019). If the government fails to provide ethnic representation and government legitimacy decreases, a host of negative outcomes including intergroup violence and civil conflict are more likely to result (Lieberman and Singh, 2012).

Does ethnic minority representation improve citizens' views of the ethnic outgroup? I argue that citizens' views improve when the amount of coethnic representation increases. This is because increased coethnic representation provides perceived benefits to coethnic citizens, which leads them to develop a favorable view of ethnic outgroups. When ethnic minority representation increases, minority citizens' will therefore react favorably and improve their views of the outgroup. However, majority citizens' views worsen because their perceived benefits decrease. I test these hypotheses by manipulating three key features of ethnic cabinet representation: descriptive representation, substantive representation, and cooperation among ministers.[1] Using a pre-registered, hypothetical vignette experiment with realistic attributes fielded among ethnic Albanians and Macedonians in North Macedonia, I show that ethnic representation does not provide the improvements in outgroup relations that many

[1]Descriptive representation refers to the number of coethnic ministers, while substantive representation refers to policies benefiting coethnics (Pitkin, 1967).

have hoped. Representation among ethnic minority Albanians slightly improved Albanian affect toward the cabinet and perceptions about the cabinet. At the same time, increasing Albanian representation provoked some backlash from ethnic Macedonians. Ministerial cooperation provided the most promising improvements in affect toward and perceptions of the cabinet, but even so, outgroup attitudes were largely unchanged. The findings suggest that ethnic representation does not have a wide-ranging impact on outgroup attitudes and, therefore, ethnic representation seems not to provide a particularly meaningful solution to citizen ethnic tensions. As a result, policy practitioners may want to re-examine ethnic cabinet representation as a solution to reduce citizen ethnic tensions and to determine if there are certain conditions under which ethnic representation is more likely to be effective.

# Theory

Citizens have long memories. Longstanding institutional discrimination, periods of ethnic conflict, and political and economic inequalities all play large roles in determining citizens' views of outgroups (Baldwin and Huber, 2010; Canelas and Gisselquist, 2018; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Charnysh, 2015; Dinas, Fouka and Schlapfer, 2019; Homola, Pereira and Tavits, 2020; Miodownik and Nir, 2016; Ostby, 2008). Each of these factors is important, but country leaders have relatively little power to alter institutional history without a great deal of time and a broad base of support.

What country leaders do have control over are political appointments, and cabinet ministers represent the most important and influential appointments in government (Blondel and Muller-Rommel, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1994). The purpose of a cabinet is to facilitate resource delivery to citizens. Cabinets do this work by writing budgets, drafting legislation, managing the bureaucracy, and interacting with the legislature. In this way, cabinets are an intermediary between citizens and the various types of resources that the government provides to citizens. Cabinet representation is a important tool that leaders have to engender

productive relationships among ethnic outgroups. While cabinet representation itself cannot address historical inequities, cabinet representation is a strong short-term signal about how political elites view relationships between ethnic outgroups.

Citizens primarily interact with cabinet ministers indirectly, receiving information about cabinet business through media sources. Because citizens' knowledge of the cabinet is limited (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013*b*), citizens use informational cues to form perceptions about who is on the cabinet and how well the cabinet is working (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013*a*).[2] The specific names of individual cabinet ministers are substantially less important than citizens' understandings of the amount and type of representation that the cabinet provides.

In this context, the key factor that can change citizen perceptions of the outgroup is the relative perceived benefit that they derive from a particular cabinet (Carlson, 2015; Koter, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013). Relative benefit involves citizens comparing the amount of benefit they perceive that they receive to the benefit received by others. In societies where ethnicity is a salient social cleavage, relative benefits are most naturally evaluated along ethnic lines (Chandra, 2004). This makes sense because benefits are frequently divided along ethnic lines (Habyarimana et al., 2007; van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Many cabinet programs or initiatives target certain ethnic groups, ethnic groups often coalesce into political parties, and discrimination primarily occurs on the basis of ethnicity. With political and social systems set-up around ethnic cleavages, citizens compare themselves with members of ethnic outgroups.

I adopt two conventions regarding the ways in which ethnic representation influences citizen attitudes. First, I evaluate majority and minority citizens separately because of historical differences in how these groups have been treated.[3] Minority ethnic groups see periods of ethnic dominance followed by relatively small perceived concessions as relatively minor steps toward ethnic representation (Bahry et al., 2005; Barnes and Saxton, 2019;

[2]Perceptions are attitudes influenced by prior beliefs — expectations for the future based on past experiences — that citizens develop based on information that they receive (Cutler, 2002; McDermott, 1998).

[3]For simplicity, I discuss a majority and a minority ethnic group; the same logic applies for a plurality ethnic group and multiple minority groups.

Howell and Fagan, 1988). On the other hand, majority groups perceive their losses as more severe because the status quo is that they have a monopoly on government representation (King and Samii, 2018). This has been shown to prompt a backlash effect wherein minority groups perceive a small amount of benefit, whereas majority groups perceive a large amount of loss (Boyer, Aaldering and Lecheler, 2020; Fisher et al., 2015; Krook, 2015; McConnaughy et al., 2010; Villarreal, 2002).

Second, in line with most prior work on ethnic representation, I examine perceived benefits for majority and minority groups while altering the amount of minority group representation. Increasing ethnic cabinet representation means providing cabinet representation to minority groups, so my theoretical argument and experimental set-up describe how the minority group is included in the cabinet.

I argue that relative perceived benefits influence citizens' views of the outgroup through perceived gains and losses. When citizens perceive that their group is losing relative benefits — relative deprivation, these losses produce a strong negative emotional response (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Emotional responses impact generalized decision-making (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Schwarz, 2000). That is, experiencing a negative emotion infuses that emotion into information processing and changes an individual's social judgments (Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Forgas, 1995; Lerner et al., 2015). In ethnically divided societies, outgroup relations are one of the most salient social judgments. Hence, citizens' negative emotional responses to losing perceived benefits translate to more negative assessments of ethnic outgroups.

Similarly, when citizens perceive their group's relative benefits increasing — they are in a domain of gain, they generate positive emotional responses. The effects of these positive emotions are also generalized to encompass all forms of decision-making (Fredrickson, 2001). Citizens, therefore, respond more favorably to the outgroup when they experience a domain of gain (Gubler, Halperin and Hirschberger, 2015; Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Mironova and Whitt, 2014).

When citizens assess the relative benefits they receive from the cabinet, I argue that they use three highly visible cabinet features as informational cues: descriptive representation, substantive representation, and ministerial cooperation (Andre and Depauw, 2017; Boggild, 2020; Celis and Mazur, 2012; Pitkin, 1967). Leaders have a relatively high degree of control over the ministerial appointment process, policies adopted by the cabinet, and the cabinet climate, therefore enabling them to influence cabinet descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation with the hope of improving ethnic outgroup views.

Descriptive representation refers to the number of cabinet ministers from a particular ethnic group. International organizations seeking increased ethnic cabinet representation often look to descriptive representation as a key method of improving outgroup attitudes. I frame descriptive representation in the conventional way by providing citizens with information about increasing the number of minority ethnic group cabinet ministers. Minority citizens whose descriptive representation increases are in a state of gain, resulting in more favorable impressions toward the majority ethnic group (Feddes, Mann and Doosje, 2015; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Tougas and Veilleux, 1988). Political integration in this way can foster a common identity, reduce ethnic prejudice, and improve outgroup attitudes by making minority group members feel included in government decision-making (Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004; Brown and Hewstone, 2005; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Hewstone and Brown, 1986; Ruiz-Rufino, 2013; Tezcur and Gurses, 2017).

Conversely, majority citizens perceive lost cabinet representation when minority groups are included (Childs and Krook, 2006, 2009; Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo, 2019; Crowley, 2004; Hawkesworth, 2003). In this state of loss, majority citizens develop negative outgroup attitudes (Casellas and Wallace, 2015; Gay, 2002; Schildkraut, 2017; Ulbig, 2007).

**Hypothesis 1:** Increasing minority descriptive representation improves minority and worsens majority citizens' views of the outgroup.

Substantive representation is the perception that citizens will benefit in some tangible way from policies and other government decisions (Childs and Krook, 2009; Heath, Schwindt-

Bayer and Taylor-Robinson, 2005). Leaders hoping to use the cabinet as a way to improve outgroup attitudes by delivering patronage benefits rely on substantive representation. Both the presence of substantive representation and the exact change in policy, budget, or government decision making matter. For minority citizens, substantive representation provides a higher form of equality than does descriptive representation (Gay, 2002; Krook, 2015; Mansbridge, 1999; Tate, 2003). Minority friendly policies indicate that the majority group is not thinking about ethnic representation as something that can be addressed by making token appointments to provide perceived inclusion (Arnesen, Duell and Johannesson, 2019; Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran, 1996; Lublin, 1999). Thus, both majority and minority groups should perceive the benefits from substantive representation at least to the extent that they perceive benefits from descriptive representation: higher for minority group members and lower for majority group members. These perceptions of benefits again lead to states of gain or loss that influence views of the outgroup.

**Hypothesis 2:** Increasing minority substantive representation improves minority and worsens majority citizens' views of the outgroup.

Citizens tend to dislike governments that they perceive as dysfunctional (Font, Wojcieszak and Navarro, 2015; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). Ethnic representation often results in dysfunction because ministers are unable to cooperate with one another (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Cheeseman, 2011; Spears, 2000; Sriram and Zahar, 2009), though this is not always the case (Whiting and Bauchowitz, 2020). I conceptualize cooperation as going beyond policy related dissent and look at the more fundamental property of ministers being able to work together.[4] All citizens perceive benefits from increased cooperation because otherwise the government would not be able to function in order to provide any benefits to anyone. Cooperation is mostly about representational quality: on paper a cabinet may be descriptively and substantively diverse while still lacking meaningful interaction between outgroup ministers. Both majority and minority groups must come together for cooperation

[4]Policy-related dissent can be popular (for example Campbell et al., 2019).

to occur, so both groups are in domains of gain when cooperation occurs.

**Hypothesis 3:** Increasing ministerial cooperation improves citizens' views of the outgroup.

Table 1 presents my empirical expectations, keeping in mind that I alter minority group descriptive and substantive representation as well as changing the level of ministerial cooperation:

Table 1: Citizens' Views of the Outgroup

| | Minority Descriptive | Minority Substantive | Cooperation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Majority | ↓ | ↓ | ↑ |
| Minority | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |

↑ indicates improved citizens' views of the outgroup; ↓ indicates worsened citizens' views of the outgroup.

# Case Selection and Design

To test these hypotheses, I implement a hypothetical vignette experiment with citizens in North Macedonia (henceforth Macedonia). Cabinets are not randomly constructed, so I cannot rely on observational data to measure how citizens respond to changes in cabinet representation. A vignette experiment allows me to independently manipulate each of the three factors I argue influence citizens' views of the outgroup: descriptive representation, substantive representation, and ministerial cooperation.

## Case Selection

An appropriate case to implement a vignette experiment testing my hypotheses needs to fulfill three criteria. First, ethnicity needs to be clearly defined and unambiguous. In many country contexts, tribes, clans, or castes make alliances or feel represented by groups that are not their own. While this proxy representation is important, it makes it difficult to clearly

link ethnic representation with changed outgroup views. Second, the minority ethnic group needs to have faced a history of discrimination. This is the typical experience of minority groups, but there are some country contexts where the minority group has consistently been influential in government. Third, the minority group needs to be large enough to practically field an experiment.

Macedonia is one country context that meets all three conditions (see Hislope, 1998). The country is a developing parliamentary democracy that is beginning the process of accession to the European Union (Ceka, 2018). There are two main ethnic groups: majority Macedonians and minority Albanians who represent 25% of the population and are primarily concentrated near the border with neighboring Albania.

Ethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians have historically been challenging. Following independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the cabinet included both Macedonians and Albanians. Despite descriptive representation, Albanian ministers lacked meaningful political power (Hislope, 2003). The 1999 Kosovo War left many Albanian refugees fleeing to Macedonia and underscored the limited voice that Albanians had in the Macedonian government. Macedonians felt threatened by the influx of Albanians as well as perceived attacks on their ethnic identity from Serbia and Bulgaria (Brunnbauer, 2002; Ceka, 2018). In 2001, Albanian nationalists demanding increased political representation began an armed conflict against the Macedonian army. The conflict ended with relatively limited casualties in the 2001 Ohrid Agreement.

The Ohrid Agreement promised to fix representational inequality in government. Ethnic tensions did, however, continue to persist post-Ohrid (Piacentini, 2019). Despite some international pressure to improve ethnic relations, it took a corruption scandal in 2016 that ushered in a new governing coalition for the Macedonian government to devote serious attention to Albanian representation (Crowther, 2017).

In 2020, when this study was conducted, the government had made efforts to address several substantive issues important to Albanians (Stewart, 2019). Albanians retained descrip-

tive representation in the cabinet, but a growing ethnic Macedonian nationalist movement advocated for eliminating Albanian representation entirely (Kelly, 2019). The 2016 corruption scandal resulted in some improvements to substantive representation for both Albanians and Macedonians, but progress was slow. Most voters preferred ethnic parties, though some traditionally ethnic Macedonian parties are starting to reach out to and to attract Albanian voters (Tahiri, 2016). Even when both descriptive and substantive representation are in place, interethnic cooperation remains difficult (Reka, 2008).

Macedonia is an ideal case to conduct an experiment about ethnic representation because descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation have all occurred to some extent in the past, and there is a clear delineation between ethnic groups. Hence, the hypothetical vignettes presented to survey respondents are realistic and are grounded in historical context. Further, the ethnic dynamics in Macedonia are largely similar to those in other post-Communist countries. See the Online Appendix (OA) 1 for more details about the historical context.

## Design

This hypothetical vignette experiment was conducted by Ipsos on their quarterly, face-to-face omnibus survey in February 2020.[5] Ipsos oversampled Albanians in order to collect 784 responses equally divided between Albanians and Macedonians.[6]

Since the experiment was conducted as part of an omnibus panel, respondents had already provided basic demographic information — including ethnicity — so that this information was not asked during the survey, eliminating priming effects. Survey questions, including the vignettes, were translated and back-translated into Albanian and Macedonian by native speakers. Particular care was paid to ensuring that the meaning of each word was the

[5]The hypotheses, design, and analysis were pre-registered with EGAP. The experimental protocol was approved by the university Institutional Review Board # 202001032. OA.1 describes vignette experiments; OA.4 discusses omnibus surveys.

[6]I conducted simulations indicating that this design provides sufficient power to detect substantively meaningful effects. See OA.2.

same in the Albanian and Macedonian surveys. Ethnic Albanian respondents were always interviewed in Albanian by ethnic Albanians and vice versa.

Each respondent was presented with a hypothetical vignette about the cabinet consisting of four attributes block randomized on ethnicity. These attributes include descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation.[7] While the vignette experiment was hypothetical, the attributes were realistic and were constructed based on historical context (see OA.1).

I measure descriptive representation by providing information about the number of Albanian ministers in the cabinet (*ProfileDescriptive*) relative to a total of 25 ministers, the average size of the Macedonian cabinet. The percentage of Albanian ministers in the Macedonian cabinet has ranged from 23% to 46% since 2001. I include four different levels of representation. Six Albanian ministers (24%) is a typical amount of Albanian representation, whereas 10 ministers (40%) is an extreme case of over-representation. There is frequent discussion of completely or almost completely excluding Albanians from the cabinet; cases with 0 and 1 Albanian ministers reflect this political discourse.

Substantive representation (*ProfileSubstantive*) is a dichotomous treatment with a condition where the cabinet increases funding for Albanian issues and a condition where no substantive representation is provided. I focus on increased funding as a measure of substantive representation because the cabinet is tasked with proposing budget legislation and government funding is hotly contested in Macedonia. The exact wording of the treatment reflects the fact that cabinet ministers set budget priorities, not individual budget line items (see OA.1). The control condition with no substantive representation acts mostly as filler, providing no new information.

I measure cooperation in two ways. First, I develop an item that specifically refers to ethnic cooperation among ministers (*ProfileCooperation*). This dichotomous treatment indicates either that ministers are proactively working together to achieve consensus or that

[7] OA.2 contains randomization and balance checks.

cabinet communication has devolved into interethnic fights.[8] I also include information about the Albanian ministers' political party membership. Albanian ethnic parties are common in Macedonia, as are Macedonian nationalist parties. The Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM) is a major party consisting mostly of ethnic Macedonians that is trying to attract ethnic Albanian members. I create a dichotomous treatment (*ProfileSDSM*) where one Albanian minister is from the SDSM and a control with no Albanian SDSM ministers. The treatment suggests that both the Macedonian leaders of the SDSM and the Albanian minister have some common ground along which to work because they are from the same political party. Since the vast majority of Albanian politicians belong to ethnic Albanian parties, the number of Albanian SDSM ministers is only either one or zero regardless of the total number of Albanian ministers. When there are zero Albanian SDSM ministers, respondents will assume that Albanians are members of ethnic Albanian parties. Ethnic Albanian parties have frequently joined coalitions with both major Macedonian parties.

Several combinations of these attributes are not logically consistent (e.g., zero ethnic Albanian ministers from several Albanian parties). These vignettes were eliminated. This practice reduces the probability that respondents react to the implausibility of the vignette and provide unexpected responses, while also having the side benefit of keeping the number of vignettes much smaller than those in most vignette experiments. Respondents were shown a single vignette, meaning that there were no anchoring effects, respondent fatigue, or other issues associated with repeating vignette experiments multiple times. To ensure that respondents fully read and understood the vignette, survey enumerators displayed the vignette on a tablet computer and provided sufficient time for respondents to carefully read it. OA.6 discusses a manipulation check suggesting that respondents did, in fact, take the treatment. The text of the vignette is displayed below with the randomized attributes and their levels in brackets.

[8] See OA.1 for a full discussion on treatment wording.

**Vignette:**

"Imagine a cabinet that contains 25 ministers with an ethnic Macedonian Prime Minister. Of the 25 cabinet ministers, [*ProfileDescriptive*: 0, 1, 6, 10] are ethnic Albanians. [*ProfileSDSM*: 1-One Albanian minister is from the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM), the rest are from several Albanian parties.; 0-The Albanian ministers are from several Albanian parties.] [*ProfileSubstantive*: 1-The cabinet has already passed legislation to increase funding for Albanian issues.; 0-The composition of the cabinet has received a lot of attention from the media.] [*ProfileCooperation*: 1-Ministers work well together and have reformed the way the cabinet operates to emphasize forming a consensus when making decisions.; 0-Ministers stick up for their ethnic background and are unwilling to compromise when making decisions that impact their ethnic group.]"

I conceptualized citizens' views of the outgroup in three ways: overall outgroup attitudes, cabinet affect, and cabinet perceptions. These three measures speak to the impact that ethnic representation may have on different types of outgroup views.

International organizations hope that pushing country leaders to increase ethnic representation will improve overall outgroup attitudes — how citizens view the outgroup. I measured overall outgroup attitudes as a combination of trust in non-coethnics (*Trust*) (Kasara, 2013; Letki, 2008; Oberg, Oskarsson and Svensson, 2011; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, 2008) and perceived equality between different ethnic groups (*Equality*) (Jackman, 1977; McIntosh et al., 1995).[9] I also attempted to discern whether respondents improve outgroup attitudes by eliminating traditional in- and outgroup boundaries and forming a shared group (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) or whether individuals fail to see themselves as sharing a common identity (*One Group*). Finally, I asked some common measures of social distance, including willingness to have an outgroup neighbor (*Neighbor*) and willingness to talk to outgroup members (*Talk Outgroup*).

Even absent ethnic representation improving overall outgroup attitudes, ethnic represen-

[9]Full question wording is in OA.1.

tation can still have a positive impact on citizens' views of outgroups. I first focused on citizens' affective (or emotional) responses to the cabinet. Ethnic groups need to *feel* represented in the cabinet in order to improve outgroup attitudes (Cheeseman, 2011; Hanni, 2017; Spears, 2000; Tezcur and Gurses, 2017). I asked four questions about respondents' emotional reactions to the cabinet profiles: their *Enthusiasm*, *Anger*, *Hopefulness*, and *Resentfulness*.

After asking about cabinet affect, I moved to more direct questions about cabinet perceptions. These questions asked citizens to evaluate the cabinet profile, to determine their perceived benefit from the cabinet, and to attribute that perceived benefit to members of the cabinet itself. I asked how well citizens believe the cabinet represents their interests (*Cabinet Represents*), how much they trust the cabinet (*Cabinet Trust*), and whether the cabinet promotes positive relationships among ethnic groups (*Cabinet Model*). These questions were similar to the overall outgroup attitudes questions, but ask respondents to think specifically about the cabinet. By asking these questions, I am able to discern whether respondents improved their perceptions about the cabinet even if these perceptions did not end up influencing overall outgroup attitudes.

There are a number of potential mechanisms that connect ethnic cabinet representation to citizens' views of the outgroup. In general, citizens may be wary of the ability of the cabinet to represent their interests, regardless of the level of ethnic representation. Citizens often express that political elites work for their own benefit and rarely deliver benefits to their constituents. If survey respondents feel this way, then ethnic representation is unlikely to have much of an effect. I asked whether respondents believed that an ethnically inclusive cabinet would only result in intra-elite cooperation with no benefit for society (*Minister Personal*).

Feelings of relative deprivation may work in the opposite way, heightening negative reactions to low levels of descriptive and substantive representation. When respondents feel relatively deprived by a given level of cabinet representation, their views of the outgroup become even worse because they perceive themselves in an extreme domain of loss. I assess this

by asking the extent to which respondents were satisfied with the amount of representation they received (*Represent Satisfied*).

Finally, substantive representation means different things to different respondents. Citizens can be substantively represented when their community receives benefits or when public policies improve their lives. Yet, it is more difficult to track these benefits compared to direct financial transfers. Hence, respondents who prefer direct financial transfers may have stronger reactions to increased substantive representation. *Benefit Them* asks whether respondents think that the cabinet will directly benefit their welfare, while *Benefit Financially* asks whether respondents expect to receive financial benefits from the cabinet.

## Empirical Strategy

I split the sample into Albanian and Macedonian respondents and run the analysis separately for each group. I estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for each profile attribute. I add dummy variables for *ProfileSubstantive*, *ProfileCooperation*, and *ProfileSDSM*, and I make *ProfileDescriptive* a factor with levels 0, 1, 6, and 10. These are the four independent variables of interest in the analysis.

For the results presented in the main text, I normalize all dependent variables to be between 0 and 1, where 0 is a low and 1 is a high level of the variable, and I run linear models with robust standard errors. To create the cabinet affect dependent variables — one each for pleasant, unpleasant, mixed and weak, I use latent profile analysis and seven types of factor analysis on respondents answers to the *Enthusiasm*, *Anger*, *Hopefulness*, and *Resentfulness* questions (Gubler and Karpowitz, 2019). Here, pleasant and unpleasant affect refer to positive and negative emotional responses, respectively, whereas weak affect indicates the absence of a strong emotional response and mixed affect the presence of both strong pleasant and unpleasant affect (Yoo, 2010). In the main text, I present the cabinet affect classification from the minimum residual Barlett score. Details about the classification procedure and the other classification methods are in OA.3.

I include several sets of control variables in these models to improve the precision of resulting estimates. Demographic controls include *Female*, *Age*, *Married*, *Education*, and *Household Size*. I also include controls for geographic region and living in *Urban* areas. Finally, I include several pre-treatment attitude questions including frequency of watching the *News*, belief that all Macedonians have *Equal Opportunities* (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich, 2011), tendency to follow the rules (*Authoritarian*) (Bizumic and Duckitt, 2018), and political *Knowledge*.

In the results section, I present marginal effects plots based on the linear regression models with robust standard errors. The online appendix includes the full model tables (OA.4), results from logistic and ordered logistic regressions (OA.5), a number of pre-registered robustness checks including an interaction with ethnic Macedonian nationalist party membership (OA.6), and attribute interaction effects (OA.7).

# Results

I present marginal effects plots for each hypothesis sequentially, focusing first on the effect of descriptive representation on cabinet affect, cabinet perceptions, and outgroup attitudes before moving to substantive representation and ministerial cooperation.

## Backlash Effects from Descriptive Representation

Hypothesis 1 stated that increasing minority representation would improve minority citizens' views of the outgroup and worsen majority citizens' views. This hypothesis is closely related to how the international community pressures country leaders to diversify their cabinets with the hope of improving outgroup attitudes. Thus, my expectation is that adding Albanian cabinet ministers will improve Albanians' outgroup views and worsen Macedonians' outgroup views. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects for adding one or ten Albanians to a 25 member cabinet. Zero Albanian ministers is the reference level. The marginal effects for six Albanian

ministers are in between the results for one and ten and are included in the full results in OA.4.[10] Marginal effects are displayed on the $x$ axis. The sets of dependent variables — cabinet affect, cabinet perceptions, outgroup attitudes, and additional mechanisms — are grouped.

Starting with cabinet affect, Macedonian respondents reacted predictably to the presence of ten Albanian ministers, significantly increasing unpleasant cabinet affect. At the same time, fewer Macedonian respondents experienced mixed affect. Thus, over-representation of Albanians did generate affective reactions in line with the expectations for Hypothesis 1. Albanians' cabinet affect did not change compared to the baseline condition of zero Albanian ministers. At least for cabinet affect, increasing descriptive representation has a backlash effect without any compensating positive attitudes from the minority group.[11]

Moving to perceptions about the cabinet, Albanians reacted negatively to the cabinet with a single Albanian minister and felt that this cabinet was significantly less representative than a cabinet with no Albanian ministers. The marginal effects for cabinet representation with one or ten ministers are indistinguishable. Descriptive representation may simply act to ethnicize perceptions of the cabinet, provoking this counter-intuitive reaction from Albanians.

Descriptive representation had similarly mixed results when examining overall outgroup attitudes. Macedonians perceived higher equality and were significantly more likely to be willing to talk to outgroup members when there was only one Albanian minister in the cabinet. Albanians felt that cabinets with ten Albanian ministers create an environment where the country is a collection of individuals, not a single group. Here Macedonians exhibited a backlash effect resulting from descriptive representation, and Albanians again seemed to indicate that increasing ethnic cabinet representation made ethnicity more salient and divided Albanians and Macedonians further.

[10]That the marginal effects for six ministers are in between one and ten is itself interesting and suggests future work focused on the sensitivity respondents have to the number of descriptive representatives.

[11]See OA.6 for a discussion of a manipulation check.

Figure 1: Descriptive Representation




Marginal effects plots from linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized from 0 to 1. Reference level is 0 Albanian ministers.

Finally, moving to the additional mechanism questions, Macedonians were significantly less satisfied with the representation they received in the cabinet when there were ten Albanian ministers, but Albanians' feelings of representation did not significantly improve. Macedonians and Albanians reacted in opposite ways to whether ministers were working for themselves or for the good of the country as the number of Albanian ministers increased. Macedonians felt that increasing Albanian representation led to ministers working for only their own benefit, whereas Albanians felt that increasing Albanian representation meant that ministers were working for the good of the country. This item provides support for Hypothesis 1: increasing coethnic representation increased feelings that ministers were working for the good of the country, at least among the minority ethnic group.

These results are in line with linear hypothesis tests comparing the point estimates for each level of Albanian descriptive representation (see OA.5). Macedonians exhibited a backlash effect when there were ten Albanian ministers, feeling that such a cabinet was less representative and less trustworthy than a cabinet with a single Albanian minister. Albanians felt that the cabinet with ten Albanian ministers was more of a model for their behavior than was a cabinet with only one Albanian minister. Macedonians were significantly less satisfied with their level of representation when there were ten Albanians compared to only one, and Albanians were more satisfied when there were ten Albanians compared to only one.

Clearly, Hypothesis 1 is at best partially supported. Macedonians exhibited some backlash to increased Albanian representation, and Albanians' attitudes only slightly improved. It is certainly not the case that increasing descriptive representation universally improves citizens' views of the outgroup or even improves said views on balance, as those in the international community pushing for increased ethnic representation or even country leaders themselves might hope.

## No Effect of Substantive Representation

Moving to substantive representation, Figure 2 displays marginal effects plots for the dichotomous substantive representation treatment, where point estimates and confidence intervals indicate the marginal effect for respondents receiving the treatment relative to the control condition. As with descriptive representation, Hypothesis 2 states that increasing minority substantive representation will improve minority citizens' views of the outgroup and worsen majority citizens' views.

Neither Macedonians nor Albanians reacted to substantive representation: cabinet affect was unchanged, cabinet perceptions were unchanged, and overall outgroup attitudes were unchanged. Interestingly, Albanians believed that substantive representation would lead to them benefiting financially. This is the expected mechanism: Albanians perceived that they will receive financial benefits and they then attributed these benefits to the cabinet and its collection of Albanian and Macedonian ministers. Thus, Albanians do receive the treatment and perceive the expected benefit, but the attribution piece is missing. Albanians' opinions about the cabinet do not improve and neither do their outgroup attitudes. It is more difficult to account for substantive representation and to identify the individual or group of ministers who provided these financial resources, especially compared to the ease with which one can figure out the number of coethnic cabinet ministers. The attribution problem may be one reason why Hypothesis 2 is not supported.

## Cooperation Helps Somewhat

Finally, Figure 3 displays the marginal effects for the SDSM and Cooperation treatments relative to each of their control conditions. I argue in Hypothesis 3 that cooperation of either variety should improve citizens' views of the outgroup.

Starting with cabinet affect, Macedonians did not differentiate between cabinets with ministerial cooperation and those without. Albanians felt significantly more pleasant and

Figure 2: Substantive Representation




Marginal effects plots from linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized from 0 to 1. Reference level is no substantive representation.

Figure 3: Cooperation




Marginal effects plots from linear regression models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized from 0 to 1. Reference level is no ministerial cooperation or no SDSM Albanian ministers.

significantly less unpleasant about the cooperative cabinet, in line with Hypothesis 3. Macedonians exhibited a backlash effect when there was an Albanian SDSM minister, significantly decreasing pleasant affect as Albanians significantly decreased unpleasant affect. Cooperation does not universally promote positive affect as Hypothesis 3 expects.

Cabinet perceptions among Macedonians were unchanged when ministers cooperated with each other. Albanians' did not react to the cooperation treatment, but did increase trust in the cabinet and their perception that the cabinet was a model for interethnic behavior when there was an Albanian SDSM minister.

Though these results about ministerial cooperation are somewhat promising, neither Macedonians nor Albanians translated their changed affect or cabinet perceptions into improved outgroup attitudes. The only significant effect of either the cooperation treatment or the SDSM Albanian minister on outgroup attitudes was on Albanians' perceptions of Macedonian citizens as one group instead of a collection of individuals. Albanians significantly improved their feeling that all Macedonian citizens are one group when there was an Albanian SDSM minister, not just ministers from Albanian ethnic parties.

Moving to the mechanism questions, Macedonians believed that they would benefit financially from cooperation, they were more satisfied with their representation when cooperation occurred, and they thought that ministers were working for the good of the country when they cooperated. Albanians were not influenced by ministerial cooperation in these ways. Interestingly, Albanians believed that having an Albanian SDSM minister led to ministers working more for their own benefit and not for the good of the country. Thus, while an Albanian SDSM minister made Albanians think of citizens as a single group, it also prompted them to believe that the ministers were working for themselves. The likely explanation for this curious finding is that the SDSM is perceived as a multi-ethnic party — hence treating citizens as a single group — but the SDSM is politically not aligned with Albanian interests.

Cooperation has mixed effects. The cooperation treatment positively impacted Albanians and Macedonians, but only in certain cases. Even though affect and the mechanism

questions change in the expected direction, the cooperation treatment had no effect on cabinet perceptions or overall outgroup attitudes. The presence of an Albanian SDSM minister provoked some Macedonian backlash and limited improved attitudes for Albanians. Thus, Hypothesis 3 remains partially supported for some outcomes of interest and not for overall outgroup attitudes.

The size of the significant effects are moderate, though substantively meaningful. For example, adding an Albanian SDSM minister increases Albanians' perceptions that ministers are working for their own benefit by about 10%, while it reduces Macedonians' perceptions by about 5%. That the composition of the cabinet contributes this much to citizens perceptions of the cabinet is noteworthy.

# Discussion and Conclusion

This study suggests that ethnic cabinet representation alone is not a solution to improve citizens' views of the outgroup. Of my three hypotheses about forms of perceived benefit that may influence said views, only ministerial cooperation showed promise for improving outgroup affect and perceptions of the cabinet, but cooperation did not impact outgroup attitudes. Majority respondents exhibited some backlash effects to descriptive representation, and these backlash effects were not compensated for by improved responses among minority individuals. Substantive representation had no effect on outgroup views. King and Samii (2018) examine ethnic recognition and find a complementary result, suggesting that ethnic cabinet representation may be effective in certain circumstances, but that it is not a universal solution for reducing citizen ethnic tensions.

The results in this study rely on a realistic hypothetical vignette experiment in Macedonia. As mentioned earlier, the international community and leaders in many countries are working to implement ethnic representation, hoping that it will improve citizens' views of ethnic outgroups. While Macedonia's clearly defined ethnic groups make it an attractive site

for an experiment, the implications about the efficacy of ethnic representation on improving citizens' outgroup views are more broadly generalizable. Representation is a core feature of government, and political scientists have long studied the ways in which political representation can be effective. This paper contributes to this literature by examining how citizens respond to government representation. Much related work compares consociationalism and centripetalism as methods of elite inclusion that are thought to also impact citizen attitudes (Reilly, 2012). Here I show that citizen responses to grand coalition cabinets where minority groups are clearly defined are limited, corroborating recent findings that consociationalism's effectiveness may be situation dependent (e.g., Wilson, 2020). I explore a movement toward centripetalism through the multi-ethnic SDSM party, but the Macedonian case is one where multi-ethnic party competition has not fully developed. Further promoting the development of multi-ethnic parties alongside traditional power-sharing structures may provide a way to ensure that ethnic minority issues are represented while, at the same time, encouraging multi-ethnic electoral cooperation (Bogaards, 2019).

Future research would do well to replicate the design of this study in other country contexts. The Macedonia case is one with prior, though relatively limited, interethnic violence and acrimonious ethnic relations. Increasing ethnic representation in contexts without such a history of ethnic tensions may have a more substantial impact on public outgroup views. At the same time, the need to reduce ethnic tensions is likely highest in post conflict settings. Additionally, one motivation in Macedonia for increasing ethnic representation and reducing ethnic tensions is the prospect of European Union accession. While there is also substantial internal pressure for improved ethnic representation, the effectiveness of international organizations in encouraging or potentially pressuring country leaders to prioritize ethnic representation deserves further attention.

The experimental results initially appear to run counter to leaders' incentives for engaging in ethnic representation. I present some evidence that ethnic representation may not improve citizen responses because minority groups are suspicious of cabinet appointees. In a

traditional patronage story, citizens elect representatives who provide them with patronage benefits. Though leaders and citizens enter into a credible commitment to exchange political support for patronage benefits, it is much more difficult for citizens to exit the bargain. Citizens only have the ability to vote out the country leader, they cannot remove an appointed cabinet minister from his or her post.

Therefore, while leaders can increase ethnic representation, the results suggest that their ability to effectively shape ethnic relations using this mechanism is limited. If government legitimacy is also influenced by ethnic representation as Arnesen and Peters (2018) find, how can leaders reduce ethnic tensions and improve citizens' relationships with government? First, while ethnic representation may not improve citizen ethnic relationships, it could impact ethnic relationships among political elites. Exposure to and forming relationships with outgroup elites could serve as a way for political elites to become key figures in efforts to improve citizen ethnic relations.

From a normative perspective, just because ethnic representation may not on its own be a solution to citizen ethnic tensions does not mean that leaders should avoid ethnic representation. Additional research is needed to examine how ethnic representation can be part of a larger strategy to reduce ethnic tensions. This study tests the often repeated advice that country leaders can meaningfully improve citizen ethnic relations by implementing ethnic representation. In the Macedonian context and when treated as its own strategy, the results generate a call for scholars and practitioners to carefully examine the conditions under which ethnic representation successfully reduces citizen ethnic tensions and how lessons from these contexts can be applied to cases like Macedonia.

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# Online Appendix:
# Citizen Responses to Ethnic Representation

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This appendix provides supporting information to the article and is posted online. Replication data and code for all empirical analysis is posted on the author's website.

## OA.1: Survey Details

- Pre-Survey Questions:

  1. Female: 1-Female, 0-Male
  2. Age (in years)
  3. Married: 1-Yes, 0-No
  4. Education: 1-No formal education, 2-Incomplete primary school, 3-Completed primary school, 4-Completed secondary school, 5-Some college, 6-Graduated college, 7-Advanced Degree
  5. Albanian: 1-Albanian, 0-Macedonian
  6. Income Personal (in EUR): 1-No income, 17-More than 2300 EUR per month
  7. Income Household (in EUR): 1-No income, 17-More than 2300 EUR per month
  8. Household Size (count)
  9. Region: 1-Skopje, 2-North West, 3-South West, 4-East (Region 4 is dropped in Albanian only models due to too few observations)
  10. Urban: 1-Yes, 2-No

- Pre-Cabinet Choice Questions:

  11. News: "I watch of read the news daily." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

12. Equal Opportunity: "North Macedonia provides equal opportunities for all individuals to be successful." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
13. Authoritarian: "What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
14. Knowledge: "How many members of parliament are in the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia? Is it 75, 100, 120, 140, or 150?" (1-Answered 120, 0-Otherwise)

- Cabinet Profile: "Imagine a cabinet that contains 25 ministers with an ethnic Macedonian Prime Minister. Of the 25 cabinet ministers [ProfileDescriptive] are ethnic Albanians. [ProfileSDSM] [ProfileSubstantive] [ProfileCooperation]."
  - ProfileDescriptive: 0-None, 1-One, 6-Six, 10-Ten.
  - Profile SDSM: 1-"One Albanian minister is from the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM), the rest are from several Albanian parties." 0-"The Albanian ministers are from several Albanian parties."
    Note: Option 1 is dropped when ProfileDescriptive=0; code those profiles as 0. Language for option 1 when ProfileDescriptive=1: "One Albanian minister is from the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM)."
  - ProfileSubstantive: 1-"The cabinet has already passed legislation to increase funding for Albanian issues." 0-"The composition of the cabinet has received a lot of attention from the media."
  - ProfileCooperation: 1-"Ministers work well together and have reformed the way the cabinet operates to emphasize forming a consensus when making decisions." 0-"Ministers stick up for their ethnic background and are unwilling to compromise when making decisions that impact their ethnic group."
  - Profile: Twenty-eight unique profiles were created with these four attributes; exact profile wordings are available in the replication data.
    Note: Respondents were block randomized based on ethnic identification into the twenty-eight unique profiles.

- Dependent Variables:

15. Trust: "How likely is it that people from different ethnic groups keep their word and do what is agreed on?" (1-Not likely to 5-Extremely likely)
16. Equality: "How likely are you to take into account the opinions of people from different ethnic groups when making decisions?" (1-Not likely to 5-Extremely likely)
17. One Group: "To what extent do you think of Macedonian citizens as one group as opposed to a collection of individuals with different experiences?" (0-Collection of individuals, 1-One group)
18. Neighbor: "I would be uncomfortable if someone who was a member of a different ethnic group moved in next door to me." (1-Strongly disagree to 5-Strongly agree)

19. Talkoutgroup: "I would be happy to talk to someone who was a member of a different ethnic group." (1-Strongly disagree to 5-Strongly agree)
20. Enthusiastic: "How enthusiastic would you feel if the cabinet you read about were in office? (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
21. Angry: "How angry would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
22. Hopeful: "How hopeful would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
23. Resentful: "How resentful would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
    Note: Resentful in Macedonian and Albanian back-translates to "disappointed" in English.
24. Cabinet Represent: "How well do you believe that this cabinet represents your interests?" (1-Not at all well to 5-Extremely well)
25. Cabinet Trust: "How much do you trust this cabinet?" (1-Not at all to 5-An extremely high amount)
26. Cabinet Model: "How well do you believe that this cabinet would promote positive relationships among Albanians and Macedonians in North Macedonia?" (1-Not at all well to 5-Extremely well)
27. Benefit You: "If this cabinet took office, how likely do you think it is that policies would be adopted to benefit you or your neighbors?" (1-Not at all likely to 5-Extremely likely)
28. Benefit Financial: "If this cabinet took office, how likely do you think it is that you or your neighbors would receive new financial benefits from the government?" (1-Not at all likely to 5-Extremely likely)
29. Represent Satisfied: "Compared to other ethnic groups, how satisfied are you with representation of your ethnic group in this cabinet?" (1-Not at all satisfied to 5-Extremely satisfied)
30. Minister Personal: "If this cabinet took office, do you think that ministers would work primarily to benefit themselves or the country as a whole?" (1-Themselves, 0-Country as a whole) (reverse coded)
    Note: "Themselves" here means the group of cabinet ministers; this was clear in the Albanian and Macedonian translations.

- Post-Treatment Independent Variable:

31. Party: "Which political party did you support in the last parliamentary election?" (1-Party for Democratic Prosperity (Albanian party); 2-Coalition for Change and Justice (center right Macedonian party); 3-Liberal Party (conservative-liberal party); 4-Levica (left wing party, anti-Albanian); 5-Democratic Party of Albanians (Albanian party); 6-SDSM (center-left party); 7-Besa (Albanian party); 8-Coalition Alliance for Albanians (Albanian coalition); 9-VMRO (nationalist

Macedonian party); 10-Democratic Union for Integration (Albanian party); 11-VMRO-DPMNE coalition (nationalist Macedonian coalition); 12-Did not vote; 13-Under 18 at the time of the election; 14-Voted for another party; 15-Refused) Note: This question generated a large number of refusals and answers that a respondent did not vote. The survey firm was instructed to push for respondents to identify which party they "supported" even if they did not vote.

## Vignette Design

In this section, I focus on how the experimental vignette was designed, the relationship between historical context and the vignette design, and how the treatment should be interpreted given this historical context. The main takeaway from this section is that the vignette was designed to align with historical and contemporary context, meaning that the treatment attributes and levels are realistic.

### Historical Context

Recent Macedonian history is defined by three notable events: Independence Day in 1991, the Ohrid Agreement in 2001, and the recent change in government leadership in 2016. These events each shaped and defined relationships between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. Though they also changed other aspects of Macedonian life, I will discuss ethnic relationships here, as they are the focus of this study.

Following independence, political institutions throughout Macedonia were set-up to nominally include both Macedonians and Albanians. Every Macedonian government since independence has included Albanian representation, and Albanians filled non-trivial numbers of seats in Parliament (Hislope, 2003). Despite the image of Albanian inclusion, Albanians have long lacked political power and were subject to both political and social discrimination.

The 2001 insurgency that led to the signing of the Ohrid Agreement resulted partly from Albanians' longstanding unequal treatment. The 1999 Kosovo War escalated ethnic tensions substantially. First, ethnic Macedonians felt that their ethnic identity was constantly under attack by neighboring countries. Macedonia had a longstanding disagreement with Greece about the name of the country that ethnic Macedonians interpreted as an attack on their ethnic identity. Additionally, Bulgaria and Serbia claimed that Macedonians were not a unique ethnic group and were instead derived from either Bulgarians or Serbs (Ceka, 2018). The Kosovo War added to ethnic Macedonian's perceived threat because it resulted in a large number of ethnic Albanian refugees crossing the border into Macedonia. Increasing numbers of ethnic Albanians meant renewed calls for more equal political representation and appeared to ethnic Macedonians as yet another attack on their ethnic identity (Adamson and Jovic, 2004; Brunnbauer, 2002).

Thus, in 2001 when Albanian nationalists demanding increased political representation began an armed conflict against the Macedonian army, many thought that this was the beginning of a major war. Fortunately, the conflict was resolved with limited casualties after the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement that promised Albanians increased political rights.

Tensions have continued in the post-Ohrid Agreement period, though they have not escalated into a full scale war (Adamson and Jovic, 2004; Piacentini, 2019*a*; Vasilev, 2013). Even absent widespread violent confrontations, there have been outbreaks of protests and an increased effort to emphasize the ethnic Macedonian identity (Brunnbauer, 2002; Stefoska and Stojanov, 2017). Decentralization has emerged as a key tool meant to manage ethnic tensions instead of providing for meaningful power-sharing opportunities (Koneska, 2014; Lyon, 2012).

Among these tensions, there has been some wider movement toward increased Albanian representation. One impetus is certainly the international community. The Ohrid Agreement was brokered by NATO and was supported by a wide range of international partners, and it was somewhat successful in implementing consociationalism throughout the Macedonian government, at least on paper (Aleksovska, 2015; Piacentini, 2019*b*). In addition, the European Union has pushed for Macedonians to increase support for Albanian rights in a move widely thought to have implications for Macedonia's prospects for EU membership (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009). However, these actions by the international community have prompted backlash, as ethnic Macedonian nationalists have become galvanized in resistance to increased Albanian representation (Stefoska and Stojanov, 2017).

Given the conflicting role that the international community plays in discussions over Albanian representation, it seems puzzling that one of the major Macedonian political parties — the SDSM — adopted a pro-Albanian representation stance when elected to government in 2016. Albanians had been represented and continue to be represented in every Macedonian cabinet, but the SDSM and Prime Minister Zoran Zaev emphasized providing Albanians with non-token representation (Crowther, 2017; Hislope, 2013). Part of the reason that the SDSM won election was their anti-corruption stance, a position formed in direct contrast with the other major party's — the VMRO-DPMNE — longstanding corruption problems. Providing meaningful representation for both Albanians and Macedonians was, therefore, a priority (Gjuzelov and Hadjievska, 2020).

**Descriptive Representation**

I now move to discussing the rationale behind each vignette attribute. Each attribute and its corresponding levels were chosen to reflect historical context in a meaningful way.

As previously mentioned, Albanians have been descriptively represented in every governing coalition since 1991 (Crowther, 2017; Hislope, 2013). Inclusion of Albanians occurs regardless of political party, with the VMRO-DPMNE providing for Albanian cabinet representation even though their party platform is right-wing and increasingly nationalist. The vignette describes one of four levels of descriptive representation in a cabinet with 25 ministers: 0 Albanians (0% of the cabinet), 1 Albanian (4%), 6 Albanians (24%), and 10 Albanians (40%). The percentage of Albanians in the Macedonian cabinet from 2001 to 2016 ranged from 23% to 46%. This study was conducted in 2020. At that time, the cabinet had 30 ministers (including the Prime Minister) with approximately 7 Albanians (23%). Therefore, the primary rationale behind choosing the 6 Albanian level was to reflect a typical level of Albanian cabinet inclusion. The treatment level with 10 Albanians represents the upper bound of Albanian cabinet representation.

While recent cabinets have not excluded Albanians, there is frequent discussion about Al-

banian exclusion and token representation in political discourse. Indeed, nationalist Macedonian political parties advocate for completely eliminating Albanian representation (Berisha, 2016; Kelly, 2019; Saveski and Sadiku, 2012). This includes the VMRO-DPMNE (Ceka, 2018; Kelly, 2019). The scenarios with 0 and 1 Albanian ministers are meant to reflect this political discourse, which is credible.

### Substantive Representation

The substantive representation treatment describes the cabinet approving legislation to increase funding for Albanian issues. The relevant question here is why I chose to focus on the cabinet's role in increasing funding for Albanian issues instead of highlighting either a specific funding proposal or some other form of substantive representation.

One of the main collective decision-making functions of the cabinet is to propose budget legislation.[1] By choosing to focus on the budget as a form of substantive representation, the treatment vignette highlights both one of the most important cabinet functions and one of the most important forms of substantive representation to the public. Within the cabinet's responsibility for creating and passing budget legislation, the cabinet develops strategic budget priorities, a fiscal strategy, and ceiling budget limits (WorldBank, 2019, 33). This means that the cabinet has the ability to set a priority of increasing funding for Albanian issues or mandating that Albanians receive a fair share of financial or government development programs. However, specific budget line items are left up to the finance ministry and bureaucrats in individual government departments. For this reason, substantive representation is best described as a general provision for more funding for issues of importance to Albanians.

In addition, finance priorities change every year in the budget and change every electoral cycle in the strategic budget plan that the Macedonian government releases. So, it is impossible to be specific about what a particular budget priority might be. If I were to choose an actual budget priority, then respondents would answer based on their actual experience with that priority, not that priority within the context of the other information in the vignette.

The Macedonian government draws their budget priorities from what they term their Operational Program. The 2020 to 2024 Operational Program emphasizes ethnic inclusion as a budgetary priority (Zaev, 2020). As such, the substantive representation treatment reflects the actual budgeting process and is credible.

What is more, Macedonian citizens were particularly interested in substantive representation when the survey was fielded. Government benefits have long been tied to clientelist practices (Crowther, 2017; Piacentini, 2019*b*,*a*). After gaining office, the SDSM has made reducing corruption and improving government delivery of benefits a priority.

### Ministerial Cooperation

I measure cooperation through a cooperation treatment and an SDSM treatment. Cooperation among both members of the public and cabinet ministers is generally lacking. Albanians and Macedonians often view each other as inherently incompatible (Vasilev, 2013) and nationalist parties are working to create an ethnic Macedonian only narrative (Gjuzelov and

[1] See the North Macedonian Constitution of 1991 (2011 revisions), Article 91.

Hadjievska, 2020). At the same time, some progress is being made, including the formation of some multi-ethnic political parties (Ceka, 2018). Highlighting the mixed record of cooperation, Reka (2008) finds that 41% of Albanians consider interethnic relations very good or excellent at the same time that 33% are willing to use violence to achieve political objectives.

Therefore, both cooperative and non-cooperative cabinets occur and are plausible to survey respondents. The specific cooperation treatment discusses how well ministers work together. The treatment does not explicitly mention cooperation across ethnic differences; instead, the nature of the cooperation is implied as interethnic cooperation. The control condition describing non-cooperation mentions unwillingness to compromise and provides ethnicity as the reason explaining this lack of cooperation.

This particular treatment and control structure, therefore, manipulates both the level of cooperation and whether ethnicity is used to justify non-cooperation. An alternative treatment and control structure would independently randomize the level of cooperation and whether the cooperation was discussed in ethnic terms or not. The structure of the survey experiment was already complicated given the four treatment attributes, and the sample size lacked power to add another treatment attribute. I therefore chose the two extreme cases for the cooperation treatment and control. The treatment condition reflects cooperation without priming on ethnicity. Adding the term "interethnic cooperation" or "cooperation across ethnic lines" to the treatment condition is likely to generate negative attitudes because cooperation is characterized as occurring between ethnic groups. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) show that the most powerful form of cooperation occurs when groups merge and form a "common ingroup." Thus, the cooperation treatment without mentioning ethnicity is likely to maximize the effect of the treatment on outgroup views. Similarly, the control condition that mentions both lack of cooperation and ethnicity is likely to generate the biggest negative reaction and outgroup views from respondents because it both mentions non-cooperation and explains that the non-cooperation occurs because of ethnicity — a particularly salient feature. Future work would do well to focus specifically on disentangling the nature of cooperation and the ways in which cooperation is discussed in a multi-ethnic cabinet setting.

Finally, I randomize whether an Albanian minister is a member of the SDSM. This measures cooperation because the SDSM is traditionally an ethnic Macedonian party that has recently begun outreach to ethnic Albanians. While Albanians traditionally support ethnic Albanian parties, there is a non-trivial percentage who support the SDSM. For example, consider Macedonia's sixth constituency, which is approximately 72% Albanian according to the 2002 census (MAKSTAT, 2005). In that constituency, 58.27% of voters voted for an Albanian political party and 19.67% voted for the SDSM in the 2020 Parliamentary elections (SEK, 2020). This implies that there are likely between 10 and 15% of ethnic Albanians who support the SDSM.[2] Albanian support for the SDSM is likely due to their intentional efforts to reach out to Albanian voters (OSCE, 2020; Piacentini, 2019*a*; Tahiri, 2016).

Within this context, it is plausible that an Albanian minister comes from the SDSM. The Vice-President of the SDSM in 2019 was an ethnic Albanian (Piacentini, 2019*a*, 282). Therefore, the treatment and control options reflect the current possibility that an ethnic Albanian minister could come from the SDSM.

[2]More precise exit polling is not available, so these numbers are necessarily approximate.

### Use of a Vignette Experiment

Thus far, I have shown that the vignette experiment reflects historical context and that all of the attributes and levels in the vignette are credible. As such, while the vignette experiment is hypothetical, it is also *realistic*, a factor that McDonald (2020) finds is particularly important in ensuring the validity of vignette experiments. One final design choice worth noting is the choice of a vignette experiment in the first place. Even if the vignette experiment is realistic, the experiment still asks respondents to imagine a situation and to respond by reporting their feelings given that situation. It is therefore possible that some respondents are better at imagining these situations than others.

Some literature in political science has addressed this exact question — whether respondents provide answers to vignette experiments that are reliable and that mimic the answers that they would provide if the vignette "came true" and respondents were asked their opinions about an actual event. Steiner, Atzmüller and Su (2016) find that vignette experiments are more realistic than standard survey questions and that the added realism increases validity. Additionally, Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015) demonstrate that vignette experiments actually reflect reality quite well. By comparing vignette experiment results against a natural experiment, they conclude that vignette experiments can be successfully used to assess respondent attitudes with relatively little deviation from natural experiments. This finding suggests that respondents must be good at envisioning hypothetical scenarios or at least good enough that their preferences are stable between vignette and natural experiments.

It is also worth emphasizing that my regression models control for common demographic variables that may be associated with differences in ability to understand hypothetical scenarios. Added life experience (i.e., age) and education, among other variables, may be systematically related to comfort with processing hypothetical scenarios. Finally, the manipulation check in OA.6 also demonstrates that respondents successfully received the vignette experiment treatment.

## Assignment and Preference of Cabinet Ministries

Beyond the historical context regarding *how many* Albanians are typically included in the cabinet, different ministries have different levels of influence. As such, we might be interested in which ministries Albanians are typically appointed to. If these ministries are systematically less powerful than the ministries to which Macedonians are appointed, then Albanians may not respond positively to increased descriptive representation because they do not believe those ministerial positions are important. I address this question in two parts. First, I detail evidence that Albanians have recently been appointed to a wide variety of ministries. Second, I use evidence from the survey experiment to show that Albanians value ministries not traditionally considered powerful. As such, Albanians do not have a token ministerial appointment in mind when they receive the experimental vignette.

Starting with the ministries that Albanians receive when they are appointed to the cabinet, while Albanians have historically been appointed to less influential ministries (Hislope, 2003), this trend has changed as politicians have realized that Albanian political support is important (Crowther, 2017). Prime Minister Zaev has appointed Albanians to particularly

prominent cabinet posts. As a result, Albanians were well represented both in terms of the number of cabinet posts and their apparent influence when this survey experiment was conducted. In 2020, Albanians held the Deputy Prime Minister post along with Economy, Education and Science, Culture, Environment and Physical Planning, Diaspora, and Political System and Inter-Community Relations. Using Krook and O'Brien (2012)'s typology for ministerial prestige, this translates to one high prestige post (Economy), two medium prestige posts (Environment and Physical Planning, and Education and Science), and three low prestige posts (Culture, Diaspora, and Political System and Inter-Community Relations).[3] Additionally, while the Deputy Prime Minister does not hold a portfolio, this position is nevertheless important. Taken together, Albanians are not only assigned to token ministries, but also to ministries with prestige and real political power.

In addition, many Albanians believe that what are typically considered "low prestige" ministries are actually the most consequential ministries in their lives. I included one question on the survey asking respondents to "Think about the cabinet ministry that is most consequential to the life of you and your family. What cabinet ministry are you thinking of?" with respondents listing a ministry. The results — broken down by ethnicity — are in Table OA.1.1. I then collapsed these results into four categories, as shown in Table OA.1.2. From these Tables, we can see that Macedonians and Albanians care equally about ministries related to the economy, but that Albanians feel that culture and welfare ministries are more consequential while Macedonians feel that security/international ministries are more consequential. For example, fully 20% of Albanians listed the Education and Science ministry as most consequential. This makes sense because Albanian language education is an important issue. It is certainly possible that Albanians believe that the ministries that are most consequential to them are also the ministries where Albanians are ministers. Table OA.1.1 suggests that this is not entirely the case: Albanians believe that the Health ministry is quite important, for example, even though there is not an Albanian health minister.

These findings suggest that Albanians do not immediately write off descriptive representation because they imagine that Albanians will receive token ministerial appointments. Instead, Albanians expect a wide variety of ministerial appointments. The fact that the empirical results show that Albanians exposed to a vignette with more descriptive representation do not improve their cabinet perceptions or outgroup attitudes means that Albanians (and Macedonians) do not see the cabinet as a powerful or influential enough institution to be able to generate the kinds of changes in outgroup views that many have hoped.

[3]Education is marked as medium prestige and science is low prestige, so I categorize it in the higher category.

Table OA.1.1: Cabinet Ministry Preferences

| | MAC | ALB |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign Affairs | 0.13 | 0.02 |
| Health | 0.17 | 0.08 |
| Justice | 0.09 | 0.03 |
| Transport and Communications | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Economy | 0.05 | 0.28 |
| Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Supply | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Information Society and Administration | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Education and Science | 0.02 | 0.20 |
| Local Government | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Culture | 0.00 | 0.09 |
| Environment and Physical Planning | 0.00 | 0.05 |
| Finance | 0.11 | 0.03 |
| Internal Affairs | 0.10 | 0.01 |
| Labor and Social Policy | 0.15 | 0.01 |
| Communications | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Diaspora | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Foreign Investment | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Foreign Affairs | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Foreign Investment | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Regulation | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Defense | 0.06 | 0.02 |
| Political System and Inter-Community Relations | 0.00 | 0.08 |

Respondents' preferred ministries by ethnicity. Foreign Affairs and Foreign Investment constitute two ministerial positions and so are repeated.

Table OA.1.2: Cabinet Ministry Preferences By Category

| | MAC | ALB |
|---|---|---|
| Culture | 0.02 | 0.19 |
| Welfare | 0.28 | 0.37 |
| Security/International | 0.30 | 0.04 |
| Economy | 0.40 | 0.40 |

Culture (Local Government, Culture, Diaspora, Political System and Inter-Community Relations). Welfare (Health, Justice, Education and Science, Environment and Physical Planning). Security/International (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Defense). Economy (all other ministries).

# OA.2: Randomization and Balance Checks

Table OA.2.1 shows multinomial logistic and logistic regression models where the dependent variable is the vignette attribute and independent variables are respondent demographics. There are only three covariates that predict assignment to vignette attributes, supporting the claim that vignette attributes were successfully randomized across attributes. Wald Tests assess whether the covariates have more combined predictive power than a restricted model with just an intercept. Only Model 2 fails the Wald Test, likely because of the combination of two significant covariates.

Table OA.2.1: Randomization Checks

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ProfileDescriptive 1 | ProfileDescriptive 6 | ProfileDescriptive 10 | ProfileCooperation | ProfileSDSM | ProfileSubstantive |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female | 0.241 | 0.441* | 0.249 | −0.004 | 0.178 | 0.151 |
| | (0.236) | (0.237) | (0.235) | (0.145) | (0.147) | (0.145) |
| Age | −0.007 | 0.006 | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.004 | −0.006 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Married | −0.146 | −0.601** | 0.042 | 0.015 | −0.233 | −0.116 |
| | (0.247) | (0.250) | (0.248) | (0.152) | (0.154) | (0.152) |
| Education | 0.096 | 0.222* | 0.018 | 0.065 | −0.041 | −0.015 |
| | (0.125) | (0.124) | (0.126) | (0.075) | (0.076) | (0.075) |
| Household Size | −0.021 | −0.055 | 0.029 | 0.068* | 0.051 | 0.007 |
| | (0.061) | (0.063) | (0.056) | (0.040) | (0.038) | (0.036) |
| North West | −0.477 | −0.171 | −0.170 | 0.123 | −0.157 | −0.162 |
| | (0.308) | (0.307) | (0.309) | (0.189) | (0.191) | (0.189) |
| South West | 0.119 | 0.075 | 0.250 | −0.132 | 0.226 | −0.057 |
| | (0.369) | (0.380) | (0.374) | (0.218) | (0.219) | (0.218) |
| East | −0.507 | −0.354 | −0.175 | 0.001 | −0.060 | 0.041 |
| | (0.353) | (0.356) | (0.351) | (0.222) | (0.226) | (0.222) |
| Urban | −0.238 | −0.004 | −0.169 | 0.172 | 0.045 | −0.155 |
| | (0.259) | (0.261) | (0.258) | (0.160) | (0.161) | (0.159) |
| Constant | 1.040 | −0.027 | 0.461 | −0.770 | −0.115 | 0.424 |
| | (0.791) | (0.802) | (0.785) | (0.496) | (0.494) | (0.484) |
| Wald Test | 0.97 | 2.32** | 1.05 | 0.07 | 1.16 | 0.64 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Models 1, 2, and 3 are output from an multinomial logistic regression; reference level is ProfileDescriptive= 0. Models 4, 5, and 6 are logistic regressions.

Table OA.2.2 displays randomization checks for each of the 28 cabinet profiles using a multinomial logistic regression model with profile 1 as the control category. There are only twelve significantly predictive coefficients, again supporting the claim that profiles were randomized successfully.

Table OA.2.2: Randomization Checks All Profiles

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | (23) | (24) | (25) | (26) | (27) |
| Female | 0.452 | −0.932 | −0.577 | 0.204 | −0.009 | −0.134 | 0.336 | 0.153 | 0.296 | −0.594 | −0.160 | 0.683 | −0.229 | 0.095 | 0.250 | 0.218 | 0.245 | 0.507 | 0.011 | 0.419 | −0.824 | 0.203 | 0.301 | 0.121 | −0.265 | −0.286 | 0.263 |
| | (0.549) | (0.574) | (0.553) | (0.546) | (0.543) | (0.543) | (0.549) | (0.542) | (0.552) | (0.553) | (0.543) | (0.554) | (0.545) | (0.543) | (0.546) | (0.545) | (0.545) | (0.550) | (0.544) | (0.549) | (0.563) | (0.545) | (0.544) | (0.546) | (0.550) | (0.545) | (0.546) |
| Age | −0.010 | −0.003 | 0.011 | −0.010 | −0.015 | −0.011 | 0.003 | −0.021 | 0.002 | −0.009 | −0.006 | −0.004 | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.020 | −0.006 | 0.009 | 0.010 | −0.007 | −0.008 | −0.011 | 0.010 | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.007 | −0.007 | −0.004 |
| | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) |
| Married | 0.573 | 1.162* | 0.296 | 0.062 | 0.916 | 0.436 | 0.234 | 0.424 | −0.158 | 0.327 | 0.495 | −0.323 | −0.005 | −0.245 | 0.543 | −0.207 | −0.546 | 0.041 | −0.005 | 0.465 | 0.995* | 0.026 | 0.059 | −0.171 | 1.294** | 1.104* | 0.680 |
| | (0.581) | (0.595) | (0.584) | (0.583) | (0.586) | (0.575) | (0.587) | (0.572) | (0.596) | (0.577) | (0.579) | (0.592) | (0.586) | (0.588) | (0.588) | (0.588) | (0.599) | (0.586) | (0.588) | (0.583) | (0.585) | (0.590) | (0.594) | (0.596) | (0.613) | (0.600) | (0.582) |
| Education | 0.406 | 0.028 | 0.176 | 0.299 | 0.269 | 0.305 | 0.374 | 0.198 | 0.294 | 0.114 | 0.197 | 0.349 | 0.465 | 0.531* | 0.581** | 0.212 | 0.354 | 0.478* | 0.071 | 0.153 | 0.178 | 0.306 | 0.197 | −0.084 | 0.386 | −0.141 | 0.428 |
| | (0.293) | (0.314) | (0.300) | (0.296) | (0.297) | (0.293) | (0.297) | (0.296) | (0.300) | (0.304) | (0.301) | (0.293) | (0.290) | (0.286) | (0.285) | (0.299) | (0.295) | (0.287) | (0.307) | (0.302) | (0.299) | (0.295) | (0.297) | (0.318) | (0.298) | (0.316) | (0.293) |
| Household Size | −0.247 | −0.104 | −0.083 | 0.032 | −0.323** | −0.170 | −0.169 | −0.159 | −0.127 | −0.202 | −0.047 | −0.191 | −0.040 | −0.064 | −0.217 | −0.043 | −0.260* | −0.140 | −0.461*** | 0.001 | −0.069 | 0.031 | −0.026 | −0.242* | −0.087 | −0.009 | −0.177 |
| | (0.157) | (0.142) | (0.134) | (0.093) | (0.161) | (0.149) | (0.143) | (0.151) | (0.142) | (0.150) | (0.125) | (0.149) | (0.115) | (0.128) | (0.152) | (0.125) | (0.149) | (0.147) | (0.164) | (0.108) | (0.136) | (0.099) | (0.120) | (0.145) | (0.140) | (0.119) | (0.150) |
| North West | −0.079 | 0.472 | −0.351 | 0.136 | −0.619 | −0.527 | −1.841** | 0.164 | −0.866 | 0.138 | −0.580 | −0.260 | −0.030 | −0.261 | 0.913 | −0.870 | −1.022 | 0.087 | 0.035 | 0.058 | −0.397 | −0.794 | 0.795 | −1.017 | 0.343 | −0.768 | 0.482 |
| | (0.739) | (0.739) | (0.713) | (0.744) | (0.720) | (0.715) | (0.792) | (0.710) | (0.770) | (0.726) | (0.730) | (0.710) | (0.695) | (0.712) | (0.734) | (0.735) | (0.735) | (0.742) | (0.730) | (0.750) | (0.722) | (0.733) | (0.751) | (0.725) | (0.748) | (0.759) | (0.760) |
| South West | −0.222 | −0.585 | −0.896 | 0.458 | −0.885 | −0.341 | −0.896 | −0.427 | 0.242 | −0.138 | −0.233 | −1.206 | −1.183 | −0.222 | −0.372 | −0.200 | −0.322 | 0.483 | −0.450 | 0.337 | −0.096 | −0.161 | −0.108 | −0.834 | −0.608 | −0.056 | 0.265 |
| | (0.849) | (0.943) | (0.901) | (0.829) | (0.848) | (0.795) | (0.808) | (0.865) | (0.796) | (0.849) | (0.811) | (0.995) | (0.994) | (0.831) | (0.937) | (0.805) | (0.800) | (0.804) | (0.878) | (0.832) | (0.790) | (0.806) | (0.956) | (0.854) | (0.939) | (0.790) | (0.863) |
| East | −0.390 | −0.365 | −0.532 | −0.346 | −1.036 | −1.390 | −1.227 | −0.739 | −0.548 | −0.709 | −0.671 | −0.451 | −0.838 | −0.813 | −0.295 | −0.660 | −1.128 | −0.586 | −0.859 | −0.177 | −1.261 | −0.606 | 0.285 | −0.895 | −0.105 | −0.638 | −0.470 |
| | (0.808) | (0.848) | (0.781) | (0.868) | (0.796) | (0.875) | (0.786) | (0.845) | (0.823) | (0.859) | (0.809) | (0.788) | (0.838) | (0.840) | (0.840) | (0.804) | (0.832) | (0.856) | (0.862) | (0.842) | (0.882) | (0.802) | (0.843) | (0.805) | (0.810) | (0.811) | (0.890) |
| Urban | −0.900 | −0.498 | 0.022 | −0.709 | −0.587 | −0.152 | −1.063* | −0.199 | −0.817 | −0.476 | −0.784 | −0.487 | −0.574 | −0.394 | 0.388 | −0.652 | −0.545 | 0.114 | −0.648 | −0.739 | −0.221 | −0.488 | 0.186 | −0.622 | −0.772 | −0.529 | −1.035* |
| | (0.599) | (0.605) | (0.615) | (0.598) | (0.608) | (0.618) | (0.599) | (0.605) | (0.601) | (0.599) | (0.597) | (0.603) | (0.603) | (0.606) | (0.637) | (0.597) | (0.605) | (0.623) | (0.600) | (0.596) | (0.613) | (0.600) | (0.604) | (0.597) | (0.606) | (0.597) | (0.602) |
| Constant | −0.027 | 0.424 | −0.360 | −0.741 | 1.294 | 0.371 | 0.298 | 0.749 | −0.028 | 1.257 | 0.354 | −0.036 | −1.252 | −1.685 | −3.359* | 0.409 | 0.295 | −2.189 | 2.415 | −0.360 | 0.350 | −1.212 | −1.937 | 2.160 | −1.710 | 1.063 | −0.880 |
| | (1.897) | (1.915) | (1.854) | (1.771) | (1.886) | (1.861) | (1.881) | (1.861) | (1.899) | (1.886) | (1.826) | (1.876) | (1.799) | (1.829) | (1.947) | (1.825) | (1.893) | (1.904) | (1.926) | (1.819) | (1.840) | (1.780) | (1.879) | (1.932) | (1.904) | (1.856) | (1.912) |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results from a multinomial logistic regression on the number of the cabinet profile seen by respondents.

Table OA.2.3 displays mean values for each profile attribute as well as a Welch Two Sample $t$-test indicating whether the covariate individually predicts the profile attribute assignment. Only two individual covariates significantly predict profile attribute assignment. Thus, individual covariates were successfully randomized for each profile attribute.

Table OA.2.3: Individual Covariate Balance

| | Mean 1 | Mean 0 | Estimate | Std. Error | $p$-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ProfileCooperation | | | | | |
| Female | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 |
| Age | 43.25 | 43.22 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.98 |
| Married | 0.50 | 0.50 | -0.00 | 0.04 | 0.97 |
| Education | 4.05 | 3.98 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.30 |
| Household Size | 4.28 | 4.06 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.14 |
| Skopje | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.82 |
| Urban | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.31 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 1.00 |
| ProfileSubstantive | | | | | |
| Female | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.031 | 0.04 | 0.39 |
| Age | 42.24 | 44.23 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| Married | 0.49 | 0.51 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.41 |
| Education | 4.01 | 4.02 | -0.00 | 0.02 | 0.92 |
| Household Size | 4.23 | 4.12 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.46 |
| Skopje | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.70 |
| Urban | 0.55 | 0.59 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.31 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 1.00 |
| ProfileSDSM | | | | | |
| Female | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.24 |
| Age | 42.33 | 43.91 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.20 |
| Married | 0.47 | 0.52 | -0.05 | 0.04 | 0.16 |
| Education | 4.00 | 4.03 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.70 |
| Household Size | 4.30 | 4.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.12 |
| Skopje | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.72 |
| Urban | 0.57 | 0.57 | -0.00 | 0.04 | 0.98 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 1.00 |
| ProfileDescriptive 0 | | | | | |
| Female | 0.45 | 0.51 | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.20 |
| Age | 44.12 | 43.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.56 |
| Married | 0.53 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.47 |
| Education | 3.95 | 4.03 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.47 |
| Household Size | 4.14 | 4.17 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.92 |
| Skopje | 0.27 | 0.31 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.43 |
| Urban | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.79 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | | | | | |
| Female | 0.50 | 0.51 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.80 |
| Age | 41.21 | 44.04 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| Married | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.68 |
| Education | 4.05 | 4.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.56 |
| Household Size | 4.20 | 4.16 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.79 |
| Skopje | 0.33 | 0.29 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.24 |
| Urban | 0.55 | 0.58 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.59 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | | | | | |
| Female | 0.54 | 0.49 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.24 |
| Age | 44.14 | 42.87 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.35 |
| Married | 0.42 | 0.53 | -0.09 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Education | 4.10 | 3.98 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
| Household Size | 4.00 | 4.24 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.14 |
| Skopje | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.88 |
| Urban | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.23 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | | | | | |
| Female | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.95 |
| Age | 43.90 | 42.97 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.49 |
| Married | 0.55 | 0.48 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.07 |
| Education | 3.92 | 4.05 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.14 |
| Household Size | 4.32 | 4.11 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.19 |
| Skopje | 0.28 | 0.31 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.48 |
| Urban | 0.55 | 0.58 | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.39 |
| Albanian | 0.50 | 0.50 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 |

OLS regressions of each covariate on the specified attribute with standard errors and $p$-values. Mean 1 refers to when the specified attribute was 1, Mean 0 refers to when the specified attribute was 0. OLS $p$-values are equivalent to Welch Two Sample $t$-tests.

To calculate experimental power, I conducted power simulations. The main regression models used in the analysis are linear models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1 and independent variables for each experimental attribute. Though I test interaction effects as a robustness check, I am primarily interested in the independent effects of each attribute. Thus, I run a simulation with a linear model set-up in this way. The results indicate that the experiment achieves at least 75% power. Some smaller effects may exist and, therefore, may not be detected by this experimental design. I am primarily interested in substantively relevant effect sizes. Changing from one attribute level in the experimental design to another requires substantial investment on the part of the country leader. For example, it is unlikely that the leader can alter the cabinet environment to move from no cooperation to full cooperation in a short period of time. Therefore, medium and large effect sizes are substantively meaningful, whereas small effect sizes are not. It is worth investigating each attribute further in future research, but this study has sufficient power to make meaningful comparisons between attribute levels and to determine whether any attributes have substantial, substantive effects on the dependent variables.

# OA.3: Affect Toward the Cabinet Classification

I present eight different methods for classifying affect toward the cabinet from the four emotion questions that appear post-treatment. According to Gubler and Karpowitz (2019), the factor analysis methods, particularly the minimum residual Bartlett method, are the most accurate. Thus, the main text presents results from the minimum residual Bartlett method.

As a first attempt, I use latent profile analysis (LPA) to determine affect toward the cabinet. To check that the affective state classification was successful, Table OA.3.1 displays the mean value of respondents assigned to each affective state across each emotion question. We can see that the emotion questions load onto affective states as expected, meaning that the LPA classification was successful.

Figure OA.3.1 displays bi-plots for each factor analysis method employed in the analysis. The arrows represent the loadings for each emotion question; in every case, the four emotion questions load onto two dimensions.

Tables OA.3.2 and OA.3.3 display the correlations between each of the seven factor analysis methods and the LPA method. Correlations are broken up between pleasant factors in columns in Table OA.3.2 and unpleasant factors in columns in Table OA.3.3.

Figure OA.3.2 shows these individuals visually with their scores on the pleasant valence questions (enthusiastic and hopeful) on the $y$ axis and for the unpleasant valence questions (angry and resentful) on the $x$ axis. Colors indicate the affective state. As is clear from the Figure, a substantial proportion of respondents have weak or mixed affective states after receiving the vignette.

Table OA.3.4 displays the number of respondents classified into each affective state for each of the eight analysis methods. Here we see that the factor analysis methods are quite consistent, but that LPA classifies many more people into a mixed affective state than do the factor analysis methods.

Table OA.3.5 displays pseudo-correlations between affective state classifications since

affective states are categorical variables.

Figure OA.3.2 shows affective state classifications for the minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis method. Dotted lines separate the affective states. Axes are the factor loadings multiplied by the pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) emotion question responses.

Figure OA.3.3 displays the same minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis scores, but with the points colored to represent the number of factor analysis methods that classify an individual in the same affective state. As is clear from the Figure, the vast majority of factor analysis methods are consistent and individuals are classified in the same affective state seven times.

Table OA.3.1: Mean Emotion Question Values for Each LPA Affective State

| Question | Pleasant | Unpleasant | Weak | Mixed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hopeful | 4.03 | 1.59 | 1.95 | 2.95 |
| Enthusiastic | 4.07 | 1.46 | 1.95 | 2.99 |
| Angry | 1.21 | 4.26 | 2.00 | 2.73 |
| Resentful | 1.16 | 4.66 | 1.71 | 3.05 |

Latent profile analysis with four classes to produce four affective states. Means for each emotion question (scale from 1 to 5 where 5 is highest) across each affective state.

Figure OA.3.1: FA Dimension Plots




Seven factor analysis methods applied to four emotion questions with two factors. Each emotion question is shown with a blue arrow.

Table OA.3.2: Correlations Between Pleasant Factors

| | Minres Reg | Minres Bartlett | Maxlik Reg | Maxlik Bartlett | PA Reg | PA Bartlett | PCA | LPA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minres Reg | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| Minres Bartlett | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| Maxlik Reg | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| Maxlik Bartlett | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| PA Reg | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| PA Bartlett | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| PCA | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| LPA | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Unpl. Minres Reg | -0.45 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.39 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.38 |
| Unpl. Minres Bartlett | -0.45 | -0.39 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.38 |
| Unpl. Maxlik Reg | -0.46 | -0.40 | -0.46 | -0.40 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.39 |
| Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett | -0.45 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.39 | -0.46 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.38 |
| Unpl. PA Reg | -0.51 | -0.45 | -0.51 | -0.45 | -0.51 | -0.44 | -0.44 | -0.44 |
| Unpl. PA Bartlett | -0.44 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |
| Unpl. PCA | -0.44 | -0.39 | -0.44 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |
| Unpl. LPA | -0.44 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |

Correlations between eight affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table OA.3.3: Correlations Between Unpleasant Factors

| | Unpl. Minres Reg | Unpl. Minres Bartlett | Unpl. Maxlik Reg | Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett | Unpl. PA Reg | Unpl. PA Bartlett | Unpl. PCA | Unpl. LPA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minres Reg | -0.45 | -0.45 | -0.46 | -0.45 | -0.51 | -0.44 | -0.44 | -0.44 |
| Minres Bartlett | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.40 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.38 | -0.39 | -0.38 |
| Maxlik Reg | -0.45 | -0.46 | -0.46 | -0.45 | -0.51 | -0.44 | -0.44 | -0.44 |
| Maxlik Bartlett | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.40 | -0.39 | -0.45 | -0.38 | -0.38 | -0.38 |
| PA Reg | -0.46 | -0.46 | -0.46 | -0.46 | -0.51 | -0.44 | -0.44 | -0.44 |
| PA Bartlett | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |
| PCA | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.39 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |
| LPA | -0.38 | -0.38 | -0.39 | -0.38 | -0.44 | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.37 |
| Unpl. Minres Reg | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| Unpl. Minres Bartlett | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| Unpl. Maxlik Reg | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
| Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
| Unpl. PA Reg | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Unpl. PA Bartlett | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Unpl. PCA | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Unpl. LPA | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |

Correlations between eight affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table OA.3.4: Affective State Classification

| Method | Pleasant | Unpleasant | Weak | Mixed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minres Regression | 269 | 223 | 126 | 156 |
| Maxlik Regression | 266 | 227 | 139 | 152 |
| Minres Bartlett | 254 | 202 | 151 | 177 |
| Maxlik Bartlett | 238 | 217 | 167 | 162 |
| Principal Axis Regression | 242 | 202 | 189 | 151 |
| Principal Axis Bartlett | 242 | 197 | 192 | 153 |
| PCA | 242 | 197 | 192 | 153 |
| LPA | 112 | 119 | 177 | 376 |

Affective State classification for eight classification methods.

Table OA.3.5: Cramer's V Correlation Between Categorical Variables

| | Minres Reg | Minres Bartlett | Maxlik Reg | Maxlik Bartlett | PA Reg | PA Bartlett | PCA | LPA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minres Reg | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.58 |
| Minres Bartlett | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 0.80 | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.60 |
| Maxlik Reg | 0.99 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.58 |
| Maxlik Bartlett | 0.94 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.61 |
| PA Reg | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.83 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.68 |
| PA Bartlett | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 0.85 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.68 |
| PCA | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 0.85 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.68 |
| LPA | 0.58 | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.61 | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.68 | 1.00 |

Pseudo-correlation between eight affective state classifications.

Figure OA.3.2: Minres Bartlett Affective States




Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate affective states calculated from the factor analysis.

Figure OA.3.3: Number of FA Methods with Same Affective State Classification




Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate the total number of factor analysis methods (out of seven) that classify an individual in the same affective state.

# OA.4: Results for Plots in Main Text

The models in this section are what was used to create the marginal effects plots in the main text. I use linear models with robust standard errors and dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1. This makes interpretation of the marginal effects plots easy. Table OA.4.1 displays results for affect toward the cabinet, Table OA.4.2 displays perceptions of the cabinet, Table OA.4.3 displays overall outgroup attitudes, and Table OA.4.4 displays the additional mechanism questions.

The main findings from this study are that descriptive representation has mixed effects on outgroup views, substantive representation has no effect, and cooperation improves some aspects of cabinet affect and perceptions, but not outgroup attitudes. I employ the Holm $p$-value adjustment on each set of dependent variables (affect, perceptions, attitudes, and mechanisms) across descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation. In the $p$-value adjusted findings, descriptive representation still has mixed effects (with ten Albanian ministers worsening Macedonians' affect, but improving Albanians feeling that ministers are working for them), substantive representation continues to have no effect, and cooperation still has slightly positive effects (with Albanians feeling less unpleasant when cooperation occurs). The $p$-value adjusted findings are consistent with the main findings, and the interpretation of the results remains the same.

One factor to consider is whether the survey design is strong enough for respondents to meaningfully distinguish between the levels of different attributes. Most of these concerns relate to the current level of ethnic tensions in Macedonia and to the realistic nature of the levels of different attributes, including their specific wording, and are addressed in OA.1. Two additional items are worth considering here: how to interpret null results and the omnibus nature of the survey.

First, the discussion in OA.1 regarding vignette construction concludes that the attributes and levels in the vignette are all plausible and are built based on contemporary conditions in Macedonia. This means that null effects are not due to portions of the vignette appearing not to be credible and, therefore, inducing random responses. Similarly, the robustness checks with respondents' preferences about descriptive and substantive representation (Table OA.6.7) suggest that the null effects are not a result of failure to treat or other design characteristics. Indeed, the effects seen with those variables are *stronger* than the outgroup views dependent variables. This suggests that respondents do take the treatment and do respond to it, but *their outgroup views are just largely unmoved by ethnic representation.*

Second, this survey was fielded as part of an Ipsos omnibus survey. Omnibus survey designs are widely used and recognized as a valid method of survey research. Nevertheless, we should consider whether the nature of the omnibus survey may have influenced respondent behavior. Omnibus surveys can be lengthy and can include many different topics, potentially increasing respondent cognitive load.

I took several steps to address this potential problem. First, I employed an in-person survey design. Krosnik (2010) examines existing literature and concludes that most work on cognitive load and survey length involve self-administered surveys. Enumerators are skilled at administering surveys and maintaining respondent attention. Therefore, the in-person nature of this survey should help combat respondent fatigue.

Additionally, I attempted to limit cognitive load by selectively employing attributes and levels in the vignette. The four selected attributes represent the absolute minimum amount of information that respondents could be provided about the cabinet in order to still make informed assessments regarding their preferences and outgroup attitudes resulting from the cabinet. There are numerous other factors that would have been nice to include in the vignette — chief among them ministries that the Albanian ministers held — but adding additional attributes increases cognitive load and the level of attention required to read a vignette with more attributes is almost certainly higher.

Finally, Ipsos is aware of the potential cognitive load problem and administers surveys that are relatively short (15 to 30 minutes) in an attempt to combat respondent fatigue.

Table OA.4.1: Main Text Results for Cabinet Affect

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pleasant | | Unpleasant | | Mixed | | Weak | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.005 | −0.120 | −0.033 | 0.063 | 0.004 | −0.014 | 0.033 | 0.071 |
| | (0.073) | (0.081) | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.060) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.032 | −0.057 | 0.033 | 0.061 | −0.053 | −0.029 | 0.052 | 0.025 |
| | (0.075) | (0.081) | (0.075) | (0.063) | (0.072) | (0.070) | (0.069) | (0.061) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.010 | −0.048 | 0.178** | 0.032 | −0.152** | 0.00003 | −0.036 | 0.016 |
| | (0.075) | (0.083) | (0.077) | (0.066) | (0.067) | (0.071) | (0.066) | (0.060) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.075* | −0.029 | 0.070 | −0.080* | −0.016 | 0.078 | 0.021 | 0.031 |
| | (0.045) | (0.051) | (0.050) | (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.048) | (0.043) | (0.042) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.029 | −0.059 | −0.028 | −0.003 | 0.010 | 0.039 | −0.011 | 0.022 |
| | (0.043) | (0.048) | (0.046) | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.039) | (0.038) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.058 | 0.099** | −0.025 | −0.140*** | 0.012 | 0.023 | −0.045 | 0.017 |
| | (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.040) | (0.039) |
| Female | 0.058 | −0.025 | 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.003 | −0.090** | 0.001 |
| | (0.044) | (0.049) | (0.047) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.040) | (0.039) |
| Age | −0.0005 | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | −0.002 | −0.00004 | 0.002 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Married | −0.043 | 0.022 | 0.016 | 0.042 | −0.018 | −0.050 | 0.045 | −0.013 |
| | (0.058) | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.051) | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.040) |
| Education | −0.004 | −0.006 | −0.017 | 0.017 | 0.002 | 0.009 | 0.020 | −0.020 |
| | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.024) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Household Size | 0.009 | 0.020 | −0.018 | −0.002 | 0.018 | −0.008 | −0.008 | −0.010 |
| | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.006) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.006) |
| North West | −0.109 | 0.125** | 0.033 | −0.081* | −0.046 | −0.126** | 0.122* | 0.082* |
| | (0.076) | (0.058) | (0.081) | (0.047) | (0.072) | (0.055) | (0.068) | (0.043) |
| South West | 0.091 | −0.017 | −0.086 | 0.017* | −0.036 | −0.004 | 0.031 | 0.003 |
| | (0.067) | (0.011) | (0.061) | (0.010) | (0.055) | (0.011) | (0.050) | (0.007) |
| East | −0.217*** | | 0.083 | | 0.002 | | 0.132** | |
| | (0.056) | | (0.061) | | (0.053) | | (0.052) | |
| Urban | 0.112** | 0.139** | −0.020 | −0.096** | −0.049 | −0.032 | −0.044 | −0.011 |
| | (0.045) | (0.056) | (0.052) | (0.044) | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.042) |
| News | 0.040** | 0.039* | 0.031* | 0.003 | −0.038*** | −0.004 | −0.033* | −0.038** |
| | (0.016) | (0.022) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.014) | (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.018) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.031 | 0.005 | −0.064*** | −0.032 | 0.038** | 0.040* | −0.004 | −0.013 |
| | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.024) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Authoritarian | −0.007 | −0.043** | 0.002 | 0.035* | 0.012 | 0.026 | −0.007 | −0.017 |
| | (0.015) | (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.019) | (0.014) | (0.020) | (0.014) | (0.016) |
| Knowledge | 0.042 | 0.013 | 0.129** | −0.021 | −0.030 | −0.106** | −0.141** | 0.113*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.054) | (0.062) | (0.044) | (0.055) | (0.050) | (0.060) | (0.042) |
| Constant | 0.076 | 0.356 | 0.385** | 0.065 | 0.168 | 0.359* | 0.371** | 0.220 |
| | (0.177) | (0.222) | (0.184) | (0.186) | (0.168) | (0.213) | (0.169) | (0.134) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Linear models with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is 1 if a respondent is a particular affect and 0 otherwise.

Table OA.4.2: Main Text Results for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Represent | | Cabinet Trust | | Cabinet Model | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.031 | −0.069* | −0.008 | −0.052 | 0.024 | −0.039 |
| | (0.045) | (0.040) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.047) | (0.040) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.037 | −0.059 | −0.017 | −0.031 | 0.039 | −0.054 |
| | (0.044) | (0.040) | (0.044) | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.039) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.067 | −0.062 | −0.066 | −0.016 | 0.031 | 0.020 |
| | (0.042) | (0.040) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.041) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.039 | 0.039 | −0.030 | 0.047** | −0.019 | 0.049** |
| | (0.027) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.028) | (0.023) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.009 | −0.007 | 0.013 | −0.011 | 0.008 | −0.008 |
| | (0.025) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.022) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.025 | 0.019 | 0.018 | 0.006 |
| | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.023) |
| Female | 0.037 | −0.020 | 0.019 | 0.014 | 0.026 | −0.016 |
| | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.027) | (0.022) |
| Age | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.0002 | 0.0001 | −0.0001 | −0.0001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Married | −0.005 | 0.042 | 0.035 | 0.042 | −0.028 | 0.062** |
| | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.029) |
| Education | 0.012 | −0.014 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.007 | −0.017 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.012) |
| Household Size | 0.002 | −0.006 | 0.005 | 0.008* | 0.001 | −0.004 |
| | (0.009) | (0.005) | (0.010) | (0.004) | (0.012) | (0.004) |
| North West | −0.057 | 0.015 | −0.024 | 0.055** | 0.022 | 0.019 |
| | (0.047) | (0.027) | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.046) | (0.025) |
| South West | 0.120*** | −0.006 | 0.143*** | −0.016** | 0.164*** | −0.020*** |
| | (0.036) | (0.006) | (0.036) | (0.006) | (0.037) | (0.006) |
| East | −0.063* | | −0.010 | | 0.016 | |
| | (0.036) | | (0.032) | | (0.034) | |
| Urban | 0.031 | 0.098*** | 0.048* | 0.076*** | 0.023 | 0.096*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.025) |
| News | −0.002 | −0.015 | −0.004 | −0.015 | 0.009 | −0.013 |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.074*** | 0.044*** | 0.085*** | 0.053*** | 0.073*** | 0.049*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Authoritarian | 0.007 | −0.026** | 0.012 | −0.017 | 0.019** | −0.036*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.012) |
| Knowledge | −0.060* | 0.016 | −0.022 | −0.012 | −0.064* | 0.008 |
| | (0.033) | (0.025) | (0.032) | (0.026) | (0.035) | (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.157 | 0.509*** | 0.089 | 0.334*** | 0.095 | 0.615*** |
| | (0.100) | (0.109) | (0.104) | (0.109) | (0.119) | (0.102) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

Table OA.4.3: Main Text Results for Albanians and Macedonians Outgroup Attitudes

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | | Equality | | Neighbor | | Talk Outgroup | | One Group | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.041 | −0.061 | 0.073 | −0.034 | −0.060 | −0.023 | 0.098* | 0.023 | 0.008 | −0.123 |
| | (0.054) | (0.039) | (0.053) | (0.046) | (0.060) | (0.047) | (0.057) | (0.048) | (0.080) | (0.077) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.011 | −0.015 | 0.029 | −0.035 | −0.094 | −0.018 | 0.081 | 0.016 | 0.094 | −0.133* |
| | (0.051) | (0.039) | (0.051) | (0.046) | (0.061) | (0.045) | (0.057) | (0.048) | (0.077) | (0.078) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.013 | −0.017 | 0.010 | −0.037 | −0.018 | −0.031 | 0.047 | 0.00001 | 0.121 | −0.156** |
| | (0.052) | (0.039) | (0.050) | (0.046) | (0.059) | (0.045) | (0.056) | (0.046) | (0.076) | (0.079) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.026 | −0.016 | −0.002 | −0.014 | −0.051 | 0.018 | −0.026 | −0.042 | 0.042 | 0.101** |
| | (0.033) | (0.024) | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.036) | (0.027) | (0.035) | (0.028) | (0.045) | (0.050) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.028 | −0.024 | −0.020 | −0.002 | 0.032 | 0.024 | 0.047 | −0.024 | 0.009 | 0.041 |
| | (0.031) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.034) | (0.025) | (0.033) | (0.026) | (0.042) | (0.046) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.014 | 0.022 | −0.010 | 0.038 | −0.004 | 0.013 | −0.038 | −0.005 | 0.062 | 0.015 |
| | (0.031) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.033) | (0.026) | (0.043) | (0.046) |
| Female | 0.049 | −0.022 | 0.076*** | 0.035 | −0.009 | −0.028 | 0.054 | 0.090*** | 0.0004 | −0.021 |
| | (0.032) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.034) | (0.027) | (0.044) | (0.048) |
| Age | −0.00005 | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.0004 | 0.002 | −0.0003 | −0.0002 | −0.001 | −0.0003 | 0.0002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Married | −0.057 | 0.034 | −0.006 | 0.027 | −0.029 | −0.035 | −0.047 | 0.029 | −0.043 | 0.039 |
| | (0.040) | (0.031) | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.050) | (0.033) | (0.045) | (0.032) | (0.056) | (0.057) |
| Education | 0.012 | 0.0005 | 0.034** | 0.017 | 0.015 | 0.005 | 0.024 | 0.012 | 0.025 | 0.018 |
| | (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.020) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.014) | (0.023) | (0.026) |
| Household Size | −0.004 | 0.003 | −0.006 | −0.002 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.003 | −0.014* |
| | (0.012) | (0.004) | (0.012) | (0.005) | (0.014) | (0.006) | (0.014) | (0.007) | (0.015) | (0.008) |
| North West | −0.017 | 0.020 | 0.006 | −0.039 | −0.068 | 0.007 | −0.112** | −0.211*** | −0.056 | 0.337*** |
| | (0.049) | (0.026) | (0.049) | (0.028) | (0.059) | (0.032) | (0.053) | (0.035) | (0.076) | (0.055) |
| South West | 0.035 | 0.001 | 0.088** | 0.012 | −0.085* | 0.021*** | 0.016 | −0.015*** | −0.071 | −0.031*** |
| | (0.043) | (0.007) | (0.036) | (0.007) | (0.047) | (0.006) | (0.044) | (0.005) | (0.058) | (0.011) |
| East | −0.053 | | 0.014 | | −0.079* | | 0.005 | | −0.037 | |
| | (0.040) | | (0.037) | | (0.047) | | (0.045) | | (0.053) | |
| Urban | −0.011 | 0.045* | 0.018 | 0.043 | 0.030 | −0.061** | −0.003 | 0.014 | −0.025 | −0.049 |
| | (0.036) | (0.025) | (0.034) | (0.028) | (0.039) | (0.028) | (0.037) | (0.030) | (0.048) | (0.053) |
| News | −0.001 | 0.027** | 0.045*** | 0.062*** | −0.012 | −0.029** | 0.034** | 0.060*** | 0.004 | 0.046** |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.016) | (0.021) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.056*** | 0.065*** | 0.062*** | 0.030** | −0.047*** | −0.008 | 0.045*** | −0.002 | −0.034* | −0.028 |
| | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.020) | (0.025) |
| Authoritarian | 0.025** | −0.018 | 0.022* | 0.034*** | −0.006 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.052** |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.021) |
| Knowledge | 0.020 | −0.072*** | −0.043 | −0.026 | 0.055 | −0.114*** | 0.014 | 0.040 | 0.171*** | 0.038 |
| | (0.043) | (0.026) | (0.041) | (0.028) | (0.050) | (0.029) | (0.045) | (0.031) | (0.065) | (0.050) |
| Constant | 0.169 | 0.225* | −0.058 | −0.044 | 0.459*** | 0.341*** | 0.220 | 0.496*** | 0.496*** | 0.462** |
| | (0.129) | (0.120) | (0.115) | (0.129) | (0.149) | (0.124) | (0.154) | (0.125) | (0.174) | (0.210) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

Table OA.4.4: Main Text Results for Additional Mechanisms

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Benefit You | | Benefit Financial | | Represent Satisfied | | Minister Personal | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.002 | 0.014 | 0.038 | −0.008 | 0.048 | −0.036 | 0.131* | −0.105 |
| | (0.040) | (0.035) | (0.042) | (0.036) | (0.050) | (0.039) | (0.072) | (0.070) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.004 | 0.018 | 0.046 | 0.011 | 0.025 | −0.002 | 0.153** | −0.126* |
| | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.036) | (0.049) | (0.038) | (0.071) | (0.071) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.047 | 0.052 | −0.013 | 0.012 | −0.094** | 0.046 | 0.144** | −0.195*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.036) | (0.048) | (0.038) | (0.072) | (0.072) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.016 | 0.022 | −0.017 | 0.010 | −0.018 | 0.019 | −0.035 | 0.094** |
| | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.030) | (0.022) | (0.043) | (0.047) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.014 | −0.002 | 0.037 | 0.038* | −0.032 | −0.005 | 0.043 | 0.065 |
| | (0.024) | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.021) | (0.041) | (0.043) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.038 | 0.026 | 0.042* | 0.001 | 0.060** | 0.023 | −0.088** | 0.024 |
| | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.029) | (0.022) | (0.041) | (0.044) |
| Female | 0.022 | 0.002 | 0.021 | 0.017 | 0.031 | −0.011 | −0.016 | −0.036 |
| | (0.023) | (0.020) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.030) | (0.021) | (0.042) | (0.045) |
| Age | −0.0005 | −0.0003 | 0.0003 | −0.001 | 0.002 | −0.001 | −0.0004 | 0.0004 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Married | 0.058* | 0.049* | 0.031 | 0.032 | 0.024 | 0.002 | −0.066 | −0.053 |
| | (0.033) | (0.027) | (0.034) | (0.031) | (0.038) | (0.029) | (0.054) | (0.052) |
| Education | 0.010 | −0.007 | −0.001 | −0.017 | −0.012 | −0.015 | 0.016 | 0.027 |
| | (0.014) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.026) |
| Household Size | −0.001 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.009** | 0.018* | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.013 |
| | (0.009) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.004) | (0.010) | (0.005) | (0.015) | (0.011) |
| North West | −0.016 | 0.026 | −0.038 | 0.102*** | −0.009 | 0.021 | 0.076 | −0.018 |
| | (0.039) | (0.024) | (0.043) | (0.025) | (0.047) | (0.024) | (0.061) | (0.057) |
| South West | 0.085** | −0.010* | 0.071** | −0.006 | 0.169*** | −0.018*** | −0.082 | −0.017* |
| | (0.034) | (0.006) | (0.035) | (0.007) | (0.042) | (0.006) | (0.059) | (0.009) |
| East | −0.020 | | 0.024 | | 0.024 | | −0.024 | |
| | (0.031) | | (0.031) | | (0.038) | | (0.054) | |
| Urban | −0.003 | 0.046** | 0.053* | 0.094*** | 0.050 | 0.084*** | −0.068 | −0.080 |
| | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.032) | (0.023) | (0.045) | (0.053) |
| News | −0.005 | −0.017* | −0.002 | −0.008 | −0.003 | −0.011 | 0.010 | 0.023 |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.020) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.094*** | 0.058*** | 0.105*** | 0.074*** | 0.075*** | 0.070*** | −0.082*** | −0.066*** |
| | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.019) | (0.023) |
| Authoritarian | 0.008 | −0.032*** | 0.013 | −0.026** | 0.008 | −0.025** | −0.044*** | 0.050*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.018) |
| Knowledge | −0.045 | −0.004 | −0.079** | −0.004 | −0.058* | 0.010 | 0.134** | −0.013 |
| | (0.031) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.024) | (0.035) | (0.022) | (0.062) | (0.051) |
| Constant | 0.109 | 0.379*** | −0.048 | 0.243** | 0.083 | 0.511*** | 0.898*** | 0.875*** |
| | (0.102) | (0.096) | (0.115) | (0.106) | (0.119) | (0.102) | (0.173) | (0.177) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

# OA.5: Ordered Logistic and Logistic Specifications

Here I present ordered logistic and logistic regression results for the dependent variables as originally coded (not normalized). Table OA.5.1 displays the full ordered logistic and logistic regression results for the cabinet perceptions dependent variables, while Table OA.5.2 displays the full ordered logistic and logistic regression results for overall outgroup attitudes dependent variables. Table OA.5.3 presents the results for the additional mechanism dependent variables.

Note that included in these tables are the results from linear hypothesis tests comparing the point estimates for different levels of *ProfileDescriptive* as discussed in the main text.

Table OA.5.1: Full Results for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Represent | | Cabinet Trust | | Cabinet Model | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.212 | −0.584* | 0.022 | −0.483 | 0.142 | −0.422 |
| | (0.324) | (0.333) | (0.327) | (0.341) | (0.324) | (0.334) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.262 | −0.472 | −0.091 | −0.238 | 0.250 | −0.510 |
| | (0.324) | (0.332) | (0.327) | (0.341) | (0.322) | (0.331) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.437 | −0.625* | −0.395 | −0.219 | 0.282 | 0.155 |
| | (0.318) | (0.330) | (0.324) | (0.341) | (0.318) | (0.333) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.333 | 0.345* | −0.223 | 0.407** | −0.113 | 0.498** |
| | (0.203) | (0.208) | (0.202) | (0.206) | (0.202) | (0.210) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.105 | −0.018 | 0.141 | −0.093 | 0.059 | −0.104 |
| | (0.188) | (0.191) | (0.188) | (0.191) | (0.187) | (0.193) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.145 | 0.268 | 0.179 | 0.148 | 0.142 | 0.018 |
| | (0.190) | (0.196) | (0.191) | (0.195) | (0.187) | (0.197) |
| Female | 0.248 | −0.208 | 0.131 | 0.171 | 0.193 | −0.117 |
| | (0.195) | (0.200) | (0.194) | (0.199) | (0.191) | (0.200) |
| Age | 0.009 | −0.003 | −0.0002 | 0.002 | −0.0001 | 0.002 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.044 | 0.433* | 0.217 | 0.418* | −0.236 | 0.665*** |
| | (0.253) | (0.251) | (0.258) | (0.245) | (0.258) | (0.246) |
| Education | 0.123 | −0.118 | 0.058 | 0.092 | 0.082 | −0.110 |
| | (0.103) | (0.106) | (0.104) | (0.105) | (0.104) | (0.106) |
| Household Size | −0.002 | −0.057 | 0.045 | 0.080** | 0.021 | −0.036 |
| | (0.071) | (0.044) | (0.073) | (0.040) | (0.076) | (0.039) |
| North West | −0.415 | 0.155 | −0.180 | 0.505** | 0.145 | 0.173 |
| | (0.339) | (0.233) | (0.332) | (0.232) | (0.333) | (0.230) |
| South West | 0.908*** | −0.064 | 1.128*** | −0.137*** | 1.150*** | −0.168*** |
| | (0.266) | (0.047) | (0.270) | (0.047) | (0.266) | (0.048) |
| East | −0.431* | | −0.056 | | 0.111 | |
| | (0.255) | | (0.251) | | (0.247) | |
| Urban | 0.166 | 0.856*** | 0.295 | 0.717*** | 0.073 | 0.854*** |
| | (0.215) | (0.223) | (0.215) | (0.221) | (0.211) | (0.223) |
| News | −0.003 | −0.127 | −0.041 | −0.128 | 0.069 | −0.126 |
| | (0.076) | (0.094) | (0.077) | (0.093) | (0.076) | (0.095) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.558*** | 0.392*** | 0.650*** | 0.463*** | 0.501*** | 0.422*** |
| | (0.095) | (0.111) | (0.095) | (0.110) | (0.093) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian | 0.019 | −0.229** | 0.082 | −0.150* | 0.134* | −0.334*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.092) | (0.071) | (0.090) | (0.070) | (0.093) |
| Knowledge | −0.537** | 0.085 | −0.135 | −0.089 | −0.404 | 0.048 |
| | (0.261) | (0.216) | (0.259) | (0.218) | (0.258) | (0.214) |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 6 | 3.56* | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.94 | 0.19 | 0.12 |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 10 | 6.63** | 0.03 | 2.75* | 1.11 | 0.31 | 5.07** |
| Hyp. Test 6 & 10 | 0.49 | 0.36 | 1.50 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 6.60** |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Ordered Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.5.2: Full Results for Albanians and Macedonians Outgroup Attitudes

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | | Equality | | Neighbor | | Talkoutgroup | | One Group | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.191 | −0.517 | 0.472 | −0.202 | −0.316 | −0.119 | 0.583* | 0.210 | 0.005 | −0.607 |
| | (0.317) | (0.332) | (0.325) | (0.334) | (0.316) | (0.339) | (0.315) | (0.333) | (0.391) | (0.399) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.059 | −0.145 | 0.223 | −0.222 | −0.520 | −0.073 | 0.515* | 0.127 | 0.490 | −0.679* |
| | (0.312) | (0.329) | (0.323) | (0.334) | (0.319) | (0.332) | (0.313) | (0.330) | (0.406) | (0.397) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.112 | −0.113 | 0.147 | −0.311 | −0.113 | −0.109 | 0.321 | −0.017 | 0.666* | −0.777* |
| | (0.312) | (0.329) | (0.319) | (0.334) | (0.313) | (0.332) | (0.311) | (0.327) | (0.404) | (0.397) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.187 | −0.153 | 0.022 | −0.107 | −0.248 | 0.121 | −0.166 | −0.313 | 0.250 | 0.488** |
| | (0.199) | (0.207) | (0.200) | (0.205) | (0.200) | (0.209) | (0.200) | (0.211) | (0.272) | (0.248) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.166 | −0.203 | −0.119 | 0.012 | 0.182 | 0.247 | 0.234 | −0.164 | 0.061 | 0.217 |
| | (0.183) | (0.191) | (0.185) | (0.190) | (0.185) | (0.193) | (0.184) | (0.194) | (0.247) | (0.229) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.112 | 0.174 | −0.044 | 0.254 | −0.017 | 0.032 | −0.155 | −0.048 | 0.365 | 0.071 |
| | (0.185) | (0.195) | (0.186) | (0.193) | (0.187) | (0.196) | (0.185) | (0.195) | (0.249) | (0.233) |
| Female | 0.285 | −0.227 | 0.467** | 0.255 | −0.041 | −0.244 | 0.325* | 0.676*** | −0.013 | −0.090 |
| | (0.190) | (0.198) | (0.190) | (0.198) | (0.190) | (0.202) | (0.191) | (0.206) | (0.254) | (0.240) |
| Age | −0.001 | 0.012 | −0.006 | 0.002 | 0.007 | −0.0005 | 0.0004 | −0.006 | −0.002 | 0.0004 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.009) |
| Married | −0.315 | 0.415* | −0.061 | 0.281 | −0.106 | −0.292 | −0.333 | 0.307 | −0.249 | 0.178 |
| | (0.247) | (0.244) | (0.251) | (0.247) | (0.257) | (0.245) | (0.253) | (0.241) | (0.339) | (0.286) |
| Education | 0.056 | 0.054 | 0.224** | 0.137 | 0.077 | 0.054 | 0.163 | 0.053 | 0.141 | 0.091 |
| | (0.101) | (0.108) | (0.100) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.109) | (0.105) | (0.104) | (0.138) | (0.126) |
| Household Size | −0.021 | 0.033 | −0.035 | −0.012 | −0.009 | 0.028 | 0.031 | 0.049 | 0.017 | −0.064 |
| | (0.072) | (0.040) | (0.072) | (0.041) | (0.073) | (0.045) | (0.073) | (0.045) | (0.093) | (0.052) |
| North West | 0.029 | 0.285 | 0.017 | −0.256 | −0.297 | 0.165 | −0.654** | −1.421*** | −0.307 | 1.536*** |
| | (0.315) | (0.229) | (0.321) | (0.225) | (0.329) | (0.232) | (0.318) | (0.248) | (0.429) | (0.276) |
| South West | 0.257 | 0.008 | 0.553** | 0.100** | −0.374 | 0.216*** | 0.051 | −0.101** | −0.412 | −0.136** |
| | (0.254) | (0.048) | (0.253) | (0.048) | (0.254) | (0.053) | (0.253) | (0.048) | (0.342) | (0.053) |
| East | −0.246 | | 0.017 | | −0.352 | | 0.053 | | −0.226 | |
| | (0.244) | | (0.248) | | (0.247) | | (0.248) | | (0.340) | |
| Urban | −0.002 | 0.357 | 0.148 | 0.339 | 0.240 | −0.483** | −0.038 | 0.140 | −0.156 | −0.217 |
| | (0.210) | (0.218) | (0.213) | (0.218) | (0.215) | (0.218) | (0.211) | (0.222) | (0.280) | (0.257) |
| News | −0.014 | 0.227** | 0.305*** | 0.452*** | −0.065 | −0.278*** | 0.201*** | 0.457*** | 0.021 | 0.224** |
| | (0.074) | (0.094) | (0.077) | (0.095) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.099) | (0.110) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.384*** | 0.585*** | 0.429*** | 0.301*** | −0.251*** | −0.047 | 0.242*** | −0.022 | −0.194* | −0.140 |
| | (0.090) | (0.110) | (0.091) | (0.107) | (0.091) | (0.108) | (0.088) | (0.105) | (0.116) | (0.123) |
| Authoritarian | 0.158** | −0.201** | 0.154** | 0.294*** | −0.037 | 0.043 | 0.048 | 0.109 | 0.094 | 0.255** |
| | (0.070) | (0.092) | (0.072) | (0.092) | (0.071) | (0.094) | (0.069) | (0.091) | (0.094) | (0.106) |
| Knowledge | 0.021 | −0.543** | −0.266 | −0.234 | 0.257 | −0.924*** | 0.042 | 0.329 | 0.917*** | 0.182 |
| | (0.257) | (0.219) | (0.261) | (0.213) | (0.264) | (0.221) | (0.255) | (0.219) | (0.324) | (0.258) |
| Constant | | | | | | | | | −0.154 | −0.274 |
| | | | | | | | | | (1.001) | (1.028) |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 6 | 1.06 | 2.11 | 1.05 | 0.01 | 0.69 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 2.22 | 0.05 |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 10 | 1.47 | 2.58 | 1.68 | 0.19 | 0.68 | 0.00 | 1.13 | 0.79 | 3.93** | 0.32 |
| Hyp. Test 6 & 10 | 0.049 | 0.016 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 2.67 | 0.02 | 0.62 | 0.32 | 0.25 | 0.11 |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.5.3: Full Results Albanian and Macedonian Mechanisms

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Benefit You | | Benefit Financial | | Represent Satisfied | | Minister Personal | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.041 | 0.193 | 0.332 | −0.100 | 0.338 | −0.411 | 0.779* | −0.627 |
| | (0.326) | (0.332) | (0.332) | (0.326) | (0.322) | (0.345) | (0.423) | (0.442) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.084 | 0.258 | 0.308 | 0.083 | 0.200 | −0.098 | 0.970** | −0.765* |
| | (0.321) | (0.330) | (0.331) | (0.324) | (0.319) | (0.340) | (0.436) | (0.438) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.407 | 0.518 | −0.069 | 0.091 | −0.493 | 0.321 | 0.882** | −1.111*** |
| | (0.322) | (0.333) | (0.327) | (0.323) | (0.316) | (0.342) | (0.421) | (0.431) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.129 | 0.219 | −0.172 | 0.083 | −0.176 | 0.142 | −0.235 | 0.484* |
| | (0.206) | (0.211) | (0.205) | (0.209) | (0.200) | (0.208) | (0.288) | (0.262) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.154 | 0.012 | 0.291 | 0.333* | −0.175 | −0.068 | 0.255 | 0.348 |
| | (0.190) | (0.195) | (0.191) | (0.193) | (0.187) | (0.194) | (0.260) | (0.244) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.260 | 0.223 | 0.315 | −0.015 | 0.341* | 0.222 | −0.577** | 0.108 |
| | (0.192) | (0.198) | (0.193) | (0.196) | (0.187) | (0.198) | (0.263) | (0.248) |
| Female | 0.225 | 0.030 | 0.127 | 0.147 | 0.185 | −0.123 | −0.106 | −0.164 |
| | (0.193) | (0.202) | (0.195) | (0.199) | (0.192) | (0.201) | (0.267) | (0.255) |
| Age | −0.002 | −0.002 | 0.007 | −0.003 | 0.013 | −0.011 | −0.002 | 0.0001 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Married | 0.502* | 0.534** | 0.139 | 0.341 | 0.088 | 0.073 | −0.503 | −0.353 |
| | (0.261) | (0.250) | (0.262) | (0.245) | (0.251) | (0.248) | (0.361) | (0.313) |
| Education | 0.092 | −0.077 | 0.005 | −0.129 | −0.067 | −0.135 | 0.112 | 0.146 |
| | (0.106) | (0.108) | (0.106) | (0.107) | (0.102) | (0.107) | (0.144) | (0.137) |
| Household Size | −0.008 | 0.052 | 0.088 | 0.070* | 0.112 | −0.026 | −0.022 | −0.067 |
| | (0.074) | (0.044) | (0.076) | (0.041) | (0.069) | (0.043) | (0.094) | (0.049) |
| North West | −0.224 | 0.190 | −0.201 | 0.834*** | −0.024 | 0.091 | 0.578 | −0.087 |
| | (0.332) | (0.234) | (0.337) | (0.232) | (0.321) | (0.234) | (0.501) | (0.286) |
| South West | 0.690** | −0.095** | 0.616** | −0.024 | 1.189*** | −0.175*** | −0.509 | −0.116* |
| | (0.269) | (0.048) | (0.266) | (0.048) | (0.268) | (0.049) | (0.347) | (0.069) |
| East | −0.199 | | 0.199 | | 0.237 | | −0.126 | |
| | (0.253) | | (0.253) | | (0.247) | | (0.349) | |
| Urban | −0.108 | 0.413* | 0.470** | 0.854*** | 0.309 | 0.785*** | −0.415 | −0.410 |
| | (0.215) | (0.220) | (0.221) | (0.219) | (0.212) | (0.224) | (0.297) | (0.277) |
| News | −0.054 | −0.174* | −0.022 | −0.101 | −0.015 | −0.138 | 0.069 | 0.132 |
| | (0.077) | (0.095) | (0.077) | (0.094) | (0.076) | (0.095) | (0.106) | (0.121) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.768*** | 0.540*** | 0.812*** | 0.654*** | 0.504*** | 0.653*** | −0.486*** | −0.379*** |
| | (0.098) | (0.114) | (0.097) | (0.116) | (0.091) | (0.115) | (0.119) | (0.135) |
| Authoritarian | 0.071 | −0.288*** | 0.103 | −0.207** | 0.044 | −0.208** | −0.277*** | 0.308** |
| | (0.071) | (0.093) | (0.070) | (0.093) | (0.069) | (0.093) | (0.096) | (0.121) |
| Knowledge | −0.400 | −0.060 | −0.652** | −0.120 | −0.435* | 0.053 | 0.815** | −0.056 |
| | (0.260) | (0.219) | (0.261) | (0.214) | (0.250) | (0.217) | (0.346) | (0.274) |
| Constant | | | | | | | 2.182** | 2.213* |
| | | | | | | | (1.057) | (1.201) |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 6 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.32 | 1.47 | 0.29 | 0.18 |
| Hyp. Test 1 & 10 | 2.02 | 1.59 | 2.45 | 0.55 | 10.97*** | 8.06*** | 0.09 | 2.32 |
| Hyp. Test 6 & 10 | 1.63 | 0.99 | 2.22 | 0.00 | 7.78** | 2.67 | 0.06 | 1.20 |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

# OA.6: Robustness Checks

The theory, hypotheses, and empirical analysis for this paper were pre-registered with EGAP. All of the analysis specified in the pre-analysis plan was conducted: additional pre-registered analyses not yet mentioned are provided here.

Additionally, I would note that, in comparison to the pre-analysis plan, the original six hypotheses (one each for majority and minority groups) have been condensed to three hypotheses (combined for majority and minority groups). The direction and implications of the hypotheses have not changed, rather the hypotheses were combined for ease of presentation.

The only change to the main analysis was using factor analysis in addition to LPA to classify cabinet affect. This change was made based on advice from the author of this method who was in the process of refining this classification method when the pre-analysis plan was filed. No other changes were made to the pre-analysis plan.

First, I present results dichotomozing Albanian cabinet representation where *ProfileOverZero* is 1 when there is at least one Albanian cabinet minister and 0 otherwise. Table OA.6.1 displays ordered logistic and logistic regression results for cabinet perceptions variables, while Table OA.6.2 displays ordered logistic and logistic regression results for overall outgroup attitudes variables.

Table OA.6.3, Table OA.6.4, and Table OA.6.5 provide the full results pooled across ethnic groups with a dummy variable for Albanians and interactions between the dummy variable and cabinet profile attributes. There are no significant mediation effects, nor do the effects change when using model based exploratory analysis.

Table OA.6.1: ProfileOverZero for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Represent | | Cabinet Trust | | Cabinet Model | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileOverZero | −0.180 | −0.560* | −0.163 | −0.312 | 0.229 | −0.264 |
| | (0.287) | (0.297) | (0.292) | (0.308) | (0.287) | (0.297) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.328 | 0.347* | −0.222 | 0.408** | −0.114 | 0.498** |
| | (0.203) | (0.208) | (0.202) | (0.206) | (0.202) | (0.210) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.113 | −0.018 | 0.141 | −0.091 | 0.056 | −0.100 |
| | (0.187) | (0.191) | (0.188) | (0.191) | (0.187) | (0.192) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.157 | 0.262 | 0.184 | 0.145 | 0.141 | 0.040 |
| | (0.189) | (0.196) | (0.190) | (0.195) | (0.187) | (0.196) |
| Female | 0.234 | −0.205 | 0.131 | 0.174 | 0.196 | −0.128 |
| | (0.194) | (0.200) | (0.194) | (0.198) | (0.191) | (0.199) |
| Age | 0.007 | −0.003 | −0.001 | 0.002 | 0.0002 | 0.003 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.070 | 0.408* | 0.184 | 0.402* | −0.229 | 0.714*** |
| | (0.251) | (0.247) | (0.257) | (0.241) | (0.256) | (0.244) |
| Education | 0.127 | −0.113 | 0.066 | 0.093 | 0.082 | −0.127 |
| | (0.103) | (0.106) | (0.104) | (0.105) | (0.104) | (0.105) |
| Household Size | −0.023 | −0.059 | 0.032 | 0.077* | 0.026 | −0.033 |
| | (0.070) | (0.044) | (0.073) | (0.039) | (0.075) | (0.039) |
| North West | −0.365 | 0.155 | −0.178 | 0.517** | 0.142 | 0.169 |
| | (0.335) | (0.232) | (0.331) | (0.231) | (0.333) | (0.230) |
| South West | 0.915*** | −0.064 | 1.108*** | −0.141*** | 1.144*** | −0.172*** |
| | (0.266) | (0.047) | (0.269) | (0.047) | (0.265) | (0.047) |
| East | −0.428* | | −0.075 | | 0.116 | |
| | (0.254) | | (0.250) | | (0.246) | |
| Urban | 0.182 | 0.862*** | 0.288 | 0.725*** | 0.071 | 0.814*** |
| | (0.214) | (0.223) | (0.214) | (0.221) | (0.211) | (0.222) |
| News | 0.015 | −0.126 | −0.029 | −0.124 | 0.066 | −0.116 |
| | (0.076) | (0.094) | (0.076) | (0.093) | (0.075) | (0.095) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.539*** | 0.390*** | 0.633*** | 0.464*** | 0.503*** | 0.430*** |
| | (0.094) | (0.111) | (0.095) | (0.110) | (0.093) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian | 0.031 | −0.232** | 0.091 | −0.161* | 0.131* | −0.336*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.091) | (0.071) | (0.090) | (0.070) | (0.093) |
| Knowledge | −0.480* | 0.069 | −0.084 | −0.081 | −0.413 | 0.123 |
| | (0.260) | (0.214) | (0.258) | (0.216) | (0.257) | (0.213) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

ProfileOverZero is 1 if ProfileDescriptive > 0 and 0 otherwise. Ordered Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.6.2: ProfileOverZero For Albanians and Macedonians Overall Outgroup Attitudes

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | | Equality | | Neighbor | | Talkoutgroup | | One Group | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| ProfileOverZero | −0.001 | −0.251 | 0.273 | −0.245 | −0.304 | −0.099 | 0.466* | 0.100 | 0.383 | −0.688* |
| | (0.280) | (0.295) | (0.289) | (0.301) | (0.281) | (0.300) | (0.278) | (0.295) | (0.349) | (0.357) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.182 | −0.157 | 0.020 | −0.106 | −0.251 | 0.119 | −0.169 | −0.307 | 0.245 | 0.486** |
| | (0.199) | (0.207) | (0.200) | (0.205) | (0.200) | (0.208) | (0.199) | (0.210) | (0.271) | (0.248) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.165 | −0.209 | −0.122 | 0.013 | 0.175 | 0.247 | 0.228 | −0.167 | 0.053 | 0.215 |
| | (0.183) | (0.191) | (0.185) | (0.190) | (0.185) | (0.193) | (0.184) | (0.194) | (0.245) | (0.229) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.110 | 0.172 | −0.051 | 0.254 | −0.029 | 0.032 | −0.147 | −0.057 | 0.353 | 0.068 |
| | (0.185) | (0.194) | (0.186) | (0.193) | (0.187) | (0.196) | (0.185) | (0.195) | (0.248) | (0.232) |
| Female | 0.279 | −0.229 | 0.467** | 0.259 | −0.060 | −0.242 | 0.328* | 0.679*** | 0.014 | −0.087 |
| | (0.189) | (0.198) | (0.190) | (0.197) | (0.189) | (0.202) | (0.191) | (0.206) | (0.252) | (0.240) |
| Age | −0.002 | 0.012* | −0.007 | 0.002 | 0.006 | −0.0004 | 0.0001 | −0.006 | −0.001 | 0.0001 |
| | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.008) |
| Married | −0.319 | 0.397 | −0.069 | 0.274 | −0.059 | −0.298 | −0.358 | 0.303 | −0.225 | 0.176 |
| | (0.247) | (0.243) | (0.249) | (0.245) | (0.254) | (0.243) | (0.252) | (0.239) | (0.334) | (0.283) |
| Education | 0.061 | 0.055 | 0.228** | 0.138 | 0.064 | 0.056 | 0.166 | 0.056 | 0.137 | 0.092 |
| | (0.100) | (0.107) | (0.100) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.108) | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.137) | (0.125) |
| Household Size | −0.028 | 0.032 | −0.046 | −0.012 | −0.001 | 0.028 | 0.020 | 0.050 | 0.034 | −0.063 |
| | (0.071) | (0.040) | (0.070) | (0.041) | (0.073) | (0.045) | (0.073) | (0.046) | (0.092) | (0.052) |
| North West | 0.019 | 0.305 | 0.009 | −0.257 | −0.291 | 0.168 | −0.651** | −1.423*** | −0.293 | 1.527*** |
| | (0.316) | (0.229) | (0.321) | (0.224) | (0.330) | (0.231) | (0.318) | (0.248) | (0.424) | (0.275) |
| South West | 0.257 | 0.005 | 0.548** | 0.101** | −0.368 | 0.216*** | 0.045 | −0.100** | −0.394 | −0.135** |
| | (0.254) | (0.048) | (0.252) | (0.048) | (0.254) | (0.053) | (0.253) | (0.048) | (0.339) | (0.053) |
| East | −0.263 | | −0.004 | | −0.334 | | 0.034 | | −0.176 | |
| | (0.243) | | (0.247) | | (0.246) | | (0.247) | | (0.335) | |
| Urban | 0.005 | 0.370* | 0.142 | 0.342 | 0.238 | −0.481** | −0.039 | 0.141 | −0.143 | −0.217 |
| | (0.210) | (0.217) | (0.213) | (0.217) | (0.215) | (0.218) | (0.211) | (0.222) | (0.278) | (0.256) |
| News | −0.010 | 0.227** | 0.316*** | 0.452*** | −0.070 | −0.277*** | 0.210*** | 0.454*** | 0.008 | 0.225** |
| | (0.073) | (0.093) | (0.076) | (0.095) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.098) | (0.110) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.376*** | 0.589*** | 0.414*** | 0.300*** | −0.238*** | −0.048 | 0.229*** | −0.022 | −0.173 | −0.141 |
| | (0.089) | (0.110) | (0.089) | (0.107) | (0.090) | (0.108) | (0.087) | (0.105) | (0.113) | (0.123) |
| Authoritarian | 0.163** | −0.209** | 0.162** | 0.295*** | −0.043 | 0.041 | 0.054 | 0.114 | 0.080 | 0.257** |
| | (0.070) | (0.092) | (0.072) | (0.092) | (0.070) | (0.093) | (0.069) | (0.091) | (0.092) | (0.106) |
| Knowledge | 0.049 | −0.533** | −0.243 | −0.245 | 0.225 | −0.927*** | 0.073 | 0.308 | 0.867*** | 0.169 |
| | (0.255) | (0.217) | (0.260) | (0.211) | (0.262) | (0.220) | (0.253) | (0.217) | (0.319) | (0.255) |
| Constant | | | | | | | | | −0.242 | −0.264 |
| | | | | | | | | | (1.001) | (1.028) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

ProfileOverZero is 1 if ProfileDescriptive $>$ 0 and 0 otherwise. Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.6.3: Full Results with Interaction Cabinet Perceptions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Represent | Cabinet Trust | Cabinet Model |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.279 | 0.056 | 0.299 |
| | (0.332) | (0.335) | (0.332) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.194 | −0.059 | 0.442 |
| | (0.330) | (0.333) | (0.330) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.384 | −0.417 | 0.377 |
| | (0.326) | (0.332) | (0.327) |
| Albanian | 0.246 | 0.343 | 0.918** |
| | (0.425) | (0.437) | (0.427) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.422** | −0.287 | −0.162 |
| | (0.207) | (0.206) | (0.208) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.090 | 0.133 | 0.098 |
| | (0.192) | (0.192) | (0.192) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.174 | 0.192 | 0.123 |
| | (0.193) | (0.192) | (0.192) |
| Female | 0.063 | 0.157 | 0.053 |
| | (0.136) | (0.137) | (0.135) |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.005 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Married | 0.207 | 0.272* | 0.201 |
| | (0.147) | (0.147) | (0.148) |
| Education | −0.015 | 0.044 | −0.071 |
| | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.072) |
| Household Size | −0.039 | 0.070** | −0.013 |
| | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.033) |
| North West | 0.033 | 0.343* | 0.146 |
| | (0.182) | (0.181) | (0.179) |
| South West | 0.826*** | 1.201*** | 1.236*** |
| | (0.210) | (0.216) | (0.213) |
| East | −0.437* | 0.041 | 0.184 |
| | (0.230) | (0.227) | (0.226) |
| Urban | 0.511*** | 0.510*** | 0.465*** |
| | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.149) |
| News | −0.075 | −0.095* | −0.042 |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.517*** | 0.595*** | 0.525*** |
| | (0.070) | (0.070) | (0.069) |
| Authoritarian | −0.082 | −0.001 | −0.051 |
| | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.054) |
| Knowledge | −0.125 | −0.074 | −0.129 |
| | (0.162) | (0.163) | (0.160) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian | −0.870* | −0.548 | −0.694 |
| | (0.463) | (0.469) | (0.460) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian | −0.291 | −0.155 | −0.866* |
| | (0.459) | (0.465) | (0.456) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian | −0.208 | 0.156 | −0.238 |
| | (0.454) | (0.466) | (0.454) |
| ProfileSDSM x Albanian | 0.702** | 0.641** | 0.562* |
| | (0.288) | (0.287) | (0.288) |
| ProfileSubstantive x Albanian | −0.158 | −0.266 | −0.253 |
| | (0.266) | (0.266) | (0.265) |
| ProfileCooperation x Albanian | 0.064 | −0.007 | −0.109 |
| | (0.267) | (0.268) | (0.266) |
| Observations | 781 | 781 | 781 |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Ordered Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.4: Full Results Overall Outgroup Attitudes Albanian Interaction

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | Equality | Neighbor | Talkoutgroup | One Group |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.293 | 0.531 | −0.378 | 0.641** | 0.013 |
| | (0.332) | (0.333) | (0.327) | (0.324) | (0.385) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.008 | 0.268 | −0.630* | 0.631** | 0.549 |
| | (0.324) | (0.330) | (0.331) | (0.322) | (0.403) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.153 | 0.208 | −0.237 | 0.371 | 0.652 |
| | (0.326) | (0.328) | (0.326) | (0.321) | (0.402) |
| Albanian | 0.493 | 0.554 | −1.094** | 1.049** | −0.068 |
| | (0.413) | (0.426) | (0.425) | (0.413) | (0.502) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.217 | 0.013 | −0.292 | −0.154 | 0.269 |
| | (0.209) | (0.205) | (0.209) | (0.205) | (0.271) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.262 | −0.141 | 0.167 | 0.275 | 0.065 |
| | (0.193) | (0.190) | (0.193) | (0.189) | (0.245) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.174 | −0.033 | −0.021 | −0.214 | 0.353 |
| | (0.193) | (0.190) | (0.193) | (0.189) | (0.246) |
| female | 0.050 | 0.363*** | −0.092 | 0.429*** | −0.041 |
| | (0.133) | (0.134) | (0.134) | (0.136) | (0.168) |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.005 | 0.006 | −0.007 | −0.004 |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Married | −0.081 | −0.088 | −0.178 | 0.044 | −0.005 |
| | (0.142) | (0.144) | (0.145) | (0.145) | (0.180) |
| Education | 0.013 | 0.180*** | 0.077 | 0.102 | 0.124 |
| | (0.070) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.089) |
| Household Size | 0.010 | −0.006 | −0.0004 | 0.039 | −0.067 |
| | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.043) |
| North West | 0.121 | −0.091 | 0.104 | −1.171*** | 0.964*** |
| | (0.173) | (0.175) | (0.177) | (0.184) | (0.221) |
| South West | 0.260 | 0.217 | −0.680*** | 0.291 | 0.374 |
| | (0.208) | (0.205) | (0.211) | (0.207) | (0.250) |
| East | −0.245 | −0.239 | −0.380 | 0.048 | 0.299 |
| | (0.227) | (0.231) | (0.233) | (0.230) | (0.285) |
| Urban | 0.179 | 0.252* | −0.075 | 0.003 | −0.199 |
| | (0.147) | (0.149) | (0.148) | (0.148) | (0.184) |
| News | 0.030 | 0.371*** | −0.144** | 0.312*** | 0.122* |
| | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.070) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.496*** | 0.372*** | −0.166** | 0.137** | −0.194** |
| | (0.068) | (0.067) | (0.067) | (0.065) | (0.081) |
| Authoritarian | 0.065 | 0.205*** | −0.045 | 0.092* | 0.184*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.067) |
| Knowledge | −0.286* | −0.208 | −0.289* | 0.164 | 0.364* |
| | (0.160) | (0.160) | (0.161) | (0.160) | (0.194) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian | −0.752* | −0.764* | 0.353 | −0.441 | −0.582 |
| | (0.452) | (0.460) | (0.455) | (0.451) | (0.541) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian | −0.153 | −0.535 | 0.595 | −0.537 | −1.156** |
| | (0.444) | (0.456) | (0.451) | (0.445) | (0.552) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian | 0.034 | −0.528 | 0.127 | −0.337 | −1.347** |
| | (0.447) | (0.456) | (0.450) | (0.445) | (0.554) |
| ProfileSDSM x Albanian | −0.351 | −0.122 | 0.308 | −0.050 | 0.167 |
| | (0.283) | (0.282) | (0.284) | (0.284) | (0.360) |
| ProfileSubstantive x Albanian | −0.488* | 0.108 | 0.017 | −0.427 | 0.094 |
| | (0.261) | (0.261) | (0.263) | (0.261) | (0.328) |
| ProfileCooperation x Albanian | 0.346 | 0.250 | 0.142 | 0.117 | −0.289 |
| | (0.263) | (0.263) | (0.265) | (0.263) | (0.331) |
| Constant | | | | | −0.433 |
| | | | | | (0.701) |
| Observations | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 |
| *Note:* | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.5: Full Results with Interaction Mechanisms

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Benefit You | Benefit Financial | Represent Satisfied | Minister Personal |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.049 | 0.453 | 0.373 | 0.625 |
| | (0.334) | (0.337) | (0.340) | (0.404) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.006 | 0.427 | 0.207 | 0.826** |
| | (0.327) | (0.333) | (0.336) | (0.415) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.371 | 0.034 | −0.536 | 0.752* |
| | (0.332) | (0.334) | (0.336) | (0.402) |
| Albanian | −0.132 | 0.656 | 0.023 | 0.494 |
| | (0.426) | (0.427) | (0.428) | (0.542) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.205 | −0.264 | −0.275 | −0.138 |
| | (0.211) | (0.208) | (0.211) | (0.276) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.159 | 0.291 | −0.222 | 0.282 |
| | (0.194) | (0.193) | (0.196) | (0.250) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.299 | 0.359* | 0.422** | −0.591** |
| | (0.195) | (0.194) | (0.196) | (0.252) |
| Female | 0.173 | 0.167 | 0.064 | −0.163 |
| | (0.137) | (0.136) | (0.135) | (0.177) |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.0004 | 0.001 |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| Married | 0.497*** | 0.264* | 0.265* | −0.297 |
| | (0.151) | (0.148) | (0.145) | (0.191) |
| Education | −0.027 | −0.098 | −0.105 | 0.183* |
| | (0.074) | (0.073) | (0.071) | (0.095) |
| Household Size | 0.041 | 0.070** | 0.021 | −0.063 |
| | (0.038) | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.042) |
| North West | 0.110 | 0.552*** | 0.127 | −0.055 |
| | (0.182) | (0.182) | (0.177) | (0.232) |
| South West | 0.726*** | 0.523** | 1.237*** | 0.016 |
| | (0.215) | (0.214) | (0.216) | (0.265) |
| East | −0.126 | 0.295 | 0.237 | 0.013 |
| | (0.231) | (0.229) | (0.231) | (0.299) |
| Urban | 0.159 | 0.633*** | 0.509*** | −0.409** |
| | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.150) | (0.196) |
| News | −0.130** | −0.076 | −0.070 | 0.157** |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.076) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.711*** | 0.764*** | 0.589*** | −0.439*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.070) | (0.084) |
| Authoritarian | −0.070 | −0.015 | −0.044 | −0.021 |
| | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.070) |
| Knowledge | −0.143 | −0.264 | −0.100 | 0.172 |
| | (0.163) | (0.161) | (0.158) | (0.207) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian | 0.016 | −0.627 | −0.727 | −1.140* |
| | (0.462) | (0.461) | (0.465) | (0.591) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian | 0.176 | −0.385 | −0.293 | −1.560*** |
| | (0.453) | (0.454) | (0.458) | (0.594) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian | 0.750 | −0.007 | 0.750 | −1.794*** |
| | (0.459) | (0.455) | (0.459) | (0.585) |
| ProfileSDSM x Albanian | 0.410 | 0.345 | 0.364 | 0.641* |
| | (0.292) | (0.290) | (0.286) | (0.378) |
| ProfileSubstantive x Albanian | −0.210 | −0.068 | 0.155 | 0.113 |
| | (0.269) | (0.267) | (0.266) | (0.346) |
| ProfileCooperation x Albanian | −0.062 | −0.328 | −0.245 | 0.660* |
| | (0.271) | (0.270) | (0.267) | (0.350) |
| Constant | | | | 1.166 |
| | | | | (0.732) |
| Observations | 781 | 781 | 781 | 781 |
| *Note:* | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.6 subsets to only Macedonians and interacts the cabinet profile attributes with nationalist party membership. I asked a post-treatment question about political party support to isolate Macedonian nationalists (*Nationalist Party*). This question must be asked post-treatment in order to avoid priming respondents on their ethnic identity (Klar, Leeper and Robison, 2020). Ethnic Macedonian nationalist parties support the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state, and their party platforms are strongly opposed to increased Albanian representation. Therefore, we can think of nationalist party membership splitting ethnic Macedonians into two groups: nationalist party members, who are opposed to increased Albanian representation, and non-nationalist party members, who may be ambivalent or potentially sympathetic to increased Albanian representation.

As is shown in the Table, nationalist party members do not differentially react to the cabinet vignette. That is, there are few significant interactions between the different attributes and levels of the cabinet vignette and nationalist party membership. One interesting result is that nationalist party members are more likely to believe that the cabinet operates as *One Group* (in line with their nationalist attitudes valuing unity). The interaction between nationalist party membership and the substantive representation attribute is negative, implying that nationalist party members start to question the unity of the cabinet when it provides substantive representation to Albanians. In general, however, nationalist party membership does not appear to systematically change how Macedonians react to the cabinet vignette.

Table OA.6.6: Macedonians Only Interaction with Nationalist Party Choice

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | Equality | Neighbor | Talk Outgroup | One Group | Cabinet Represent | Cabinet Trust | Cabinet Model |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.579 | 0.464 | −0.687 | 1.079 | −0.282 | 0.516 | 0.059 | −0.060 |
| | (0.609) | (0.644) | (0.637) | (0.670) | (0.855) | (0.644) | (0.647) | (0.638) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.009 | −0.144 | −1.161* | 0.788 | 1.117 | 0.737 | 0.751 | 1.396** |
| | (0.596) | (0.630) | (0.670) | (0.668) | (0.968) | (0.672) | (0.687) | (0.692) |
| Profile Number 10 | −0.042 | 0.251 | −0.746 | 1.127* | 1.020 | 0.112 | −0.088 | 1.159* |
| | (0.564) | (0.596) | (0.600) | (0.623) | (0.868) | (0.604) | (0.608) | (0.621) |
| Nationalist Party | −1.901** | −1.106 | −0.598 | −0.668 | 1.840* | −0.906 | −1.078 | −0.579 |
| | (0.834) | (0.817) | (0.788) | (0.803) | (1.106) | (0.800) | (0.818) | (0.782) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.138 | 0.026 | 0.119 | −0.581 | 0.685 | −0.785* | −0.653 | −0.065 |
| | (0.417) | (0.431) | (0.458) | (0.447) | (0.696) | (0.458) | (0.455) | (0.443) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.451 | 0.418 | 0.269 | −0.242 | 1.220* | 0.548 | 0.408 | −0.001 |
| | (0.383) | (0.401) | (0.400) | (0.402) | (0.629) | (0.413) | (0.409) | (0.411) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.029 | 0.079 | −0.037 | 0.129 | 0.255 | −0.019 | 0.228 | 0.172 |
| | (0.370) | (0.382) | (0.391) | (0.389) | (0.585) | (0.396) | (0.398) | (0.402) |
| Female | 0.363 | 0.628** | −0.180 | 0.769*** | 0.230 | 0.567** | 0.260 | 0.276 |
| | (0.278) | (0.280) | (0.274) | (0.281) | (0.402) | (0.279) | (0.279) | (0.280) |
| Age | −0.011 | −0.007 | 0.001 | −0.003 | 0.003 | 0.001 | −0.003 | −0.013 |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Married | −0.435 | −0.171 | −0.804** | −0.373 | −0.779 | 0.337 | 0.564 | −0.101 |
| | (0.366) | (0.364) | (0.372) | (0.360) | (0.574) | (0.371) | (0.373) | (0.364) |
| Education | −0.083 | 0.293* | −0.090 | 0.178 | 0.352 | 0.327** | 0.382** | 0.144 |
| | (0.151) | (0.152) | (0.152) | (0.157) | (0.232) | (0.153) | (0.152) | (0.150) |
| Household Size | 0.037 | −0.148 | −0.102 | −0.055 | 0.149 | −0.072 | −0.014 | 0.005 |
| | (0.097) | (0.100) | (0.102) | (0.102) | (0.139) | (0.099) | (0.102) | (0.104) |
| North West | 0.497 | 0.305 | −0.265 | −0.619 | −0.976 | −0.337 | −0.267 | 0.336 |
| | (0.452) | (0.462) | (0.491) | (0.457) | (0.702) | (0.498) | (0.490) | (0.484) |
| South West | 0.628 | 0.776** | −0.365 | 0.059 | −0.204 | 1.581*** | 1.789*** | 1.831*** |
| | (0.389) | (0.391) | (0.396) | (0.381) | (0.625) | (0.412) | (0.412) | (0.412) |
| East | 0.137 | 0.331 | −0.078 | 0.289 | −0.765 | −0.074 | 0.113 | 0.211 |
| | (0.362) | (0.376) | (0.368) | (0.369) | (0.582) | (0.375) | (0.373) | (0.372) |
| Urban | −0.010 | 0.354 | 0.279 | 0.348 | 0.613 | −0.114 | 0.008 | 0.095 |
| | (0.308) | (0.308) | (0.308) | (0.303) | (0.415) | (0.322) | (0.318) | (0.311) |
| News | −0.019 | 0.397*** | −0.074 | 0.241** | −0.090 | 0.196* | 0.168 | 0.251** |
| | (0.106) | (0.110) | (0.105) | (0.106) | (0.154) | (0.110) | (0.111) | (0.111) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.326** | 0.400*** | −0.174 | 0.192 | −0.293 | 0.594*** | 0.642*** | 0.542*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.142) | (0.134) | (0.132) | (0.192) | (0.142) | (0.143) | (0.140) |
| Authoritarian | 0.244** | 0.208* | −0.055 | 0.019 | 0.099 | −0.088 | 0.038 | 0.036 |
| | (0.104) | (0.108) | (0.102) | (0.099) | (0.150) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.102) |
| Knowledge | 0.054 | −0.614 | 0.189 | 0.011 | 0.962 | −0.810* | −0.285 | −0.566 |
| | (0.451) | (0.467) | (0.445) | (0.452) | (0.627) | (0.454) | (0.447) | (0.454) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x Nationalist Party | 2.012** | 0.732 | 0.910 | −0.855 | −0.417 | 0.445 | 0.616 | 0.435 |
| | (0.964) | (0.938) | (0.921) | (0.936) | (1.253) | (0.932) | (0.942) | (0.912) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x Nationalist Party | 0.915 | 1.074 | 1.426 | −0.313 | −1.563 | −0.190 | −0.212 | −1.089 |
| | (0.968) | (0.950) | (0.961) | (0.946) | (1.367) | (0.970) | (0.989) | (0.961) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x Nationalist Party | 1.007 | 0.629 | 1.233 | −1.416 | −1.416 | 0.126 | 0.465 | −0.636 |
| | (0.941) | (0.921) | (0.888) | (0.906) | (1.265) | (0.904) | (0.925) | (0.897) |
| Profile SDSM x Nationalist Party | 0.009 | −0.128 | −0.209 | 0.469 | −0.659 | 0.216 | 0.417 | −0.007 |
| | (0.584) | (0.586) | (0.593) | (0.586) | (0.891) | (0.604) | (0.604) | (0.588) |
| ProfileSubstantive x Nationalist Party | −0.692 | −0.654 | 0.182 | 0.555 | −2.040** | −0.891 | −0.115 | 0.084 |
| | (0.542) | (0.548) | (0.545) | (0.540) | (0.832) | (0.556) | (0.554) | (0.552) |
| ProfileCooperation x Nationalist Party | −0.191 | −0.148 | 0.159 | 0.141 | 0.195 | −0.274 | −0.786 | −0.108 |
| | (0.538) | (0.540) | (0.545) | (0.534) | (0.793) | (0.549) | (0.557) | (0.547) |
| Constant | | | | | −1.556 | | | |
| | | | | | (1.826) | | | |
| Observations | 204 | 204 | 204 | 204 | 204 | 204 | 204 | 204 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

All models subset to Macedonians with interaction for nationalist party supporters (Levica or VMRO-DPMNE). Ordered logistic and logistic regression models.

We naturally want to make sure that respondents were fully exposed to the cabinet vignette treatment. Fortunately, the in-person nature of this study makes ensuring that the treatment is received relatively straightforward. Survey enumerators used computers or tablets to record survey responses. When respondents were exposed to the cabinet vignette, they were asked to read the vignette from the computer or tablet. Enumerators were specifically trained to ask respondents to read the text carefully. Enumerators told respondents that they would be asked to remember what they read and to use it in following questions. Enumerators provided sufficient time so that the respondent could fully read the vignette and were able to monitor whether the respondent was attentive, due to the in-person nature of the interview.

Post-treatment, the survey asked respondents several questions about the ministry that they identified as most important to them. These questions cover respondents' preferences for descriptive and substantive representation in the ministry.

- Hiring: "The ministry should invest heavily in hiring more employees from my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Employee: "The ethnicity of the minister and those who work for the ministry matters a great deal to me." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Financial: "The ministry should devote more financial resources to develop pro- grams designed to help my family and my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Concerns: "The ministry's ability to respond to the concerns of and provide solutions to challenges my ethnic group faces matters a great deal to me." (1- strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

We should expect that respondents' views regarding descriptive and substantive representation are colored by the cabinet vignette to which they are exposed. That is, we can conclude that respondents were fully exposed to the treatment if their preferences for descriptive and substantive representation change based on the cabinet vignette. Table OA.6.7 shows these regression results and supports this argument.

From the Table, we can see that attributes of the cabinet vignette did significantly influence responses to these questions about descriptive and substantive representation in the ways we would expect. When Macedonians were exposed to the substantive representation treatment, they cared less about the ethnicity of ministry employees. This makes sense because the cabinet subsumes the bureaucracy's ability to provide substantive representation in the substantive representation treatment.

Similarly, when Albanian descriptive representation increased, Albanians cared less about ethnic representation in hiring, devoting more financial resources to help their ethnic group, and the ministry's ability to respond to their concerns. With more co-ethnic ministers, Albanians can seek these resources directly from co-ethnic ministers. When Albanians are exposed to the substantive representation attribute, they care more about the demographics of ministry employees, likely because those employees are responsible for implementing substantive representation. Finally, when there was an Albanian minister from the SDSM,

Table OA.6.7: Preferences About Descriptive and Substantive Representation

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hiring | | Employee | | Financial | | Concerns | |
| | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB | MAC | ALB |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.077 | −0.438** | −0.0002 | −0.024 | 0.206 | −0.488** | 0.136 | −0.343* |
| | (0.227) | (0.178) | (0.242) | (0.199) | (0.217) | (0.199) | (0.202) | (0.185) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.083 | −0.397** | 0.060 | −0.247 | 0.205 | −0.357* | 0.015 | −0.373** |
| | (0.221) | (0.184) | (0.236) | (0.202) | (0.215) | (0.191) | (0.205) | (0.187) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.011 | −0.485*** | 0.102 | −0.132 | 0.222 | −0.578*** | 0.012 | −0.333* |
| | (0.225) | (0.188) | (0.235) | (0.202) | (0.220) | (0.198) | (0.203) | (0.189) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.040 | 0.064 | 0.211 | −0.050 | 0.099 | 0.035 | 0.032 | 0.013 |
| | (0.124) | (0.107) | (0.133) | (0.112) | (0.117) | (0.113) | (0.113) | (0.107) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.037 | 0.060 | −0.067 | 0.090 | −0.165 | 0.251** | 0.045 | 0.042 |
| | (0.133) | (0.113) | (0.138) | (0.121) | (0.119) | (0.120) | (0.119) | (0.113) |
| ProfileSubstantive | −0.110 | 0.016 | −0.361*** | 0.206* | 0.020 | 0.147 | −0.076 | 0.053 |
| | (0.124) | (0.107) | (0.130) | (0.112) | (0.114) | (0.112) | (0.111) | (0.107) |
| Female | 0.139 | 0.105 | 0.119 | 0.019 | 0.173 | 0.140 | 0.137 | 0.152 |
| | (0.129) | (0.110) | (0.131) | (0.114) | (0.120) | (0.115) | (0.119) | (0.109) |
| Age | −0.005 | −0.001 | −0.007 | 0.003 | −0.001 | 0.002 | 0.003 | −0.0002 |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Married | −0.090 | −0.067 | 0.023 | 0.054 | −0.106 | 0.023 | 0.048 | −0.041 |
| | (0.170) | (0.131) | (0.175) | (0.144) | (0.165) | (0.130) | (0.161) | (0.134) |
| Education | −0.029 | 0.021 | −0.025 | 0.011 | 0.080 | 0.043 | 0.029 | 0.059 |
| | (0.069) | (0.056) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.061) | (0.055) |
| Household Size | −0.047 | 0.015 | −0.140*** | 0.042** | −0.081* | 0.021 | −0.064 | 0.021 |
| | (0.048) | (0.027) | (0.051) | (0.018) | (0.048) | (0.028) | (0.041) | (0.026) |
| North West | 0.850*** | 0.074 | 0.600*** | 0.021 | 0.496*** | 0.174 | 0.430** | −0.018 |
| | (0.182) | (0.122) | (0.225) | (0.134) | (0.175) | (0.147) | (0.169) | (0.120) |
| South West | 0.182 | −0.110*** | 0.204 | −0.046 | 0.012 | −0.127*** | −0.013 | −0.108*** |
| | (0.166) | (0.023) | (0.177) | (0.029) | (0.157) | (0.025) | (0.155) | (0.023) |
| East | −0.134 | | −0.272 | | 0.210 | | 0.194 | |
| | (0.177) | | (0.177) | | (0.164) | | (0.157) | |
| Urban | −0.376*** | −0.243** | −0.364** | −0.269** | −0.423*** | −0.117 | −0.290** | −0.124 |
| | (0.131) | (0.122) | (0.151) | (0.131) | (0.120) | (0.136) | (0.122) | (0.119) |
| News | 0.063 | 0.319*** | −0.001 | 0.315*** | 0.083* | 0.206*** | 0.053 | 0.177*** |
| | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.058) | (0.048) | (0.053) | (0.048) | (0.052) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.115** | −0.158*** | 0.182*** | −0.094 | 0.044 | −0.064 | 0.072 | −0.076 |
| | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.064) | (0.065) | (0.054) | (0.060) | (0.052) | (0.058) |
| Authoritarian | −0.081 | −0.023 | −0.127** | −0.003 | −0.050 | 0.026 | −0.008 | 0.010 |
| | (0.050) | (0.047) | (0.051) | (0.056) | (0.045) | (0.055) | (0.045) | (0.050) |
| Knowledge | 0.069 | 0.099 | 0.022 | −0.021 | 0.289* | 0.185 | 0.052 | 0.057 |
| | (0.158) | (0.120) | (0.174) | (0.127) | (0.167) | (0.128) | (0.156) | (0.123) |
| Constant | 3.990*** | 3.956*** | 4.220*** | 2.352*** | 3.347*** | 3.452*** | 3.591*** | 3.817*** |
| | (0.533) | (0.471) | (0.551) | (0.529) | (0.534) | (0.478) | (0.471) | (0.469) |
| Observations | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 | 391 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Albanians cared more about the ministry devoting financial resources to their group. This finding fits with Albanian skepticism of the SDSM and its positioning as a multi-ethnic party. Given this evidence and the intentionality with which the vignette was administered, we can be assured that respondents were fully exposed to the vignette.

# OA.7: Interaction Models

I present models interacting features of the cabinet vignette on key dependent variables.

Table OA.7.1: Interaction with Trust

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Trust | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.153 | 0.543 | 0.199 | −0.209 | −1.057** | −0.516 |
| | (0.430) | (0.427) | (0.317) | (0.454) | (0.469) | (0.332) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.393 | 0.328 | −0.055 | 0.236 | −0.791* | −0.148 |
| | (0.424) | (0.421) | (0.312) | (0.453) | (0.470) | (0.329) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.179 | 0.217 | −0.108 | 0.305 | −0.541 | −0.111 |
| | (0.423) | (0.419) | (0.312) | (0.450) | (0.464) | (0.329) |
| ProfileSubstantive | −0.269 | 0.157 | −0.028 | 0.443 | −0.203 | −0.314 |
| | (0.496) | (0.183) | (0.262) | (0.514) | (0.192) | (0.273) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.196 | 0.193 | 0.192 | −0.156 | −0.149 | −0.153 |
| | (0.199) | (0.199) | (0.199) | (0.207) | (0.207) | (0.207) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.096 | 0.549 | −0.299 | 0.180 | −0.676 | 0.063 |
| | (0.185) | (0.486) | (0.259) | (0.195) | (0.513) | (0.274) |
| Female | 0.310 | 0.294 | 0.304 | −0.238 | −0.231 | −0.233 |
| | (0.192) | (0.190) | (0.191) | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.199) |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.012 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.310 | −0.307 | −0.326 | 0.423* | 0.438* | 0.404* |
| | (0.248) | (0.248) | (0.248) | (0.245) | (0.244) | (0.245) |
| Education | 0.070 | 0.068 | 0.064 | 0.047 | 0.042 | 0.058 |
| | (0.101) | (0.102) | (0.101) | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.108) |
| Household Size | −0.023 | −0.026 | −0.025 | 0.035 | 0.033 | 0.032 |
| | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.041) |
| North West | 0.036 | 0.037 | 0.009 | 0.279 | 0.296 | 0.282 |
| | (0.315) | (0.316) | (0.316) | (0.231) | (0.230) | (0.229) |
| South West | 0.256 | 0.238 | 0.245 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| | (0.254) | (0.255) | (0.254) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| East | −0.258 | −0.249 | −0.251 | | | |
| | (0.244) | (0.244) | (0.244) | | | |
| Urban | 0.001 | 0.009 | −0.006 | 0.348 | 0.367* | 0.361* |
| | (0.212) | (0.210) | (0.210) | (0.218) | (0.218) | (0.218) |
| News | −0.017 | −0.017 | −0.015 | 0.226** | 0.224** | 0.227** |
| | (0.074) | (0.074) | (0.074) | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.094) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.372*** | 0.384*** | 0.373*** | 0.580*** | 0.597*** | 0.584*** |
| | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.110) | (0.110) | (0.110) |
| Authoritarian | 0.166** | 0.170** | 0.167** | −0.206** | −0.207** | −0.203** |
| | (0.070) | (0.070) | (0.070) | (0.092) | (0.092) | (0.092) |
| Knowledge | 0.045 | −0.020 | 0.033 | −0.498** | −0.550** | −0.549** |
| | (0.257) | (0.259) | (0.257) | (0.221) | (0.220) | (0.219) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.704 | | | −0.631 | | |
| | (0.606) | | | (0.625) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.679 | | | −0.767 | | |
| | (0.598) | | | (0.632) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.148 | | | −0.856 | | |
| | (0.604) | | | (0.629) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.767 | | | 1.002 | |
| | | (0.603) | | | (0.628) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.835 | | | 1.201* | |
| | | (0.598) | | | (0.626) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.724 | | | 0.771 | |
| | | (0.591) | | | (0.624) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | 0.385 | | | 0.220 |
| | | | (0.374) | | | (0.383) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.2: Interaction with Equality

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Equality | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.618 | 0.463 | 0.465 | 0.029 | −0.687 | −0.201 |
| | (0.443) | (0.449) | (0.325) | (0.471) | (0.459) | (0.334) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.251 | 0.614 | 0.212 | −0.251 | −0.391 | −0.224 |
| | (0.443) | (0.456) | (0.323) | (0.471) | (0.458) | (0.334) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.320 | 0.429 | 0.144 | −0.248 | −1.059** | −0.314 |
| | (0.439) | (0.448) | (0.320) | (0.468) | (0.457) | (0.334) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.088 | −0.121 | 0.097 | 0.158 | −0.001 | −0.097 |
| | (0.517) | (0.185) | (0.269) | (0.530) | (0.191) | (0.272) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.022 | 0.018 | 0.020 | −0.113 | −0.110 | −0.103 |
| | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.205) | (0.205) | (0.205) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.043 | 0.319 | 0.161 | 0.251 | −0.583 | 0.146 |
| | (0.186) | (0.506) | (0.262) | (0.193) | (0.524) | (0.272) |
| Female | 0.458** | 0.477** | 0.444** | 0.269 | 0.202 | 0.247 |
| | (0.192) | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.198) | (0.199) | (0.198) |
| Age | −0.007 | −0.006 | −0.007 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.044 | −0.054 | −0.071 | 0.289 | 0.293 | 0.269 |
| | (0.252) | (0.252) | (0.251) | (0.248) | (0.246) | (0.248) |
| Education | 0.228** | 0.239** | 0.219** | 0.144 | 0.133 | 0.140 |
| | (0.101) | (0.101) | (0.100) | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.103) |
| Household Size | −0.040 | −0.034 | −0.033 | −0.010 | −0.013 | −0.013 |
| | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| North West | 0.026 | 0.016 | 0.027 | −0.228 | −0.238 | −0.257 |
| | (0.321) | (0.322) | (0.321) | (0.226) | (0.227) | (0.225) |
| South West | 0.556** | 0.545** | 0.564** | 0.098** | 0.106** | 0.100** |
| | (0.253) | (0.255) | (0.253) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.049) |
| East | 0.018 | 0.028 | 0.018 | | | |
| | (0.247) | (0.249) | (0.248) | | | |
| Urban | 0.158 | 0.162 | 0.152 | 0.345 | 0.342 | 0.345 |
| | (0.214) | (0.214) | (0.213) | (0.218) | (0.218) | (0.218) |
| News | 0.303*** | 0.306*** | 0.304*** | 0.455*** | 0.448*** | 0.452*** |
| | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.095) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.433*** | 0.433*** | 0.436*** | 0.305*** | 0.316*** | 0.302*** |
| | (0.092) | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.107) | (0.107) | (0.107) |
| Authoritarian | 0.154** | 0.163** | 0.147** | 0.297*** | 0.303*** | 0.293*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.093) |
| Knowledge | −0.258 | −0.295 | −0.279 | −0.244 | −0.213 | −0.237 |
| | (0.262) | (0.262) | (0.261) | (0.216) | (0.215) | (0.213) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.302 | | | −0.444 | | |
| | (0.621) | | | (0.631) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.062 | | | 0.065 | | |
| | (0.621) | | | (0.637) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.351 | | | −0.116 | | |
| | (0.621) | | | (0.641) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.039 | | | 0.993 | |
| | | (0.619) | | | (0.633) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.740 | | | 0.388 | |
| | | (0.620) | | | (0.630) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.543 | | | 1.518** | |
| | | (0.610) | | | (0.633) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.415 | | | 0.214 |
| | | | (0.375) | | | (0.380) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

# Table OA.7.3: Interaction with Neighbor

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Neighbor | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.218 | −0.302 | −0.316 | −0.237 | −0.102 | −0.121 |
| | (0.439) | (0.431) | (0.317) | (0.468) | (0.483) | (0.339) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | −0.549 | −0.609 | −0.522 | −0.713 | 0.027 | −0.074 |
| | (0.449) | (0.434) | (0.320) | (0.461) | (0.475) | (0.332) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.003 | −0.232 | −0.108 | −0.808* | 0.120 | −0.112 |
| | (0.437) | (0.425) | (0.314) | (0.459) | (0.476) | (0.332) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.295 | 0.181 | −0.068 | −0.608 | 0.246 | 0.295 |
| | (0.496) | (0.185) | (0.261) | (0.528) | (0.193) | (0.275) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.244 | −0.247 | −0.247 | 0.119 | 0.132 | 0.121 |
| | (0.201) | (0.201) | (0.200) | (0.209) | (0.210) | (0.209) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.019 | −0.131 | −0.273 | 0.029 | 0.220 | 0.080 |
| | (0.187) | (0.487) | (0.266) | (0.196) | (0.532) | (0.277) |
| Female | −0.045 | −0.037 | −0.015 | −0.203 | −0.239 | −0.240 |
| | (0.192) | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.203) | (0.203) | (0.202) |
| Age | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.001 | −0.0004 | −0.0005 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.090 | −0.103 | −0.101 | −0.284 | −0.301 | −0.287 |
| | (0.258) | (0.257) | (0.257) | (0.246) | (0.245) | (0.246) |
| Education | 0.077 | 0.075 | 0.086 | 0.083 | 0.052 | 0.053 |
| | (0.105) | (0.105) | (0.105) | (0.110) | (0.109) | (0.109) |
| Household Size | −0.013 | −0.010 | −0.010 | 0.026 | 0.030 | 0.028 |
| | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| North West | −0.298 | −0.293 | −0.321 | 0.212 | 0.180 | 0.165 |
| | (0.329) | (0.331) | (0.330) | (0.235) | (0.234) | (0.232) |
| South West | −0.375 | −0.372 | −0.390 | 0.218*** | 0.216*** | 0.217*** |
| | (0.254) | (0.254) | (0.254) | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.053) |
| East | −0.355 | −0.348 | −0.363 | | | |
| | (0.247) | (0.248) | (0.247) | | | |
| Urban | 0.246 | 0.239 | 0.225 | −0.471** | −0.484** | −0.486** |
| | (0.216) | (0.216) | (0.216) | (0.220) | (0.218) | (0.218) |
| News | −0.066 | −0.066 | −0.067 | −0.277*** | −0.274*** | −0.278*** |
| | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.097) | (0.097) |
| Equal Opportunity | −0.250*** | −0.252*** | −0.259*** | −0.031 | −0.046 | −0.046 |
| | (0.092) | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.109) | (0.108) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian | −0.038 | −0.040 | −0.031 | 0.062 | 0.038 | 0.044 |
| | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.095) | (0.094) | (0.094) |
| Knowledge | 0.268 | 0.262 | 0.270 | −1.021*** | −0.943*** | −0.923*** |
| | (0.266) | (0.264) | (0.264) | (0.225) | (0.222) | (0.221) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.199 | | | 0.268 | | |
| | (0.600) | | | (0.636) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.051 | | | 1.255** | | |
| | (0.610) | | | (0.639) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.232 | | | 1.430** | | |
| | (0.606) | | | (0.645) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.025 | | | −0.018 | |
| | | (0.597) | | | (0.646) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.178 | | | −0.195 | |
| | | (0.607) | | | (0.634) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.247 | | | −0.445 | |
| | | (0.594) | | | (0.639) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | 0.506 | | | −0.095 |
| | | | (0.373) | | | (0.385) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.4: Interaction with Talk Outgroup

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Talk Outgroup | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.549 | 0.491 | 0.584* | 0.320 | −0.438 | 0.210 |
| | (0.438) | (0.436) | (0.315) | (0.467) | (0.455) | (0.333) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.660 | 0.332 | 0.522* | 0.887* | −0.533 | 0.129 |
| | (0.441) | (0.440) | (0.313) | (0.470) | (0.451) | (0.330) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.126 | 0.423 | 0.323 | 0.402 | −0.474 | −0.016 |
| | (0.440) | (0.432) | (0.311) | (0.464) | (0.453) | (0.327) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.184 | 0.233 | 0.359 | 0.553 | −0.167 | −0.128 |
| | (0.491) | (0.184) | (0.261) | (0.518) | (0.194) | (0.274) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.168 | −0.171 | −0.168 | −0.306 | −0.305 | −0.314 |
| | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.211) | (0.211) | (0.211) |
| ProfileCooperation | −0.152 | −0.244 | −0.030 | −0.015 | −1.073** | −0.012 |
| | (0.185) | (0.481) | (0.262) | (0.196) | (0.515) | (0.277) |
| Female | 0.318* | 0.309 | 0.313 | 0.660*** | 0.686*** | 0.678*** |
| | (0.193) | (0.192) | (0.192) | (0.207) | (0.207) | (0.206) |
| Age | 0.0002 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | −0.006 | −0.006 | −0.006 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.362 | −0.335 | −0.335 | 0.328 | 0.333 | 0.311 |
| | (0.254) | (0.254) | (0.254) | (0.243) | (0.242) | (0.241) |
| Education | 0.159 | 0.162 | 0.161 | 0.034 | 0.026 | 0.052 |
| | (0.104) | (0.105) | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.105) | (0.105) |
| Household Size | 0.042 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 0.048 | 0.053 | 0.049 |
| | (0.074) | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.045) |
| North West | −0.648** | −0.672** | −0.640** | −1.519*** | −1.414*** | −1.421*** |
| | (0.319) | (0.318) | (0.319) | (0.252) | (0.249) | (0.248) |
| South West | 0.062 | 0.074 | 0.067 | −0.091* | −0.101** | −0.101** |
| | (0.254) | (0.253) | (0.254) | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| East | 0.063 | 0.049 | 0.059 | | | |
| | (0.248) | (0.249) | (0.248) | | | |
| Urban | −0.048 | −0.039 | −0.036 | 0.122 | 0.170 | 0.139 |
| | (0.211) | (0.212) | (0.211) | (0.224) | (0.223) | (0.223) |
| News | 0.205*** | 0.203*** | 0.201*** | 0.464*** | 0.455*** | 0.457*** |
| | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.097) | (0.097) | (0.097) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.243*** | 0.241*** | 0.246*** | −0.036 | −0.007 | −0.022 |
| | (0.090) | (0.088) | (0.089) | (0.106) | (0.106) | (0.105) |
| Authoritarian | 0.046 | 0.044 | 0.043 | 0.087 | 0.106 | 0.109 |
| | (0.069) | (0.069) | (0.069) | (0.092) | (0.092) | (0.091) |
| Knowledge | 0.015 | 0.044 | 0.038 | 0.400* | 0.326 | 0.329 |
| | (0.256) | (0.255) | (0.255) | (0.222) | (0.221) | (0.219) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.075 | | | −0.190 | | |
| | (0.595) | | | (0.629) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.301 | | | −1.455** | | |
| | (0.605) | | | (0.634) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.371 | | | −0.837 | | |
| | (0.599) | | | (0.632) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.181 | | | 1.322** | |
| | | (0.593) | | | (0.634) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.363 | | | 1.335** | |
| | | (0.597) | | | (0.627) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.220 | | | 0.926 | |
| | | (0.588) | | | (0.623) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.251 | | | −0.072 |
| | | | (0.372) | | | (0.384) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.5: Interaction with One Group

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | One Group | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | −0.477 | −0.498 | 0.003 | −0.813 | −0.829 | −0.608 |
| | (0.543) | (0.539) | (0.393) | (0.545) | (0.562) | (0.399) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.254 | 0.151 | 0.489 | −0.693 | −0.687 | −0.679* |
| | (0.572) | (0.562) | (0.408) | (0.549) | (0.559) | (0.397) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | 0.611 | 0.227 | 0.665 | −0.868 | −1.416** | −0.776* |
| | (0.581) | (0.554) | (0.406) | (0.542) | (0.562) | (0.397) |
| ProfileSubstantive | −0.390 | 0.061 | 0.373 | 0.030 | 0.213 | 0.094 |
| | (0.608) | (0.248) | (0.340) | (0.634) | (0.231) | (0.324) |
| ProfileSDSM | 0.260 | 0.250 | 0.251 | 0.490** | 0.514** | 0.490** |
| | (0.274) | (0.273) | (0.273) | (0.248) | (0.251) | (0.248) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.373 | −0.366 | 0.698** | 0.069 | −0.415 | −0.049 |
| | (0.251) | (0.598) | (0.355) | (0.233) | (0.634) | (0.323) |
| Female | 0.016 | −0.019 | −0.043 | −0.091 | −0.137 | −0.097 |
| | (0.257) | (0.256) | (0.256) | (0.242) | (0.243) | (0.240) |
| Age | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.003 | 0.0002 | 0.0002 | 0.0003 |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Married | −0.257 | −0.254 | −0.257 | 0.173 | 0.192 | 0.162 |
| | (0.342) | (0.341) | (0.340) | (0.287) | (0.288) | (0.287) |
| Education | 0.154 | 0.134 | 0.130 | 0.086 | 0.091 | 0.092 |
| | (0.138) | (0.140) | (0.139) | (0.126) | (0.127) | (0.126) |
| Household Size | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.023 | −0.065 | −0.067 | −0.065 |
| | (0.094) | (0.093) | (0.094) | (0.051) | (0.052) | (0.051) |
| North West | −0.304 | −0.303 | −0.290 | 1.515*** | 1.569*** | 1.534*** |
| | (0.430) | (0.431) | (0.431) | (0.278) | (0.282) | (0.276) |
| South West | −0.414 | −0.400 | −0.389 | −0.134** | −0.137** | −0.137*** |
| | (0.344) | (0.345) | (0.344) | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.053) |
| East | −0.226 | −0.218 | −0.206 | | | |
| | (0.341) | (0.341) | (0.341) | | | |
| Urban | −0.159 | −0.171 | −0.144 | −0.224 | −0.225 | −0.209 |
| | (0.281) | (0.282) | (0.281) | (0.257) | (0.259) | (0.258) |
| News | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.025 | 0.225** | 0.215* | 0.224** |
| | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.110) | (0.112) | (0.110) |
| Equal Opportunity | −0.197* | −0.198* | −0.184 | −0.144 | −0.138 | −0.144 |
| | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.123) | (0.124) | (0.123) |
| Authoritarian | 0.095 | 0.092 | 0.085 | 0.255** | 0.265** | 0.255** |
| | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.106) | (0.107) | (0.106) |
| Knowledge | 0.941*** | 0.947*** | 0.899*** | 0.182 | 0.211 | 0.178 |
| | (0.326) | (0.326) | (0.325) | (0.261) | (0.261) | (0.258) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.974 | | | 0.429 | | |
| | (0.745) | | | (0.764) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.443 | | | 0.037 | | |
| | (0.778) | | | (0.762) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.101 | | | 0.188 | | |
| | (0.786) | | | (0.764) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | 1.037 | | | 0.427 | |
| | | (0.742) | | | (0.773) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.685 | | | 0.011 | |
| | | (0.781) | | | (0.758) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.903 | | | 1.258* | |
| | | (0.776) | | | (0.764) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.670 | | | 0.246 |
| | | | (0.500) | | | (0.459) |
| Constant | −0.035 | 0.208 | −0.252 | −0.135 | −0.014 | −0.181 |
| | (1.037) | (1.059) | (1.007) | (1.086) | (1.073) | (1.042) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.6: Interaction with Cabinet Represent

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Represent | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.524 | 0.435 | 0.206 | −0.506 | −1.005** | −0.581* |
| | (0.447) | (0.454) | (0.324) | (0.463) | (0.461) | (0.333) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.053 | 0.115 | −0.270 | −0.149 | −0.923** | −0.472 |
| | (0.441) | (0.452) | (0.324) | (0.463) | (0.460) | (0.331) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.460 | 0.013 | −0.444 | 0.095 | −1.033** | −0.625* |
| | (0.436) | (0.443) | (0.318) | (0.457) | (0.460) | (0.330) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.434 | 0.098 | 0.348 | 0.625 | −0.013 | −0.086 |
| | (0.507) | (0.188) | (0.268) | (0.521) | (0.192) | (0.272) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.348* | −0.329 | −0.341* | 0.335 | 0.346* | 0.347* |
| | (0.204) | (0.204) | (0.204) | (0.208) | (0.209) | (0.208) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.139 | 0.733 | 0.385 | 0.293 | −0.448 | 0.199 |
| | (0.190) | (0.502) | (0.267) | (0.196) | (0.512) | (0.279) |
| Female | 0.230 | 0.233 | 0.217 | −0.264 | −0.214 | −0.213 |
| | (0.196) | (0.195) | (0.197) | (0.201) | (0.201) | (0.200) |
| Age | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 | −0.004 | −0.002 | −0.003 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.059 | −0.032 | −0.051 | 0.419* | 0.432* | 0.426* |
| | (0.254) | (0.255) | (0.254) | (0.252) | (0.251) | (0.252) |
| Education | 0.114 | 0.131 | 0.116 | −0.139 | −0.124 | −0.117 |
| | (0.104) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.107) | (0.106) | (0.106) |
| Household Size | 0.005 | −0.005 | −0.001 | −0.057 | −0.058 | −0.057 |
| | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (0.044) |
| North West | −0.424 | −0.423 | −0.398 | 0.128 | 0.175 | 0.156 |
| | (0.339) | (0.339) | (0.339) | (0.234) | (0.235) | (0.233) |
| South West | 0.908*** | 0.907*** | 0.931*** | −0.065 | −0.066 | −0.064 |
| | (0.266) | (0.266) | (0.267) | (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.047) |
| East | −0.430* | −0.428* | −0.416 | | | |
| | (0.256) | (0.256) | (0.255) | | | |
| Urban | 0.166 | 0.185 | 0.174 | 0.853*** | 0.863*** | 0.860*** |
| | (0.216) | (0.216) | (0.216) | (0.224) | (0.224) | (0.223) |
| News | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.005 | −0.123 | −0.126 | −0.128 |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.094) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.566*** | 0.565*** | 0.567*** | 0.392*** | 0.402*** | 0.392*** |
| | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.111) | (0.111) | (0.111) |
| Authoritarian | 0.017 | 0.027 | 0.011 | −0.250*** | −0.234** | −0.229** |
| | (0.072) | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.092) | (0.092) | (0.092) |
| Knowledge | −0.559** | −0.567** | −0.545** | 0.172 | 0.094 | 0.083 |
| | (0.262) | (0.261) | (0.262) | (0.219) | (0.217) | (0.216) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.610 | | | −0.167 | | |
| | (0.619) | | | (0.629) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.634 | | | −0.609 | | |
| | (0.616) | | | (0.636) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.051 | | | −1.436** | | |
| | (0.613) | | | (0.636) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.420 | | | 0.829 | |
| | | (0.615) | | | (0.628) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.733 | | | 0.885 | |
| | | (0.618) | | | (0.625) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.885 | | | 0.787 | |
| | | (0.607) | | | (0.622) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.486 | | | 0.134 |
| | | | (0.380) | | | (0.383) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.7: Interaction with Cabinet Trust

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Trust | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.407 | 0.165 | 0.021 | −0.504 | −0.919* | −0.484 |
| | (0.462) | (0.445) | (0.327) | (0.466) | (0.481) | (0.341) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.104 | 0.460 | −0.092 | 0.178 | −0.589 | −0.249 |
| | (0.460) | (0.445) | (0.327) | (0.472) | (0.479) | (0.341) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.451 | 0.276 | −0.397 | 0.044 | −0.657 | −0.219 |
| | (0.457) | (0.439) | (0.324) | (0.468) | (0.480) | (0.341) |
| ProfileSubstantive | 0.410 | 0.130 | 0.175 | 0.296 | −0.091 | −0.291 |
| | (0.522) | (0.189) | (0.266) | (0.550) | (0.191) | (0.273) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.242 | −0.231 | −0.224 | 0.405** | 0.410** | 0.419** |
| | (0.203) | (0.203) | (0.203) | (0.206) | (0.207) | (0.207) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.174 | 1.025** | 0.214 | 0.167 | −0.528 | −0.048 |
| | (0.191) | (0.520) | (0.270) | (0.196) | (0.540) | (0.274) |
| Female | 0.112 | 0.118 | 0.126 | 0.149 | 0.150 | 0.156 |
| | (0.196) | (0.195) | (0.197) | (0.200) | (0.200) | (0.199) |
| Age | −0.001 | −0.00002 | −0.0003 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | 0.216 | 0.221 | 0.217 | 0.434* | 0.420* | 0.395 |
| | (0.259) | (0.261) | (0.259) | (0.246) | (0.245) | (0.246) |
| Education | 0.046 | 0.073 | 0.057 | 0.078 | 0.084 | 0.098 |
| | (0.105) | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.105) | (0.105) |
| Household Size | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.078** | 0.078** | 0.078** |
| | (0.074) | (0.074) | (0.073) | (0.039) | (0.040) | (0.040) |
| North West | −0.186 | −0.212 | −0.178 | 0.464** | 0.534** | 0.500** |
| | (0.333) | (0.334) | (0.333) | (0.233) | (0.234) | (0.231) |
| South West | 1.121*** | 1.115*** | 1.130*** | −0.136*** | −0.140*** | −0.140*** |
| | (0.270) | (0.271) | (0.270) | (0.047) | (0.048) | (0.047) |
| East | −0.057 | −0.063 | −0.054 | | | |
| | (0.251) | (0.252) | (0.251) | | | |
| Urban | 0.301 | 0.318 | 0.296 | 0.703*** | 0.730*** | 0.728*** |
| | (0.215) | (0.216) | (0.215) | (0.222) | (0.222) | (0.221) |
| News | −0.043 | −0.046 | −0.041 | −0.130 | −0.135 | −0.129 |
| | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.093) | (0.094) | (0.093) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.654*** | 0.664*** | 0.651*** | 0.451*** | 0.467*** | 0.462*** |
| | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.110) | (0.109) | (0.110) |
| Authoritarian | 0.079 | 0.097 | 0.081 | −0.160* | −0.146 | −0.153* |
| | (0.071) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.090) |
| Knowledge | −0.156 | −0.194 | −0.136 | −0.038 | −0.083 | −0.097 |
| | (0.260) | (0.261) | (0.260) | (0.221) | (0.218) | (0.218) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.739 | | | 0.031 | | |
| | (0.630) | | | (0.645) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.359 | | | −0.825 | | |
| | (0.629) | | | (0.656) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.139 | | | −0.548 | | |
| | (0.626) | | | (0.661) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.328 | | | 0.828 | |
| | | (0.630) | | | (0.647) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | −1.160* | | | 0.661 | |
| | | (0.635) | | | (0.644) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −1.422** | | | 0.829 | |
| | | (0.627) | | | (0.646) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.069 | | | 0.390 |
| | | | (0.381) | | | (0.384) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

# Table OA.7.8: Interaction with Cabinet Model

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cabinet Model | | | | | |
| | Macedonians | | | Albanians | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 | 0.172 | −0.193 | 0.142 | −0.670 | −1.108** | −0.423 |
| | (0.448) | (0.441) | (0.324) | (0.468) | (0.467) | (0.334) |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 | 0.142 | −0.128 | 0.249 | −0.099 | −0.985** | −0.511 |
| | (0.443) | (0.443) | (0.322) | (0.467) | (0.462) | (0.332) |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 | −0.017 | 0.346 | 0.280 | 0.498 | −0.483 | 0.155 |
| | (0.440) | (0.436) | (0.318) | (0.467) | (0.463) | (0.333) |
| ProfileSubstantive | −0.176 | 0.059 | 0.124 | 0.192 | −0.106 | −0.141 |
| | (0.506) | (0.187) | (0.266) | (0.526) | (0.193) | (0.273) |
| ProfileSDSM | −0.118 | −0.119 | −0.112 | 0.510** | 0.508** | 0.499** |
| | (0.202) | (0.202) | (0.202) | (0.210) | (0.211) | (0.210) |
| ProfileCooperation | 0.148 | −0.241 | 0.207 | 0.035 | −0.973* | −0.020 |
| | (0.187) | (0.503) | (0.265) | (0.197) | (0.515) | (0.280) |
| Female | 0.202 | 0.169 | 0.187 | −0.171 | −0.152 | −0.120 |
| | (0.192) | (0.192) | (0.192) | (0.201) | (0.201) | (0.200) |
| Age | −0.0004 | −0.001 | −0.0002 | 0.0005 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Married | −0.238 | −0.246 | −0.238 | 0.671*** | 0.662*** | 0.662*** |
| | (0.259) | (0.258) | (0.258) | (0.248) | (0.246) | (0.247) |
| Education | 0.078 | 0.070 | 0.081 | −0.141 | −0.121 | −0.110 |
| | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.104) | (0.107) | (0.105) | (0.106) |
| Household Size | 0.027 | 0.029 | 0.021 | −0.039 | −0.040 | −0.037 |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.039) |
| North West | 0.142 | 0.100 | 0.152 | 0.104 | 0.223 | 0.172 |
| | (0.334) | (0.334) | (0.334) | (0.233) | (0.232) | (0.230) |
| South West | 1.157*** | 1.194*** | 1.153*** | −0.167*** | −0.173*** | −0.169*** |
| | (0.267) | (0.267) | (0.267) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| East | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.116 | | | |
| | (0.247) | (0.247) | (0.247) | | | |
| Urban | 0.067 | 0.076 | 0.074 | 0.844*** | 0.867*** | 0.857*** |
| | (0.211) | (0.212) | (0.211) | (0.223) | (0.223) | (0.223) |
| News | 0.068 | 0.072 | 0.069 | −0.135 | −0.140 | −0.126 |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.095) |
| Equal Opportunity | 0.499*** | 0.507*** | 0.503*** | 0.410*** | 0.429*** | 0.421*** |
| | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.108) | (0.108) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian | 0.132* | 0.119* | 0.132* | −0.344*** | −0.334*** | −0.335*** |
| | (0.070) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.093) |
| Knowledge | −0.413 | −0.399 | −0.407 | 0.110 | 0.060 | 0.046 |
| | (0.258) | (0.258) | (0.258) | (0.218) | (0.215) | (0.215) |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive | −0.036 | | | 0.462 | | |
| | (0.613) | | | (0.635) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.227 | | | −0.804 | | |
| | (0.613) | | | (0.640) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive | 0.612 | | | −0.686 | | |
| | (0.613) | | | (0.642) | | |
| ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.685 | | | 1.324** | |
| | | (0.614) | | | (0.634) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation | | 0.772 | | | 0.895 | |
| | | (0.620) | | | (0.624) | |
| ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation | | −0.114 | | | 1.231** | |
| | | (0.609) | | | (0.627) | |
| ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive | | | −0.129 | | | 0.073 |
| | | | (0.376) | | | (0.386) |
| Observations | 391 | 391 | 391 | 390 | 390 | 390 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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